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# USSR Report

TRANSLATIONS FROM KOMMUNIST

No. 6, April 1985

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12 July 1985

## USSR REPORT

### TRANSLATIONS FROM KOMMUNIST

No 6, April 1985

Translations from the Russian-language theoretical organ of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow (18 issues per year).

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NEW DOCUMENT BY VLADIMIR IL'ICH LENIN

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6, Apr 85 (signed to press 12 Apr 85) pp 3-8

[Text] The following is a new document by Lenin written during the initial period of upsurge of the mass worker movement in the 1890s.

As capitalism developed in Russia, the working class increased rapidly. By that time, some 3 million workers were already employed at large factories, plants, railroads and the mining industry throughout the country.

A 12-13-hour work day, low wages, a semihungry existence and horrifying housing conditions triggered the protest of the proletarian masses and raised them to the struggle against the capitalists. However, uncoordinated and spontaneous actions usually ended in worker defeats. In order to fight the capitalists successfully, the struggle had to be organized and the revolutionary ideas of scientific socialism introduced into it.

The political enlightenment and organization of the workers, the development of their socialist awareness and their comprehension of the general objectives and means of proletarian class struggle were tasks which Lenin clearly understood and which he explained to the Petersburg Marxists, after his arrival from Samara at the end of August 1893. By the time Vladimir Il'ich arrived in Petersburg, several political circles of workers had been formed in the city. By the end of 1895 they united under his leadership into an "Alliance in the Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class," which marked the beginning of a truly revolutionary social democratic party and the embryo of a party of a new type. For the first time in Russia, this "Alliance" took the path of combining socialism with the labor movement and converted from the dissemination of Marxism among a small circle of progressive workers to political agitation among the broad proletarian masses.

Lenin taught the members of the "Alliance" political work among the masses. He involved them in gathering data on the situation of the working class and gave his students written questions the answers to which required thorough study of plant and factory life. M. Sil'vin recalls that, in raising the question of the study of the working and living conditions of workers at each plant, Lenin "drafted a detailed 'questionnaire,' and that it would be interesting to find it somewhere among the police files. This questionnaire covered slightly over four quarter-sized sheets, written in his precise handwriting. Every one of us was issued such a questionnaire. We copied it and distributed it among propagandists in other circles.... One of our workers, Shelgunov or Merkulov, would go to Lenin's home and he would make them sweat from his interrogations" ("Vospominaniya o Vladimire Iliche Lenine" [Recollections of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin]. In five volumes. Vol 2, Moscow, 1984, p 47).

The specific answers to the questions provided rich data on the workers' situation in the various factories and plants and, combined, on the situation of the working class as a whole, as well as important information for drawing conclusions on the extent of readiness of the proletariat to perform its great revolutionary role.

The document which follows provides a clear idea of the specific facts of the worker's life and working and living conditions that Lenin studied. The content of the questions shows that Vladimir Il'ich was interested in a wide range of problems: number of workers, social origin, national affiliation, working conditions, length of working day, relations between factory bosses and workers, wages, fines, availability of worker courses, medical care, housing and nutrition. Lenin paid particular attention to problems of protecting the interests of the workers and to the forms of their unification and revolutionary struggle.

The original document has not been preserved and Lenin's authorship was proved through research. As Sil'vin presumed, a copy of the document was found in the archives of the police department of the Central State Archives of the October Revolution of the USSR (form 1167, list 3, file 9137, sheets 7-8) by Candidate of Historical Sciences V. Lozhkin. A handwritten copy of the document may be found also at the Central Party Archives of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism. The document is included in "Leninskiy Sbornik" [Leninist Collection], No 60.

CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism

## Questionnaire

(1984-1985)

### I. Factory and Factory Bosses

1. Name of factory or plant.
2. Address.
3. Year founded.
4. Have there been changes in factory management, production and work procedures? Have changes of administrator, director, foreman, etc., affected the workers (their situation in the factory, wages, etc.)? Give the most outstanding examples.
5. Name of owner and manager  
Number of workshops or subdivisions (shops, etc.).
6. List all of them.

### II. Factory Workers

7. Number of men and women workers, adults (approximate age), adolescents, and children of both sexes.
8. Worker nationality (how many of each). Relations among them. Attitude toward Russian foremen, etc. Is there any hostility among different nationalities? Reason. Examples. Development of other nationalities.
9. Workers' origins: rural or native. What was their initial reason for moving to the city and how long ago was that? Are there sharp differences between rural and urban workers (what are they); what is the attitude of urban workers toward them; is there any alienation or hostility between rural and city workers; do they get together; what is the behavior of the rural workers at first and subsequently?
10. How long do the workers stay at the given factory and if they change jobs, for what reason?
11. Up to what age do they hold the different jobs? Are work breaks required? Do they leave during the summer for the countryside to restore their health or, in the case of rural workers, to work in the fields? How many consecutive years could one work at a given factory? What are the hiring conditions? Is there a medical examination? Does it happen that the majority of them suffer from illnesses which they did not have previously, but which appeared subsequently, in the course of their employment?

### III. Working Conditions

12. List all separate jobs (machine operators, spinners, fitters, turners, common laborers, etc.). Number of workers by job, noting sex and age.
13. Description of the jobs. What is the nature of the job, i.e., does it require more mental or physical effort? Immobility, monotony, boredom of the job.
14. Factory premises, their size, temperature, cleanliness; indicate departments where the situation is particularly bad (dust, heat, drafts, cold, etc.). Hygiene at the premises.
15. What type of machines are there, and are they fast (have they become faster of late), are they dangerous (cog wheels, dangerous exposed drive mechanisms), are there any barriers, are there accidents in general, what type and what is their most common cause (narrow passages, fatigue, cleaning working machinery). What is the attitude of the workers toward all this--give examples.
16. Are disabled workers paid a compensation; are trials frequent and who wins; give examples of amounts paid by the factory for labor accidents and number of cases in which no compensation was paid; where do most maimed workers, who are no longer able to hold a job, go?

### IV. Wages

(Conditions for earning wages, reasons for raises or reductions, payment periods, etc.)

17. Wages by job, age, sex....
18. Comparison with wages in the past; if reduced, since when; if increased, why? Examples.
19. Piecework payments. Are there norms (a certain number of pieces to be made); if piece rate wages are paid, since when; are piece rates better than hourly rates; is there a tendency to raise the norms as a result of rivalry among workers?
20. Do some departments pay by the hour or the week, etc.; does the worker understand the advantages of the hourly or weekly wage; what is his attitude toward either--examples.
21. Do wages vary with the shop; are there cases in which workers are paid below the shop wage ("progar") and to what extent is this the fault of the factory administration; how high are shop wages compared with others and what is the workers' attitude toward them--examples.
22. Time between paydays; has there been a reduction or extension of late; attitude of the workers toward different payday periods.

23. Are there subcontractors: 1) subcontractors (elders) who do nothing but take work from the factory and does the factory itself settle accounts with them; 2) contractors (piecerate workers) who take work themselves from the factory and set their own wages (not the office); who are these piecerate workers: are they foremen or workers; do they profit a great deal from the workers (in the sense of exploiting them or receiving kickbacks); do they lower earnings; what is the workers' attitude toward this, particularly toward the latter; have their been demands to eliminate such piecerate workers?

24. Longevity (continuity) of job; what is the busiest season for the factory (time of year); if the work stops are the workers paid or discharged; are the workers forced to wait for the resumption of the work, without pay?

25. Is there an "army of unemployed" at that plant; are there permanent applicants living near the plant (visiting the factory daily and, should a worker leave, take his place); could you indicate where the unemployed come from (have they been replaced by machines, have they lost their jobs because of higher productivity or shortage of work at their factory, etc.)? Is there noticeable pressure exerted by the unemployed on the employed in the sense of reduced wages, are there more frequent purely arbitrary job refusals by the bosses and, in general, is there greater arbitrariness?

27. Conclusion of contracts and stipulation of conditions between the factory and the workers. Describe in detail hiring conditions. If a worker is refused, give reason and cite facts; how many show up daily looking for a job? During what periods of the year are there more or less applicants?

28. On settling accounts with workers. Have there been or are there any catches as a result of which the factory owners can swindle the workers-- describe in detail.

#### V. Working Day

29. Length of the working day during the week and on Saturdays; breakdown by job, sex, age, workshop and department; what is the situation of the stokers and, in general, what is the length of the working day of workers who must begin their work day earlier (to get the steam boiler or the machine ready for work, etc.).

30. Shifts; are there shifts? Describe in detail when they begin and end and work breaks; night work, by sex, age and skill.... What is the workers' attitude toward shifts and night work at the factory?

31. Is there a shorter work day for children and if so, is it strictly observed in accordance with factory inspection laws; who determines them; does employing children reduce the worker personnel and does it lead to throwing older workers out? Examples.

32. Is there a difference between a normal work day and overtime; are there arbitrary extensions, such as turning on the machines earlier and stopping them later and extending the time between lunch and dinner, etc.?

33. If there is overtime, is it frequent and long; are the workers forced to work on holidays; are there wage differentials? Give examples of the amount of overtime per week or month.... During what time of the year is there the most overtime? Does overtime work reduce earnings. If so, give examples.

34. Holidays, number of holidays, are Sundays, royal holidays and major church holidays celebrated; is work done on holidays and how is it paid?

#### VI. Immediate Superiors, Hiring Conditions, Thefts and Fines

35. Foremen, deputy foremen and assistant foremen (tallymen, ranking men, etc.); attitude of the workers toward them; who are they and what is their attitude toward the workers (abuse, beatings); do the workers protest and what are the results of their protests--cite cases; what is the attitude of foremen and other superiors toward women and children?

36. Defective goods; are fines levied in cases of unsuitable materials rather than defective work (rotten threads supplied to weavers, etc.). Give detailed examples.

37. Are materials stolen by workers and/or foremen? Are there searches and are women searched more thoroughly (undressing, taunting); if thefts do occur, what are the consequences for the workers (fines, dismissals, prosecution). What are the reasons for theft and could they be low wages?

38. Fines; their size (what is the fine for being late for work 15 minutes, half a day, no show, absenteeism, disobedience, etc.); what are the amounts of fines? Give several examples of how much the factory owners have collected in fines from the workers per week or month. How is the money used (does it go to the capitalists or to meet the needs of the workers, according to the law)? Is the law circumvented by paying bonuses to fined workers (workers are first fined then given a bonus).

39. What happens to those who lose their ability to work (disabled or elderly)? Are they dismissed or paid benefits? Are they sent to the factory's hospital; who pays for the treatment of victims of accidents--cite facts.

#### VII. Cleaning the Machinery, Courses, Medical Aid

40. Is a special time allocated for cleaning machines and machine tools; are they cleaned while they are running or not? Are accidents frequent in such cases and have the workers protested? Are special wages paid for machine cleaning?

41. Are there courses, give the number of students, are they the children of workers or foremen, are workers being trained, and are there withholdings from wages to pay for the courses? What is the attitude toward them of factory owners and workers, and how important do they consider them to be?

42. Are many of the workers literate and do they read newspapers and books, what type mostly? Are intelligent literate workers singled out and what is

the attitude of the other workers toward them? Are foremen hostile to those who read?

43. What is the attitude of factory owners toward workers who read books and go to school on Sundays? Are they hostile to this?

44. Are there hospitals and how well-appointed are they? Are wages withheld to pay for them and what is the attitude of the physicians toward the workers and vice versa?

#### VIII. Factory Inspection, Complaints, Housing, Nutrition

45. Do factory inspection personnel visit the factory frequently; how attentive and conscientious are they concerning factory shortcomings? What is their attitude toward worker complaints? Give as many examples as you can. Name an address of inspectors.

46. Complaints addressed to factory owners, the police or the inspectors. Do the workers consider it worth complaining? Have there been dismissals from the factory, detentions or fines following complaints? Examples.

47. Worker housing at and outside the factory. Factory barracks, their cost, size, cleanliness, environment, do the owners show a profit from them? Prices. Are workers closely supervised in the barracks? Are there restrictive rules and other police measures applicable to bachelors and family people? Give details. Are there baths? What is the attitude of the workers toward factory barracks, are they satisfied or are there protests? Examples.

48. Describe both private housing and barracks for the workers. How are family people and bachelors housed? Are there many people sharing the same room? Tightness, price, how distant are they and how much time is spent commuting to work?

49. Worker nutrition. Do workers eat meat frequently? Is there a factory mess and do the factory owners show a profit from it? Are there public readings in mess rooms and what is being read? Prices, and what is the attitude of the workers toward such messrooms? Examples.

50. Do factory owners pay in goods and if so of what nature? Is this more expensive or, in general, advantageous to the workers? Examples.

51. Are there factory stores; is shopping in them mandatory and are there price differences; detailed examples; quality of goods, attitude of the workers toward such stores, protests, are there agreements between factory owners and storeowners? What are the results? Examples.

52. Are there consumer or savings societies? Are mandatory salary deductions made for such purposes? Is there worker control? Are there abuses? What is the attitude of the workers toward them? Is there a desire on the part of the workers to organize their own savings banks independently, for the purpose of providing unemployment benefits?

53. Are there donations (are the workers pressured to make donations for religious services, icons, etc.)? Are those who refuse to make donations out of favor with their superiors? What is the workers' attitude toward this? Examples.

54. Store credit. Do many workers purchase goods on credit; price differences; do the workers realize their losses in such cases and the disadvantages? Do they consider changes? Examples.

#### IX. Blacklists and Strikes

55. Do factory owners keep blacklists on the workers? What is their attitude toward those politically involved? Is such information entered in their records? How friendly are relations between factory owners and the police and factory inspectors? Examples.

56. Protests and strikes. List in detail all cases and reasons, developments, outcomes and results. Are there or have there been cases of workers wishing to establish unions of all sorts and what kind? Give numerous examples.

57. What is the workers' viewpoint on such means for the defense of their interests?

Reprint of an anonymously handwritten copy.

#### FOOTNOTE

1. Item 26 omitted in the manuscript.

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IT IS NECESSARY TO MOVE FORWARD, IT IS NECESSARY TO LOOK AHEAD

AU031631 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6, Apr 85 (signed to press 12 April 85) pp 9-20

[Editorial]

[Text] These bright spring days communists, Soviet people, the peoples of socialist countries and the whole of progressive mankind are broadly marking the 115th anniversary of the birth of the genius of revolutionary ideas and revolutionary action, the founder of the Communist Party and the Soviet state--Vladimir I'lich Lenin. In the light of Leninist ideas and principles, every party member exactly appraises his deeds and actions, his attitude toward work and his social duty and his line of conduct in order to "swim further into revolution," as a poet once said. Preparing for its 27th Congress, the Leninist party comprehends the aggregate of problems connected with perfecting socialism in our country in all their scale and depth, and it maps out further ways of effectively combining its planned economic system with the achievements of the scientific-technical revolution and more fully revealing its creative forces and advantages.

The March 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum once again convincingly showed that the party of Leninists knows no hesitation or confusion and that the Soviet people believe in it as their guiding force and leader tested more than once by history. Comrade M. S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, whose unanimous election to the top party post was met with approval by the party and people, said in his program speech at the plenum: "The strategic course developed at the 26th Congress and at subsequent Central Committee plenums with the active participation of Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov and Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko has been and remains invariable. It is a course aimed at speeding up the country's socioeconomic development and perfecting all aspects of social life. It is a question of transforming the material-technical basis of production. It is a question of perfecting the system of social relations, primarily economic. It is also a question of developing the individual himself and qualitatively improving the material conditions of his life and work, as well as his spiritual aspect."

Scientific theses developed in recent years relating to the level of social maturity reached by Soviet society, which have found systematized expression in the Marxist-Leninist concept of developed socialism, serve as the

principled basis of the party's strategic line. The conclusions and evaluations made by the party on the basis of this concept caution against rushing ahead and against confusing what is with what should be. But they also state that one must not exhibit sluggishness in practical actions, in the resolution of urgent problems, and in the elimination of shortcomings, while adjusting one's work in line with the loftiest examples and the communist ideal.

The country has begun the last year of the 11th Five-Year-Plan. It has begun it under complicated conditions. An unusually cold and snowy winter has affected the results of work in industry, transport and agriculture in many regions. Of course, only a frivolous person can ignore the objective causes of the difficulties that have arisen. However, it is also harmful to dwell on and relish these causes, because this would mean covering up the subjective causes. The results of the first quarter have been affected to a considerable extent by disorganization, sometimes complacency, and, in some places, even irresponsibility. In the best party and Soviet traditions--increasing the cadres' responsibility for the matter at hand, strengthening organization and discipline, and not pleading difficulties--one must direct intensive effort into liquidating the consequences of these difficulties and into overcoming and eliminating them. The tasks of the five-year plan must be fulfilled. This is an indispensable starting point for making further progress in all branches of the economy. We know how to do this in the country's most difficult times, and we are sure that we will also be able to do this now.

Any breakdown, even in one unit of the unified national economic complex, weakens planning--the basis of socialist economic operations. The March Central Committee Plenum urged a successful conclusion to work to fulfill plans for economic and social development this year which would thereby ensure a confident start to the next, 12th Five-Year Plan. This primarily requires every individual to carefully look around in his work place, take stock of all available reserves, hitherto unnoticed or not put to use, and have a clear idea not only of what is in short supply and where, but also, without fail, of where, when and how this shortage will be filled or substituted.

Among the tasks that the party and the people have to fulfill both today and in the foreseeable future, the CPSU Central Committee plenum gives prime place to the necessity to speed up the development of the socialist economy. This is natural, since otherwise it is impossible to successfully fulfill the tasks of society's political, social and cultural development and to ensure its security. We have to reach a decisive turning point in setting the national economy on the rails to intensive development, it was noted at the plenum. We must, we are bound to reach the most advanced scientific-technical positions and the highest world level of social labor productivity.

The time has come when this task can no longer be shifted onto the shoulders of future generations. This is because, first, we simply have no other way of increasing the rates of development of the national economy and, consequently, of constantly improving the Soviet people's material well-being and spiritual development; second, because our country now has both skilled cadres in every branch of activity and vast production and scientific-technical potential. Of course, these are only potentials--they do not operate by themselves. They

must be sensibly and energetically utilized in the interests of not simply increasing, but seriously transforming social production on the basis of fundamentally new equipment and technology that yields a sharp, not gradual increase in labor productivity.

Naturally, such a transformation requires perfection of the entire system of social relations, primarily production relations. A radical improvement in socialist economic operations is hardly possible without serious changes in the economic mechanism itself, particularly in the organization of management. It is not simply a question of reorganization, for which an excessive number of projects have been proposed, which Lenin himself mercilessly derided as fuss creating simply the "appearance of work, but in actual fact cluttering up our institutions and our brains" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 45, p 392). No, it is a question of the truly historic task of scientifically optimizing the leadership of the planned socialist economic system primarily in accordance with its collectivist nature and humanist, and also with the communist direction of its development. However complex and multifaceted this task may appear, and whatever new research it may demand of theoreticians and practical workers, fulfilled it must be, and fulfilled, of course, not only using old baggage.

Admiration of one's successes and complacency are unacceptable to us as they are fraught with the unfounded belief that one can progress further simply by following a well-beaten track, without constantly seeking new solutions appropriate to changed conditions. The authority of Marxist-Leninist theory for Soviet communists is indisputable, because by virtue of its profound nature and revolutionary spirit it demands strictly dialectical-materialist and, consequently, realistic analysis and appraisal of what has been achieved, as well as boldness of thought, scope for initiatives and creativity. It is sickened by any inertia, any thoughtless attitude to reality and intellectual stagnation. This is well understood by the CPSU as the party of innovators and pioneers of the future. It must also be understood and felt by every aware builder of the new society.

The journal's editorial office receives letters reporting cases of interdepartmental confusion that frequently takes up the valuable time of intelligent specialists and turns them into ordinary clerks. Thus, the experience of organizing rayon agroindustrial associations in the republics, krays and oblasts shows that their successful work is not stimulated by the guardianship of a large number of ministries and departments, particularly if there is no real need for this for the matter at hand, but it is only for writing instructions, directives, raising claims and so forth. Obviously the time has come to thoughtfully, gradually, patiently "tap" every unit of the administrative apparatus (if only following the example of certifying work places), reveal the correspondence between the functions of both individual officials and certain institutions and real social needs, and, if necessary, adopt appropriate measures. This is an urgent order of the present time. A flood of papers and circulars, reports and summaries, it was noted at the All-Union Economic Conference on the Problems of the Agroindustrial Complex (March 1984), pushes the real work into the background and sometimes creates a false impression of the cadres' competency and their diligence. In this respect bureaucracy in some places adapts itself very cunningly to the requirements of

efficiency and a businesslike attitude in work. Bearing this fact in mind, emphasis must be laid on the achievement of final results.

The achievement of final results! This is what the activities of all organs responsible for the management of material and spiritual production must be aimed at. A good administrative apparatus is not enough for this. Adopted decisions must be based on political economy at every level of the national economy and the fundamental principles of socialist economic operations must be consistently applied: strengthening socialism's economic basis--social ownership of production means, developing the economy on a plan basis, and implementing democratic centralism, which envisages an organic unity of centralized scientific planning and the strictest plan discipline, together with increased rights and independence for the labor collectives, and consequently an increase in their interest in the results of their work and their responsibility for these results. This is the aim of the Law on Labor Collectives, the large-scale economic experiment in progress, and a number of resolutions adopted by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR government to develop the most important branches of the economy.

The situation in economic science, as in other branches of the social sciences, was subjected to detailed criticism at the 26th CPSU Congress. The CPSU Central Committee resolution on the work of the Economics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences (1984) has determined the main directions of scientific studies in the sphere of socialist political economy. These are: studying qualitative changes in productive forces and ways of perfecting socialist production relations; elaborating the theoretical bases of comprehensively perfecting management and planning of the national economy; overcoming lag in research into the key problems of production efficiency, intensive expanded reproduction, key increases in labor productivity and improvement in production quality; and expanding research into the theoretical problems of the scientific-technical revolution and combining its achievements with the advantages of socialism.

It was noted at the All-Union Scientific-Practical Conference "Perfecting Developed Socialism and Party Ideological Work in the Light of the Decisions of the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum" (December 1984) that definite work has been done by the representatives of economic science. At the same time, this science has not yet provided a developed concept of ways to make the transition to a dynamic, highly efficient economy and forming a more perfect economic mechanism. Research is not always carried out in close connection with practice. Some scientists are unable to give up obsolete ideas and stereotypes. Their theoretical research is frequently adjusted to fit preconceived schemes and revolves in a circle of scholastic debates.

The conference pointed out fundamental shortcomings in political-economic analysis of socialist production relations and the ways of perfecting them together with contemporary productive forces. Revealing the objective dialectics of these aspects of social production is primarily essential in order to disclose and resolve in good time any contradictions arising in this sphere. Progress in research into this fundamental problem is frequently impeded by dogmatic ideas, the force of inertia and conservative thinking.

The party is now devoting special attention to perfecting socialism's economic basis and the corresponding economic mechanism. This is necessary in order to more fully realize the potential and advantages of the socialist economic system in contemporary conditions. Tasks arising in this sphere must be resolved in indissoluble unity with the forms of labor and production organization, management and planning and the incentive system. The long well-known instruments of commodity-monetary relations also find their place within this context. One must learn to utilize them still better, while definitely taking into account those special features inherent in them under socialism. This requires serious scientific recommendations on the use of economic levers such as price, prime costs, credit and others under the conditions of economic accountability.

Developing economic accountability by no means signifies that the prospects of increasing the rates of economic development and improving economic efficiency are dependent only on the development of commodity-monetary relations. Any attempts to interpret their role in this way run counter to the planned nature of our economy. The dialectics of prime costs and consumer costs must be more fully taken into account in order to reveal the strictly socialist specifics of our economy. Further creative Marxist-Leninist study of the problems of socialist planning and economic accountability is a most important aspect of economic research.

The March Plenum confirmed that "the party will steadily conduct the social policy it has developed. Everything in the name of the individual and for the good of the individual--this program thesis must be given increasingly deep and concrete substance." From each according to his abilities, to each according to his work. This principle of social justice, which is the only justice possible in the socialist phase of communist formation, must be strictly observed everywhere. The labor collectives and their social organizations must participate more actively in controlling the implementation of this principle and in ensuring that improvement in the material and cultural-social conditions of every individual corresponds to his contribution to the general cause. If deviations from this principle are permitted, it was noted at the plenum, social justice is inevitably violated, this justice being a most important factor in socialist society's unity and stability.

The experience of brigades, sectors and workshops shows that social justice in earnings, housing and various forms of material and moral incentives is more fully implemented where work is based on truly collectivist principles and where any worker is in view of all and the members of the collective themselves evaluate the degree (coefficient) of labor participation of every individual in joint work.

There it is impossible to dodge, hide behind someone else's back, and be at work without working. A great deal has been both said and written about the great economic, social and educational effect of the brigade contract. One must do everything to ensure that its principles everywhere become the norm of labor organization.

Most important and urgent social problems are those of sharply reducing, and then liquidating heavy physical and manual poorly skilled labor,

industrializing agricultural work, introducing industrial technology to the agrarian sector of the economy, and forming contemporary agroindustrial complexes. Combined with social and cultural building, this is a decisive condition of liquidating class differences and fundamental differences between working and living conditions in the cities and in the countryside, and, consequently, of forming a basically classless social structure within the historical framework of socialism in precise accordance with the ideas of Lenin, who pointed out more than once that, strictly speaking, a society must be called totally socialist when it has eliminated the class differences between the workers and the peasantry (ibid., vol 38, pp 353-354; vol 39, pp 276, 277; vol 43, p 130). From the point of view of class-forming indications, these differences are already insignificant. However, a great deal of work still has to be done until they disappear completely.

It was noted at the plenum that the party regards further perfecting and developing democracy and the entire system of the people's socialist self-management as a vital task of domestic policy. The main things have already been achieved in this sphere. The Soviet individual has the right to choose his work and the field of his social activities and technical, scientific and artistic creativity according to his vocation and abilities, and also to participate in the management of state and the affairs of social organizations. In practical terms, the degree of the individual's participation depends on available material possibilities, on the one hand, and on the level of the working people's political culture and awareness, and their skills in sociopolitical activities, on the other. A very great deal still has to be done in this sphere in order to ensure the real and effective involvement of each and every citizen in the people's socialist self-management.

In the period since the 26th CPSU Congress the rights of the local soviets have been vitally increased and the role and significance of their permanent committees have likewise increased in developing draft laws and the decisions of organs of state power, and also in controlling the activities of the executive organs. The aim should be to ensure that these rights are exercised properly and that the people's deputies and more than 30 million-strong aktiv of soviets do not overlook cases of bad management and wastefulness, let alone breaches of public law and order.

The 136 million-strong collective of trade unions is a great force in Soviet society. They too cannot complain of a shortage of rights for exerting a weighty influence on the nature of decisions adopted at every level of the administrative apparatus and state power. Output and wage rate norms are not changed without their sanction, nor are wage tariff rates revised or a single worker or employee dismissed or transferred to lower paid work. At the level of the central departments all issues relating to the work and everyday life of the working people in a certain branch are resolved with the indispensable participation of the Central Council of the branch trade union, and at the all-state level, with the participation of AUCCTU, which has the right of legislative initiative. The trade unions' field of activity--from participation in work and production organization to medical-sanatoria and prophylactic help for the working people, from the organization of physical culture work and artistic education to concern for the housing and everyday

lives of the workers, employees and kolkhoz workers--is truly vast. It is a matter of ensuring that their rights and potentials are made full use of and that members of the labor collectives are more exacting toward their trade union leaders with regard to their work and help them with criticism and good advice.

An important place in the political organization of Soviet society belongs to the Leninist Komsomol, the party's closest helper and reserve. Its combat and labor merits are well-known. They have been marked with six high awards of the motherland. Great is the role of the Komsomol in the ideological-political, military-patriotic, labor and moral education of young people and in the improvement of the work of general educational schools, vocational-technical schools, technical colleges and higher education institutes. It basically fulfills its role as it should. However, one cannot turn a blind eye to imperfections in young people's education and to cases, still frequently encountered, of parasitism, drunkenness, hooliganism, bourgeois narrow-mindedness and other moral quirks, which attest to the fact that the potentials for Komsomol ideological-educational influence are not yet used to the full. One comes across Komsomol leaders who have grown old early and who, by imitating their senior leading comrades' solidity and staidness, somehow forget that they themselves were young once and knew how to enjoy themselves, angrily expose those who had to be exposed, have a friendly joke, sing a song in chorus and demand work. "The main thing, comrades, is not to grow old at heart" goes the Komsomol song. This applies equally to new Komsomol members and to their already experienced leaders.

The soviets and trade unions, the Komsomol, organs of people's control, numerous scientific-technical, sports and defense societies and creative unions encompass virtually the whole of the country's population. They serve as a school for cultivating civic maturity and moral purpose and values. Ensuring that every one of these organizations of the working people fulfills its perhaps at first glance not so outwardly impressive, but nevertheless necessary task, and fulfills it without fuss and ostentation, means making vital progress in implementing the idea of the people's socialist self-management.

The CPSU Central Committee plenum noted that deepening socialist democracy is indissolubly connected with developing social awareness. The search has long been going on for an indicator of the effectiveness of ideological work. Of course, any scientific search, even if it has not yet produced the planned final result, is, without doubt, useful by virtue of its interim results. Thus, the study of public opinion has become considerably more active, oral agitation and propaganda is being updated and better equipped and the activities of the mass information media are being perfected, and this naturally has a positive effect on the state of all ideological-educational, mass political work. Its effectiveness, it was noted at the plenum, is primarily manifest in the fact that workers, kolkhoz workers, and the intelligentsia participate in resolving large and small problems and also in how they work and struggle against shortcomings. Increasing the labor and social activeness of Soviet people, strengthening discipline, and cultivating patriotism and internationalism--these tasks cannot be removed from the agenda either now or in the foreseeable future, because socialist awareness does not

arise out of nothing and is not inherited in ready-made form. It is constantly reproduced, and every new generation must develop it by mastering the basics of the Marxist-Leninist world outlook and the experience of preceding generations and also by enriching this experience with their own.

Everyone involved in ideological and ideological-educational work must definitely take into account the fact that the Soviet individual is no longer what he was not only in the 1930s and 1940s, but also in the 1950s and 1960s. He has developed in general educational and cultural respects, he is better informed, wishes to understand the events and facts of domestic and foreign policy life and is inclined to give his own appraisals of what is taking place. He must be helped to correctly interpret reality so that these appraisals are not one-sided or, what is more, wrong. However, he must only be spoken to in the language of truth, without reservation and smooth phrases, avoiding both raptures over successes and the painting over of shortcomings and sensational exaggeration of negative phenomena in our social life. One can be sure that the party's open, honest words addressed to the Soviet people will always be understood and supported; supported by work and social activeness, steadfastness, courage and heroism. So it was when we were building, strengthening and defending socialism and so it is today.

The party has once again emphasized that, in addition to measures aimed at exerting an ideological-educational influence, every necessary administrative and law enforcement measure will also henceforward be taken to further establish order, to cleanse our life of alien phenomena and any encroachments on social and civic interests, and to strengthen socialist law, which is the same for everyone, irrespective of post, calling, or merit. The party urges us to comprehensively support, encourage and praise those who demonstrate their honest and conscientious attitude to social duty not by words, but by deeds and practical results; it also urges us to struggle uncompromisingly against any manifestations of ostentation and verbiage, arrogance and irresponsibility, hypocritical time-serving and substitution of narrow, mercenary cohesion for businesslike collectivism and against everything that runs counter to the socialist norms of life.

Having confirmed the continuity and immutability of the party's Leninist domestic and foreign policy--a strictly principled policy--the plenum emphasized the complexity and vast scale of the tasks facing the Soviet people and its vanguard. Fulfillment of these tasks essentially requires further strengthening the party and its ideological and organizational cohesion and mobility, as well as enhancing its leading, organizing and guiding role in all spheres of social life.

The party sees its duty to the people not only in that it collectively develops policies that take into account the interests of all classes and social groups, all nations and nationalities in the country, but also in that it organizes and rallies the people to consistently and steadily implement its policies.

Lenin persistently emphasized that the main task in organizational work is the selection of people and verification of fulfillment. In this lies the key to resolving all of our problems. He saw only one means of radically improving

the state apparatus: "...That the best elements in our social structure...who one can guarantee will not take a single word on trust and will not utter a single word against their conscience, have no fear of admitting to any difficulty or waging any struggle to achieve an aim they have seriously set themselves" (ibid., vol 45, pp 391-392). We have millions upon millions of such people. We must simply know them well and appoint them in good time to the task with which they are most at home and most suits them. Then an individual's talents and abilities can be fully revealed.

The party work and the party and political leadership in all spheres of vital activity of the society--this primarily and mainly means work with people. Consequently, the party leadership in the economy also means work with the economic management cadres. These are all copybook truths. But, just like any copybook, they are forgotten now and then. It happens quite often that party committees issue instructions on what should be done in farms, in fields, in workshops, or in laboratories, instructions that could and should be issued by specialists without the party committees. At the same time, these party committees run out of forces and opportunities--which they are expected to have--to study the cadres and to thoroughly know the individuals who are heading labor collectives. If the cadres are selected, trained and educated in a way that leaves no room for doubt about their work and political qualities, there will also be no need for keeping a constant watch over them, let alone for replacing them. Many lapses in work are due only to the fact that at times someone who would be a good administrator holds the position of a specialist whereas an individual who is capable of leading a new direction in science and of forming his own school is wasting his time in administrative and management tasks. The same leading workers at the rayon, oblast and even higher levels hold responsible positions for a long time, gathering, like moss, penalties basically for the fact that they are not doing their jobs, or they move from one work position to another (equal in rank or even higher) with the same results both for the task at hand and for themselves.

It is universally known how irreconcilable Lenin was toward any discrepancy between the form and the content of work, between words and action. He considered these things as impermissible, first and foremost for communists. Lenin was especially distrustful of pomposity and all kinds of attributions behind which no serious political meaning can be perceived but which show only a desire to make an impression and to "pack" one's authority. He believed that in the Soviet state the workers and the working people must rid "their social relations with the greatest economy of all traces of any kind of overindulgence" (ibid., vol 45, pp 404-405). Discrepancies between duty, rank and title on the one hand, and real businesslike and creative returns on the other are one of the typical manifestations of such overindulgences. It is impossible not to recall Lenin's attitude toward facts of this kind. Having received notification from the Presidium of the Socialist Academy of Social Sciences that he had been elected member of the academy, he immediately replied: "I thank you very much. Unfortunately, because of illness I cannot fulfill even to a minimum extent the duties of a member of the Socialist Academy. I do not wish to be a fictional member. Therefore I ask you to cancel my name from or not to enter my name in the list of members" (ibid.,

vol 54, p 184). This is a model not only of communist modesty but also of the greatest responsibility for any task that is entrusted or can be entrusted to a party member.

Preparing for the congress, all party organizations, ranging from party groups in enterprises to the republican organizations, are called upon to once again take a close and attentive look to see whether the party, state, economic and other leadership cadres are correctly placed, and to do this not in a campaign-like manner but in their everyday work. They are called upon to once again take a close look to see whether communist or nonparty leaders are really engaged in their task, whether anyone should be transferred or whether anyone should be dismissed from a leading position.

It is possible that one of the reasons for shortcomings in the study, election and placement of cadres is not only the tendency of fragmentation of the apparatus of the state and economic administration and management, as a result of which one branch is at times subject to the curatorship of nearly half a dozen or more union or union republic ministries and departments, something that is most certainly not due to the need for deepening the production specialization, but also the tendency of increasing the branch links of the party apparatus. This creates the possibility for the influence of departmentalism with all of its consequences on party work as well, and this already requires active counteractions on the part of party committees.

Since the 26th CPSU Congress and the November 1982 Central Committee Plenum, the party has constantly called attention to the need to intensify exactingness toward cadres according to the principle: the higher the position a leader holds, the greater is his responsibility for the task entrusted to him. However, left outside the party organization's control, even an intelligent administrator or talented organizer may easily stop in his growth and even turn into a complacent official who tolerates neither comradely advice nor well-meaning criticism. This unfortunately happens even with the people who at one time earned high social recognition for their conscientious and selfless work. To prevent this from happening, the party committees must constantly encourage the initiative of leaders, opportunely support those who waver, and deal more resolutely with careerists, windbags and "promisers," let alone dishonest individuals who use their official positions for their own egoistic interests.

Lenin was especially persistent in demanding that "practice be verified and red tape disciplined. Sensible people must concern themselves only with this," he emphasized (*ibid.*, vol 44, p 429).

"In my opinion, the main thing is," he suggested to A. D. Tsyurupa, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, "to shift the center of importance from the writing of decrees and orders to the selection of people and verification of fulfillment. This is the linchpin" (*ibid.*, pp 368-369). It should not be thought that these ideas of Lenin were applicable only to that time when the stratum of people possessing management skills was still very thin in our country and when they often did not manage to complete something, doing physically more than they could and exerting themselves to the utmost. Now when we have at our disposal a hundred and a thousand times greater

detachments of educated and experienced leaders, the Leninist exactingness toward cadres is even more appropriate. This is so because bureaucratic approach, conceit and red tape contradict the strengthening of the links between the party and people and are incompatible both with the fulfillment of leadership tasks and frequently with a continued presence in party ranks.

The forthcoming reports and elections meetings and conferences provide the richest opportunity for generalizing everything positive in the development of internal party relations, the relations of communist comradeship and high exactingness. The party's leading role in the society is ensured by the fact that the communists provide an example in work and in sociopolitical activities with their moral character and their vanguard role in collectives. Every communist is responsible for the party and before the party just as the party is responsible for every one of its members.

The Soviet and world public has received with great approval the plenum's statement on the immutability of the Soviet Union's foreign policy course, the course of peace and progress.

The first commandment of the CPSU and Soviet state is to protect and strengthen in every way possible the fraternal friendship with our closest comrades-in-arms and allies, the countries of the great socialist community. M. S Gorbachev's friendly meeting with the leaders of parties and member-states of the Warsaw Pact at which a general aspiration was expressed for the further development of comprehensive ties among the fraternal countries and for their close interaction in political, economic, ideological and other spheres, was of great significance in this respect.

From the very first days of its existence, the Soviet Union has continued to support the struggle of peoples for their liberation from colonial yoke. The Soviet Union is openly declaring now also that its sympathies have been and continue to be with the peoples following the path of strengthening their independence and of social renewal. We are always ready to develop economic, scientific-technical and cultural cooperation with all countries that have liberated themselves from colonial fetters in order to help them more quickly overcome the heavy inheritance left to them by imperialists and to resist neocolonialism in all of its forms.

The clear intention of the land of the soviets to invariably follow the Leninist course of peace and peaceful coexistence, stated by the CPSU Central Committee plenum, was also confirmed in the talks of Soviet leaders with Western heads of governments and states and leading political workers. The peoples of all countries have been able once again to convince themselves that the Soviet Union resolutely acts in favor of improving the international situation, curbing the arms race, eliminating the threat of war and strengthening peace.

The eyes of all peace-loving people are now fixed on Geneva where the Soviet Union and the United States have opened negotiations on the question of ending the arms race, primarily the nuclear arms race, on earth and of preventing the militarization of outer space. An agreement on these key questions would be

the only reasonable way out of the situation that has developed and that is fraught with the most terrible threat that has ever hung over mankind.

It was stated at the CPSU Central Committee on the eve of the negotiations that we have in mind an agreement on an honest and equal basis without any attempts by either side to "score in the game" against the other and to dictate its own conditions. "...We do not aspire to achieving any unilateral advantages over the United States and NATO countries, or to military superiority over them; we want an end and not a continuation of the arms race and therefore we propose to freeze nuclear arsenals and stop further deployment of missiles; we want a real and large reduction of accumulated weapons and not the development of ever newer weapons systems either in outer space and on earth." This is the Soviet Union's position at the negotiations. If the other side adheres strictly to the previously reached agreements on the subjects and aims of negotiations, it will be possible to achieve important results.

Unfortunately, Washington's actions give rise to great doubts about the U.S. side's sincerity. Such steps as the continuing deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe, the allocation of new appropriations for the production of first-strike strategic missiles and intensification of efforts for the militarization of outer space do not attest to goodwill. The hopes for success of the negotiations are very problematic if this atmosphere is maintained.

"As soon as we sit down at the table to reach an accord on the reduction of arms," M. S Gorbachev has noted, "then the least we should do is not continue to increase them. Therefore we propose that the USSR and the United States introduce for the entire period of negotiations a moratorium on building--including scientific research work in this respect--testing, and deploying space-based strike weapons and freeze their strategic offensive weapons. At the same time, the deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe and, correspondingly, the increase of our countermeasures should be stopped." This is a true businesslike and the only reasonable approach to the difficult problem.

As yet further evidence of the Soviet side's goodwill and of its aspiration to achieve a serious agreement, the Soviet Union is introducing a moratorium on the deployment of its medium-range missiles and is stopping the implementation of its other countermeasures until November. What decision we shall make after that depends on whether the United States will follow our example, that is, whether or not it will stop the deployment of its medium-range missiles in Europe.

There can be no illusions on this question. We are ready not in words but in deeds to work not only to reduce but also to completely liquidate all weapons of mass destruction of human life. However, we have no intention of acting as simpletons and shall respond to Washington's "peaceful" actions with the readiness to maintain our motherland's defense capability at a level ensuring that any potential aggressors will know well: Any encroachment upon the security of the Soviet state and its allies and upon the peaceful life of the Soviet people will be met with a crushing retaliatory strike. Lenin wrote 65

years ago: "We have stated our aspiration to peace more than once and we have stated that we need peace...but we have no intention of allowing ourselves to be suffocated to death in the name of peace" (ibid., vol 40, p 152). These words have not lost their topicality.

The might of socialism achieved in the decades since then serves not only the interests of the Soviet people but also the cause of general peace and disarmament and of international security as a whole. Our friends and allies in the struggle for peace and social progress and, first and foremost, the most consistent and resolute participants in this struggle, the communists, have spoken about that on more than one occasion.

The meetings of CPSU leaders with delegations of communist, workers and a number of revolutionary-democratic parties have again confirmed that, as always, in this great struggle the party of Lenin will closely cooperate with them and work for the unity and active interaction of all revolutionary forces. At the March Central Committee Plenum, the CPSU, an internationalist party by its nature, assured the people abroad who share its views that it continues to be staunchly loyal to the course of every possible cohesion of forces of the international communist and workers movement.

The work on drafting the basic directions of the country's economic and social development for the next five-year plan period and for the period to the year 2000 is now nearing completion. The new five-year plan must become a turning point in all respects and it is extremely important for labor collectives, in working out their five-year plans, to take into account all possibilities and to foresee everything for the fulfillment of their plans.

Traditional Leninist subbotniks have already begun in the country, during which one can see examples of highly productive communist labor. While preparing for the 27th Party Congress, which will adopt the new edition of the CPSU program and certain changes in its statute, communists and working people are summing up their glorious deeds. There has been a multitude of such deeds during the current five-year plan period, and we have something to be proud of. Despite all this, we must remember Lenin's wise warning that the danger of conceit "must be strictly taken into account by all bolsheviks individually, and by the bolsheviks as a whole political party" (ibid., vol 40, p 327). This was said after the triumph of the October Revolution and the victories in the civil war, when "the tasks comprising the essence of the socialist revolution were moved aside by the tasks of organizing the struggle against the everyday manifestation of petty bourgeois elements, fragmentation and dispersal, that is, against everything that drags us back to capitalism" (ibid.). Now, the conditions in which our party and the Soviet people live and struggle have essentially changed, but our tasks have also become immeasurably more complicated and the demands made on communists have increased. Consequently, Lenin's warning and his other immortal ideas are accepted as before in all their vitality.

While celebrating the anniversary of the birth of its founder, leader and mentor, the party remembers that the Leninist faith in the strengths, reason, talent and diligence of the Soviet people and its unity with the people both in moments of victory and in periods of ordeal is the very foundation of its

activity. If it was stated at the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum that the individual in our country must be cultivated not simply as the bearer of a certain sum of knowledge, but primarily as a citizen of socialist society and an active builder of communism with ideological aims, morals, interests and high standard of work and conduct characteristic of him, then this primarily applies to the vanguard of the army of creators of a new world--communists.

We will remember Lenin's order: "It is necessary to move forward, it is necessary to look ahead, it is necessary to bring to the congress well-thought-out practical experience in economic construction, which has been carefully studied in common labor and through common efforts by all party members" (ibid., p 142).

It is precisely from collective creative experience, the collective living ideas of all communists and constant support by the popular masses that the party draws its confidence in the ultimate triumph of Lenin's unfading ideas.

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M. S. GORBACHEV'S 8 APRIL 1985 SPEECH AT THE MEETING WITH MANAGERS OF INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATIONS AND ENTERPRISES, KOLKHOZES AND SOVKHOZES, PRODUCTION BRIGADES, SPECIALISTS AND SCIENTISTS

PM120927 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No. 6, Apr 85 (signed to press 12 Apr 85) pp 21-25

[Text] Esteemed comrades! Permit me to cordially welcome you in the CPSU Central Committee. We have scheduled this meeting in order to confer with you on how best to solve both the urgent and the long-term production, economic and social tasks confronting us, and to consider both the matters that must be decided without delay and those that require reflection and a thorough assessment.

Our country is going through a crucial period: Preparations are under way everywhere for the next, 27th, CPSU Congress. This is a time of great events and important decisions, of deep analysis and realistic appraisal of what has been attained, of exposure and removal of obstacles impeding forward movement. This time should be filled with intensive labor and bold thought and should open up scope for people's initiative and creativity. There is a need now to raise the level of organization at work, to mobilize all forces and reserves in order to ensure confident and dynamic socioeconomic development and to speed up the rates of our progress.

It falls to you to directly manage production, to work at the ground level with the working people and to implement in practice the party and government's directives and decisions. The experience and knowledge you have built up enables you to form profound and concrete judgments about the strengths and weaknesses in the running of the economy, what hinders things at work and what holds back the growth in efficiency. One would like to hear what needs to be put right or changed, and how to mobilize the reserves now at the disposal of every enterprise and labor collective and, indeed, our whole socialist economy, more fully.

Many complex tasks must be tackled simultaneously at the present stage. The most immediate of these is the successful fulfillment of the 1985 plan and of the five-year plan as a whole. The current year did not have an easy start: There are various reasons for this, both objective and subjective. One must not, of course, discount the severe winter. However, let us be frank: The results of the first quarter, and we cannot be satisfied with them, have been

affected to a considerable extent by lack of organization, occasional placidity, and here and there, irresponsibility. The main thing now is to overcome such lagging, to make up for lost time and to fulfill everything laid down by the plan.

A study shows that the rate of progress we are making in this 5-year period is insufficient. It must be stepped up, and stepped up substantially. This task must be tackled without delay. Time must not be wasted. The country's socioeconomic development, the strengthening of its defense capability and an improvement in the lives of Soviet people depend on how successfully we solve these tasks.

As concerns long-term tasks, in the forefront among them are the questions of resolutely putting production on the path of intensification, improving its structure, speeding up scientific and technical progress, significantly raising the quality of output and further perfecting the economic mechanism and management as a whole.

We must do this. There is no other way. We cannot rely on manna from heaven, as the saying goes. Work is necessary--intensive, enterprising, honest and conscientious--from everyone, from the worker to the minister, from the engineer to the academician. It is necessary to increase resolutely the accountability of cadres, the level of organization and discipline, not in words but in deeds. The question of strong discipline must be understood on a broad scale. It includes high standards of production and strict technological discipline, which directly determines the quality level of the products, the strict implementation of output delivery plans by enterprises and, of course, labor discipline. Eventually, everything begins with a high degree of exactingness toward people, toward leading cadres, toward all of us, comrades.

The issues of working in an efficient and well-organized manner and of using reserves should be the focus of attention both in our day-to-day activity and in the solution of long-term tasks. At present, work is coming to an end on the draft basic guidelines for the country's socioeconomic development for the 12th Five-Year Plan and up to the year 2000. Although this encompasses a long period, the new five-year plan must become a turning point in all aspects, and it is not far off. It is important, even now, for every collective in town and country, while drawing up their own five-year plans to utilize their available reserves and resources and make provision for everything that is needed to implement what has been planned.

First and foremost, it is important to make maximal use of everything that we have at our disposal. Our country has achieved great heights in socioeconomic progress and has created a solid economic potential, ensuring a successful advance. Life shows that if just one thing is done, if proper use is made of what already exists, it would be possible to achieve a substantial improvement in the state of affairs in the national economy. Many examples prove that simply by strengthening order, fighting laxity and ensuring a good working rhythm at enterprises there is a much faster growth in labor productivity, enhancement in the quality of output and improvement in all the other results of activity.

I would like to single out in particular the question of the quality of output, its technical standard and how to raise it decisively. How does such a situation arise: An enterprise turns out outdated products of low technical standard, consumer goods that are not in demand, but survives normally and sometimes even flourishes? Our economic machinery permits such phenomena. How is such a situation to be corrected, and as quickly as possible at that?

We evidently need resolute measures: Whoever turns out products to the standard of contemporary requirements should earn moral and material benefits. But if for a prolonged period an enterprise fails to attain high consumer standards in its output and does not update it, this should inevitably have an effect on the material situation of its workers, particularly the managers of labor collectives. The expediency of such an approach does not seem to arouse any objections. This means that we must move on from talk to practical actions.

Another important problem is the intensification of the policy of economy, the struggle against wastefulness, the efficient use of everything that the labor collective has at its disposal: machine tools, equipment, land and other material and financial resources. We cannot and must not rely, now or in the future, on their significant growth. We must decisively relinquish such hopes, although some people have become accustomed to such an ineffectual path of development.

We must reorganize work, strive to obtain a greater end product from each unit of raw material and installed capacity and to reduce labor costs more decisively. This is, in point of fact, intensification of production. This is how each manager, each economic planner and each labor collective must think and act today.

All that has been said relates fully to agriculture, too, a subject to which we have been and are devoting immense attention. Considerable capital investment is being directed toward the countryside, and kolkhozes and sovkhoses are being increasingly equipped technologically. Raising purchase prices has helped to strengthen their financial-economic situation. All this is producing definite results, but many farms continue to use their land, labor and material resources inefficiently. In connection with this, further raising efficiency in the work of kolkhozes and sovkhoses and the mutual responsibility of all links of the agroindustrial complex, improvement in planning and administration and fuller use of work time and all daylight hours are worthy of serious attention.

It is important to take steps to improve the economic mechanism and management for the all-around development of activity and initiative within labor collectives. While strengthening centralized planning in the main directions, we propose to further extend the rights of enterprises and introduce true financial autonomy and, on this basis, to increase the responsibility, as well as the interest, of both the collective as a whole and of each individual

employee, in the end results of labor. This is the purpose of the economic experiment.

The system of economic management should be structured in such a way that every collective, every working person, strives to make full use of his abilities and potential in public sector production and in raising its efficiency. The more closely the production and social questions, state interests, the collective and the individual are linked, the better these tasks will be resolved.

The true independence and responsibility of enterprises and associations can obviously be achieved when the rights and obligations of each level of management are correctly defined. We will not resolve the problem of independence if a director, in each instance, has to have dozens of things approved and discuss everything from A to Z. The resolution of every problem cannot be left to the center. The level of our economic management cadres fully allows many problems to be resolved on the spot. We only need to remove the fetters of poor and superfluous instructions from them, decisively decrease accountability to higher bodies and free ourselves from the paper chase, which will at the same time contribute to a reduction of the management apparatus. This concerns both ministries and all-union industrial associations.

In the past few years, extensive rights have been given to labor collectives. A USSR law has been passed that sets for them an enhanced role in the solution of production and social questions, but so far there has been no proper return. The question arises as to what it is that prevents the collective from making full use of the rights it has been granted. What else must be done to ensure that the law promotes to the full an enhancement of labor and social activity and the development of the democratic norms of life of society?

The law is, after all, aimed at enhancing the role played by working people in production management and the responsibility of chiefs to the collective. Workers' meetings should be addressed to the most topical and vital issues, and managers at all levels should take account of them.

Evidently, far from all managers have been psychologically prepared for such a turnaround. It still seems to many of them that if they spend less time conferring and simply issue commands, the path to the target will be simpler and shorter. In actual fact, however, comrades, looking for support to the collective and creating in it a friendly, creative atmosphere--and this is precisely how far-sighted managers operate--is the most important accelerator for progress.

There are brigade leaders present at our conference. They represent the almost 2 million-strong ranks of the leaders of the primary production links. The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government highly assess their labor. The brigade is the primary cell of the labor collective. It is precisely here that the foundation is laid for successful production and social activity. Here is the key to giving a mighty stimulus to our democracy, for the most important questions of production, providing

incentives and deducation, can be resolved by the collective itself. From here starts the broadening of the participation of working people in managing the affairs of society and laying the foundations for self-management.

A considerable number of brigades today has gone over to a progressive method of work; they are making wide use of the powers granted them in the organization of production and labor, moral and material incentives and the education of working people. At the same time it is well-known that the brigade form of labor organization is not successfully developing everywhere. Brigades are converting to financial autonomy only slowly; in many brigades labor productivity is rising only slightly. One would like to find out what the obstacles are and what must be done to improve the situation.

In general, comrades, we are counting on a frank conversation on those and other urgent problems.

At the conclusion of the meeting, M. S. Gorbachev noted that a useful exchange of views, rich in content, a conversation of great state importance, had been held. On behalf of the CPSU Central Committee, he expressed gratitude for the valuable proposals. They deserve most serious attention, study and familiarization in state organs.

The meeting has convinced us of the correctness of the directions of socioeconomic development being worked out in the Central Committee, the government and in our economic departments. Alongside the acceleration of scientific and technological progress, a great deal should be achieved by improving further the economic mechanism, increasing the independence of the main production units and the responsibility of our cadres. This idea was distinctly expressed in the speeches.

This means that we should continue to improve the system of management and to deepen the economic experiment. Everyone came out in its support and noted the necessity of not only making a faster use of the experience that has been accumulated but also of more speedily resolving the questions posed by life itself.

The discussion has shown the importance of supplementing the measures that are being implemented with further improving the organizational structures of management. Higher bodies, accustomed to the old style of work, frequently fail to promote a consistent implementation and development of the principles of management that lay at the base of the economic experiment. This is manifested, in particular, on the level of the all-union industrial associations. It is necessary to tackle these questions without delay, since without changing the management methods on the ministry and all-union industrial association level, we will only be marking time.

Another important area where changes are needed in the organizational structure of management is the agroindustrial complex. The speeches made have shown that we must take the improvement of the management of this important sphere of the national economy to its logical conclusion. The agroindustrial complexes must, as determined at the May 1982 CPSU Central Committee Plenum,

be planned, financed and managed as a single entity. So far, we have not achieved this and we are incurring great expenses as a result.

Many of the speakers, citing their enterprises and brigades as examples, have shown how much can be achieved if we put our house in order and maintain discipline in industry. I want to point out once again the need for tough technological discipline. This largely determines both labor productivity and quality. It is important in this connection to strive for a strict rhythm of production. Where will quality come from if many enterprises are producing in the last third of the month, half of what they planned to produce during the month? Then there is no time to worry about quality--just "get the plan out." Discipline requires that we raise the whole standard of the way we run our industrial production.

Comrades! You are about to return home. Please tell your collectives about this meeting. Inform party and economic activists. Say that the CPSU Central Committee will continue to consult the working people and the broad public on the fundamental questions of party policy and in preparing proposals for the next, 27th, CPSU Congress.

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M. S. GORBACHEV INTERVIEW WITH THE EDITOR OF THE NEWSPAPER PRAVDA

PM071608 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6, Apr 85 (signed to press 12 Apr 85)  
pp 26-29

[Text] Question: Our newspaper has received many letters--from Soviet people and from abroad--devoted to international affairs. How, Mikhail Sergeyeovich, would you describe the international situation?

Answer: I understand the increased interest in international affairs. The broad people's masses on all continents are striving to exert an active influence on the fate of the modern world.

This is not fortuitous. The world is full of complex problems--political, social and economic alike. Two opposed social systems--socialism and capitalism--exist in reality. Dozens of new states, with their history, traditions and interests, are active in the international arena. This is also a reality.

To build international relations in today's world, it is impossible to disregard this, to ignore the interests of other states and especially to attempt to deprive them of their rights to choose their own path of development. In broad terms, this is also the policy of peaceful coexistence, whereby each system attempts to prove that it is better by force of example and not by force of arms.

Another conclusion which is equally topical is the need to end the arms race. The development of the international situation has reached a point where the questions arise: Where do you go from here? Is it not time for those who make state policy to stop, ponder and not allow the making of decisions which would push the world toward a nuclear catastrophe?

There is an urgent need for international cooperation in organizing a dialogue and seeking realistic decisions that would ease tension in the world and help bar the way to the arms race.

All states--large and small alike--must participate in this. It is understandable that the nuclear powers, and primarily the Soviet Union and the United States, have a special role to play.

Our country has pursued and will continue to pursue an active and constructive foreign policy for the sake of strengthening peace. This was reaffirmed at the recent CPSU Central Committee plenum, where the Soviet state's foreign policy principles were spelled out.

Question: A great deal in the world is linked with the state of Soviet-American relations. In your view, have opportunities emerged for a change for the better in them?

Answer: Relations between the USSR and the United States are an exceptionally important factor in international politics, but we do not look at the world solely through the prism of these relations. We realize the importance of other countries in international affairs and take this into account in assessing the general situation in the world.

Are there changes for the better in Soviet-American relations at this time? There is no simple answer to this question. Some things give grounds for hope, but there continues to be a considerable and even great number of things that inspire anxiety.

The new Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons have begun in Geneva. This is a positive fact. Together with the United States, we determined the subject and objective of the talks, and, to put it concisely, we determined them as follows: not to start an arms race in space, end the arms race on earth and pursue the objective of totally eliminating them.

This accord must now be implemented. The talks are important. I say this primarily because the question of where the development of Soviet-American relations and developments in the world as a whole go from here is now being decided. The choice is as follows: either an arms race in all areas and the growth of the war threat or the consolidation of general security and a more stable peace for all.

There is some stir in other fields of Soviet-American relations as well, but it is very slight. On the whole relations remain tense.

Washington is gambling on force, making no secret of the fact. It is counting on superior force that would subordinate the rest of the world to the United States. Diplomacy and negotiations are literally subordinate to missiles and bombers there, for it is a fact that new strategic arms programs are being forced through Congress also by the same people, who are conducting the talks in Geneva on behalf of the United States.

Everybody has heard a great deal about the "Star Wars" plans proclaimed by the U.S. administration. The vocabulary sounds as though borrowed from science fiction, but an attempt is being made to use it to conceal a real and awful danger for our planet. I would use the term fiction to describe the arguments cited to justify the militarization of space. They talk about defense but are preparing for attack, they advertise a space shield but are forging a space sword, they promise to eliminate nuclear weapons but in practice are building up and improving them. They promise the world stability but are moving toward disrupting the military equilibrium.

Since people can intuitively sense the danger of the "Star Wars" plans, the authors of these plans want to make people believe that it is a question of innocuous scientific research, research that even promises technological benefits. Using this lure, they also want to turn their allies into accomplices in this dangerous venture.

It is even asserted that the elimination of nuclear weapons can be achieved through the creation of space weapons. This is a deception. Just as the emergence of nuclear weapons did not eliminate conventional types of weapons but only gave rise to an accelerated nuclear and conventional arms race, so the creation of space weapons will have a single result--the arms race will become even more intensive and encompass new spheres.

I have singled out the factors that are primarily complicating Soviet-American relations and at times bring them to the verge of acute tension. But it appears that some people in the United States regard this situation as normal, considering confrontation virtually a natural condition.

We do not consider this to be the case. Confrontation is not an inborn defect in our relations. Rather it is an anomaly. There is nothing inevitable about its continuation. We regard the improvement of Soviet-American relations as not only extremely necessary but possible. Of course, it is impossible to manage without reciprocity here.

Question: The possibility of you meeting the U.S. President is generating great interest. What are the prospects?

Answer: The question of such a meeting has been touched upon in our correspondence with President Reagan. I can say that a positive attitude to holding such a meeting has been expressed from both sides. The timing and venue for holding it will be the subject of subsequent agreement.

In broader terms, the correspondence dealt with finding joint ways to improve relations between the USSR and the United States and making them more stable and constructive. I am convinced that a serious impetus must be given to Soviet-American relations at a high political level. We propose to the U.S. government that matters be dealt with in such a way that everyone--our peoples and other countries--may see that the political courses of the USSR and the United States are directed not toward enmity and confrontation but toward the search for mutual understanding and toward peaceful development.

Question: It is clear from what you have said, Mikhail Sergeyevich, that there is need for action on a broad front. Nevertheless, what do you see as the main lever for a substantial turnabout?

Answer: Intensive mutual efforts, indeed efforts across a broad front. Mutual understanding on the need to promote the settlement of conflict situation in the world would have a beneficial influence on relations between us and on international relations. A considerable amount could also be done to our mutual benefit in the development of bilateral ties between the USSR and the United States.

Nevertheless, what you called the main lever lies in the field of security. From what specific point could it be possible to start in this case?

Since we have now sat down at the table to seek agreement on reducing armaments, it is necessary at least not to increase them. Therefore, we propose that for the entire duration of the talks the USSR and the United States impose a moratorium on the development--including scientific research--testing and deployment of space strike weapons and freeze their strategic offensive weapons. Simultaneously, there must be a halt to the deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe and, correspondingly, to the buildup of our countermeasures.

The American leaders state that they advocate radical arms reductions. If this is so, it would be logical to first stop the arms race and immediately move on to reductions.

We are in favor of honest dialogue. We are again prepared to demonstrate our goodwill. As of this date--let me emphasize this--the Soviet Union is imposing a moratorium on the deployment of its medium-range missiles and is suspending the implementation of other countermeasures in Europe. The moratorium will be in effect until November of this year. The decision we make thereafter depends on whether the United States follows our example, whether it stops the deployment of its medium-range missiles in Europe or not.

Summing up, I would say the following: Opportunities do exist for improving Soviet-American relations and for improving the general international situation. These opportunities must not be missed; they must be translated into specific policies and practical decisions.

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TALK BETWEEN M. S. GORBACHEV AND THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
OF THE U.S. CONGRESS

LD101747 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6, Apr 85 (signed to press 12 Apr 85)  
pp 29-30

[Text] Welcoming the American congressmen, M. S. Gorbachev expressed satisfaction over the fact that the authoritative delegation from the House of Representatives held an active political dialogue with their colleagues from the USSR Supreme Soviet, which both sides assess as positive. We know the role played by Congress in America's political life, he said, and we attach great importance to developing contacts among the parliamentary line as one of the elements of invigorating Soviet-American relations.

The time is such now that people, shaping the policy of the two countries, should by all means converse with one another. The world situation is disquieting, even dangerous, and a kind of ice age is being observed in relations between the USSR and the United States (at least, this was so until the recent time).

M. S. Gorbachev stressed that the Soviet leadership sincerely wishes that Soviet-American relations should return into a normal channel. We do not think that underlying the present-day tensions in these relations is some fatal clash of national interests of both countries. On the contrary, our peoples can gain much from the development of broad and fruitful cooperation, to say nothing of the fact that they are united by the dominating common interest in ensuring security and preserving the very life of our peoples. The difference in the social systems and in the ideology of our countries is no cause for curtailing relations, much less for kindling hatred.

Practical experience has shown that Soviet-American mutually beneficial cooperation is quite possible. A number of fundamental documents signed by both sides in 1972 and 1973 laid the groundwork for fruitful cooperation in various fields. This also contributed to spreading detente in international relations as a whole, and to the success of the European conference in Helsinki, in particular. In 1972, the leaders of the USSR and the USA put their signatures under a document saying that peaceful coexistence between our two countries is the sole sensible alternative in this nuclear age.

This concerns, of course, also the recognition of the right of every people to arrange its life as it sees fit, without interference in its internal affairs, without attempts to shape other countries according to one's own fashion or to impose one's will on other peoples.

A genuine improvement of relations between the USSR and the USA, M. S. Gorbachev stressed, requires political will on the part of the leaders of these countries. From the Soviet side such a will exists. If it is displayed by the American side as well, then many concrete questions now separating our countries gradually will begin to find their solution.

M. S. Gorbachev dwelt in detail on questions of ensuring the security of the peoples of both countries, preventing nuclear war and, in particular, on the Soviet-American talks in Geneva. The Soviet Union, he said, agreed to the new talks with the United States, being guided by the sense of profound responsibility to its people and to other peoples for the cause of peace on earth. We are satisfied with the U.S. acceptance of our proposal for the talks. We agreed to them in order to conduct them honestly and seriously, seeking to agree on tangible real results, on very large reductions of strategic nuclear weapons and medium-range weapons. But it is possible to attain these objectives only if the American side gives up its provocative designs of transferring the arms race into outer space, where it wants to secure the possibility of making a first nuclear strike with impunity under the cover of "defensive" weapons. That is why the solution of the issues of ending the race of nuclear armaments on earth and preventing it in outer space is a single problem that must be resolved in its entirety, as agreed upon by the Soviet Union and the United States in January this year.

It is hard to understand how one can tally the statements by the United States on the intention to reach agreement on a cut in nuclear weapons with the feverish everyday activities for the buildup of these weapons, M. S. Gorbachev said. The claims made by the United States Administration and USA propaganda as regards some superiority of the USSR in various types of nuclear weapons are an utter distortions of the facts. M.S. Gorbachev cited specific facts and figures to show the guests that, in reality there is a parity, a rough parity between the Soviet Union and the NATO countries in all of these weapons. That is precisely why, wishing to meet the hopes of the peoples, to reach already now the first specific results at the talks in Geneva and ensure for them a further successful course, the USSR proposed the most natural and sensible thing: in the first place, put an end to a further buildup of the nuclear arsenals on earth, end preparations for the creation of weapons for deployment in outer space, and on this basis, under the conditions of mutual trust thus strengthened, immediately go over to preparing agreements on a cut in the accumulated weapons stocks. In order to prove its sincerity and good will even more convincingly, the USSR has declared that it unilaterally terminates until next November the further development of its medium-range missiles and suspends the implementation of other countermeasures in Europe.

It might seem that, given this intention to reach agreement, one could be expected to clutch at these proposals and actions by the USSR, which have been evaluated the world over as an important and constructive goodwill gesture. Yet, the U.S. Administration displayed absolutely incomprehensible haste and

right away declared its negative attitude, describing our actions as "propaganda." How can one, under these conditions, not question the sincerity of the intentions of the United States at the Geneva talks?

The Soviet Union sincerely strives for the reaching of specific accords in Geneva and wants Soviet-American relations to be returned to the channel of normal mutually advantageous cooperation and mutual respect, M. S. Gorbachev said. He asked the congressmen to convey this to the U.S. Congress and Administration.

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SOLDIERS' DELEGATION TO LENIN; FROM THE CHRONICLES OF THE FIRST DAYS OF  
PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6, Apr 85 (signed to press 12 Apr 85) pp 31-38

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences V. Polikarpov]

[Text] In addressing the Nonparty Worker-Red Army Conference on 3 September 1919, Lenin explained the nature of the prerequisite for the strength of the Soviet system and its successful struggle against the external and internal revolution: the truly democratic nature of the Soviet system, the foundations of which are the toiling masses. In recalling the past growth of the consciousness of the worker masses and the rapid increase in the number of bolsheviks in the soviets even before the October Revolution, Lenin described noteworthy phenomena which accompanied its victory. When we seized the power in October, he said, "the mensheviks and the SR, who had spread throughout Smolnyy, threatened us that the front would come to us and wipe us off the face of the earth. We only laughed back, knowing that the toiling masses would understand our explanations, that they supported the power of the working people and, consequently, the power of the soviets. Indeed, when numerous delegations from the front arrived in Petrograd, and after we had explained to them the situation, all of them took our side" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 39, p 175).

Comparing with specific facts the policies of the provisional government and the practical activities of the Soviet of People's Commissars, Lenin called upon every working person "to learn from the history of Kerenskiy's government," which pursued a "policy of swindling" the toiling masses and trying to reconcile them with the exploiters and, subsequently, fed them "mere promises which were not met" (ibid., pp 174-175). Both the provisional government and the conciliationist leadership which supported it discredited themselves in the eyes of the people and nothing could prevent their fall any longer.

The process of the revolutionizing of the soldier masses can be clearly traced with the example of the 49th Army Corps--one of the formations which the provisional government and Supreme Command Headquarters transferred in October 1917 from the Romanian and Southwestern fronts to the approaches to Petrograd with a view to routing the revolutionary forces and preventing the arising socialist revolution. This large-scale operation was prepared by headquarters

in Mogilev and by the staff of the commander in chief of the armies on the Northern Front, in Pskov, where Kerenskiy, high officials of the War Ministry and ministers of the provisional government went especially for that purpose. The plan was kept strictly confidential.

The headlong revolutionizing of the soldiers' masses, in the wake of the failure of the Kornilov mutiny in August 1917, had triggered the extreme annoyance of the top brass and the ruling strata. Their correspondence and telegraph tapes of discussions among army and front staffs and headquarters and between Mogilev and Petrograd showed fear of the revolution as well as rage which motivated the reaction to resort to most extreme means to suppress the class enemy. In the situation as it existed, however, it was extremely difficult for the generals to find the necessary troops. By October-November 1917, as Lenin emphasized, half the army had become bolshevik and "bolsheviks enjoyed tremendous superiority" at the Northern and Western fronts, which were the closest to the capital (see op. cit., vol 40, pp 9-10). Headquarters did not hope to find the necessary troops for such purposes at these fronts and demanded of the commands of the southern fronts to make a thorough investigation of the moods of the soldiers and select reliable formations which could be transferred to the capital. The 17th Corps from the Romanian Front and the 22nd and 49th corps from the Southwestern Front were moved to Petrograd. The former was to deploy in the Nevel, Velikiye Luki and Novosokolnikovo area; the second was to deploy north of Pskov, in the area of the Luga railroad station; the third was to deploy at Vezenberg (today Rakver) and the Taps railroad station (Tapa) with a view to throwing such forces not only against Petrograd but, if necessary, against Moscow as well.

It was no accident that Lenin hastened with preparations for the October armed uprising and demanded of the bolsheviks to study the forces and deployment of the "Second Convocation Kornilov Forces," and to ignore the counteraction of the SR Menshevik Central Executive Committee, which called for waiting for the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. He pointed out that the Central Executive Committee could postpone the congress to November, and argued that the uprising "must not be postponed, thus allowing Kerenskiy to bring in more Kornilov forces" (op. cit., vol 34, p 389). It was precisely because of the accelerated military preparations by Kerenskiy's government that on the evening of 24 October Lenin insisted "that the government be arrested at all cost, this evening, tonight," "that in no case should Kerenskiy and company remain in power until the 25th" and passionately argued with the leading party nucleus that "history will not forgive a procrastination by the revolutionaries, who could win today (and would certainly win today), but risked losing a great deal tomorrow, risked losing everything" (ibid., pp 435-436).

The appeal of the Petrograd Military-Revolutionary Committee "To the Citizens of Russia!" on overthrowing the provisional government and the seizure of the power by the Military Revolutionary Committee, which was issued at 10 am on 25 October, found the bulk of the Kornilov forces scheduled for transfer either on the way to their points of embarkation or on the trains. On that day, the Military Revolutionary Committee called upon the army "not to allow sending from the front unreliable military units toward Petrograd. To use words and persuasion and, if this did not help, to block such transfers

through the merciless use of force." The military-revolutionary committees blocked all the ways of the counterrevolutionary forces and their transfer was paralyzed to such an extent that neither on 25 October nor the following day was Kerenskiy able to acquire a single echelon for the march on Petrograd, and units of the Third Cavalry Corps which were on the move and had remained at the Northern Front after the Kornilov mutiny, were separated from units summoned from the south.

Outstripping the counterrevolution, the revolution took the initiative away from it and blocked and actually eliminated the new counterrevolutionary march on Petrograd. Agitators of military-revolutionary committees, who were sent to meet the echelons, explained to the soldiers the nature of the anti-people's adventure in which the army command and mensheviks and SR, who were members of the army committees, were trying to involve them.

In stormy 1917, it had become the custom of the broad democratic masses, who were becoming involved in the political struggle, to send delegations to Petrograd to clarify the situation. Such was also the case at the final stage of the "Second Kornilovism." "...All detachments sent to Petrograd," Krylenko said, "stopped midway..., sent delegations and...advanced no further..." Soldiers' delegations mandatorily visited Smolnyy and, obtaining the necessary explanations, returned to their units and scattered around the country already as convinced agitators in favor of soviet power.

Somewhat later, 4 months later, Lenin was to say at the 7th Extraordinary RKP(b) Congress that "the troops which abandoned the front took with them, wherever they went, maximal revolutionary resolve to put an end to conciliationism, and the conciliationist elements, the White Guard and the sons of the landowners found themselves deprived of any kind of support among the population. Gradually, as the broad masses and the army units which were advancing against us took the side of the bolsheviks, the war turned into a victorious and triumphant march of the revolution" (op. cit., vol 36, p 5). In speaking of units "moving against us," Lenin referred to the troops summoned by headquarters from the southern fronts. In connection with the appearance of a delegation "from units of the 17th Corps, which threatened us with a march on Peter" in Petrograd on 5 November 1917, Lenin described this threat as ridiculous, "for the advance elements of these Kornilovites are already defeated and fled at Gatchina, and the majority refused to march against the Soviets" (op. cit., vol 35, p 75).

On 18 November, the congress of delegates of the 17th Army Corps acknowledged the Sovnarkom as the sole authority and refused to accept as supreme commander in chief "General Dukhonin, the enemy of the expectations of the masses of soldiers, workers and peasants and of immediate peace." Lt A. V. Fedorov was elected commander of this formation, replacing General Shilling, who was removed from his post and arrested. Subsequently, as Lenin had predicted, speaking about the army as a whole, the 17th Corps as well began to send revolutionary units to fight the counterrevolution.

The revolutionizing of the 22nd Corps, summoned from the South, proceeded at the same headlong pace. This is confirmed, in particular by the open wire discussions between Major General Akhverdov, commander of the Third Finnish

Division, and headquarters. He reported to Dukhonin that "deputies from the Smolnyy Institute came to the 12th Finnish Regiment on 11 November, after which a delegation of regimental soldiers went to Petrograd from where it brought instructions on the reelection of all committees and commanding personnel and the instruction that, henceforth, the units move not according to headquarter orders but as ordered by the Soviet authorities. General Akhverdov depicted the cheerless situation in the division from the viewpoint of the counterrevolution: reelections of committees had begun in the units and elections of commanding personnel were to take place. The new committees, the division commander reported, "will be even more irreconcilable and the masses, urged on by numerous agitators, will ignore the command personnel totally. Naked power is in their hands and I believe that they could use it both toward officers and railroad personnel." "All in all," Akhverdov said, "I must report that the division, which thus far, in any case, was considered one of the better ones, has as a result of the adverse situation it finds itself in, now gotten entirely out of hand."

Dukhonin was particularly impressed by the report that the soldiers, who were receiving simultaneously instructions from headquarters (transmitted by the division commander) and from Petrograd, as well as from the local military-revolutionary committees, were choosing to carry out only the "illegal" orders of these committees.... He had already delayed moving the division toward Petrograd for an entire week. Now, following the information presented by the division commander, he called upon Akhverdov "to arm himself with all his courage and skill" and if he could, to move the entire division back to Ostashkov and Velikiye Luki.

New documents provide a most complete description of the history of the way elements of the 49th Army Corps, which had come from the Southwestern Front, took the side of the Soviet system. Military-revolutionary committee agitators began to penetrate the echelons of these elements while still on the move. At their arrival in the concentration area--the Vezenberg and Taps railroad stations--the soldiers were already aware of the fact that they were being moved not only to protect the front from the foreign enemy but also for purposes of punitive operations against the revolutionary people. A military-revolutionary committee consisting of soldiers and Baltic seamen, who had come here, was set up at Taps station. The new authority immediately called for no reinforcements to be sent to the counterrevolutionary forces advancing on Petrograd. Meetings were held by the corps units and resolutions were passed supporting the Soviet system with arms. The regiments demanded the reelection of conciliationist committees and the replacement of the counterrevolutionary command personnel. However, at those same meetings, members of the counterrevolutionary "Committee for Saving the Homeland and the Revolution," and activists of menshevik and SR organizations, argued that military units had to be sent to help Kerenskiy and Krasnov.

The political atmosphere in the corps remained tense. The power of the mensheviks and the SR who, even after the provisional government had been overthrown, controlled the army committees, was being felt. They were actively helped by envoys of the "Salvation Committee." All of them argued with the soldiers that the Soviet system was "illegal" and that it had to come to life allegedly as a result of a "conspiracy in the night" by the bolsheviks

against the "democratic" provisional government, which included "socialist" ministers.

They did not consider legitimate the 2nd Congress of Soviets, which had set up a Soviet government, on the grounds that, allegedly, it consisted of representatives "exclusively" of the Bolshevik Party, nonparty people and left-wing SR, who had abandoned "revolutionary democracy" and followed the bolsheviks. The conciliationists argued that the Constituent Assembly alone was the true "master of the Russian soil." It alone could organize the country's administration, but the seizure of power by the bolsheviks prevented holding it. At assemblies and meetings, traitors to the revolution claimed that the leaders of the SR and the former ministers of the provisional government, who had joined headquarters in haste, not waiting for the Constituent Assembly, had initiated a campaign in favor of organizing a "homogeneous-socialist government" headed by Chernov, the SR "leader." They failed to mention that the slogan of "proportional" representation of all socialist parties actually meant the primary participation of petit bourgeois parties.

The SR and the mensheviks agitated in favor of ending the civil war whereas, in fact, they themselves were fanning it and encouraging the disarming of the proletariat in the face of the military counterrevolution. Jointly with the reactionary command of that same 49th Corps, they urgently set up a combined force the purpose of which was to rout revolutionary Petrograd. Characteristically, headquarters sent Lieutenant Mazurenko (SR) as the organizer and commissar of the detachment--that same lieutenant who had already headed the punitive detachment summoned by the provisional government to Petrograd during the July events.

Playing on the aggravated feelings of the soldiers, tortured by the heavy burden and horrors of a long war, the conciliationists tried to convince them that the bolshevik government, which was not recognized by the "allies" nor by the German coalition, would be unable to bring peace to the tortured country, for which reason, allegedly, it was in the interests of the soldiers themselves actively to support the government of "revolutionary democracy" which was being formed ("cabinet" was the word used at that time).

Such claims and the false information about events in the country confused the soldiers, who were only beginning to become involved in political life. The voice of the bolshevik agitators was deafened by waves of pseudorevolutionary promises and appeals by the false "friends" of the people with their refined agitation methods.

At the congress held by the 49th Corps on 9 November, in addition to the requirements of the soldiers, which reflected their expectations, the conciliationist elements imposed the inclusion in the resolution of demagogic incantations about ending the civil war and setting up a socialist cabinet which would include everyone, from bolsheviks to popular socialists. The final edition of the promulgated decree included the following requirements:

- "1. Ending the civil war.

"2. Immediate creation of a popular socialist cabinet, proportional and answerable to the soviet of peasant, worker and soldier deputies of the Second Congress, prior to the split, i.e., from bolsheviks to popular socialists inclusive.

"3. Convening a constituent assembly at the appointed time, without postponement.

"4. Signing a democratic peace as soon as possible.

"5. Transferring the land and all tools to the land committees.

"6. Democratization of the army.

"7. All ringleaders, counterrevolutionaries and executioners of the Romanov dynasty to be tried by a revolutionary court.

"8. Abolishment of the death penalty.

"9. Worker control over production."

(USSR TsGVIA [Central State Military Historical Archives], f. [form] 2273, op. [list] 5, d. [file] 7, l. [sheet] 13).

In order to settle arguments on the political situation in the country once and for all, the decision was made to send a 20-man delegation to Petrograd. It was instructed to acquaint with the congress decree not only the Soviet government but the central committees of the menshevik and SR parties, so that all of them could present their explanations.

Under those circumstances, a delegation of the 49th Army Corps traveled to Petrograd. It was received by Sovnarkom Chairman Lenin in Smolnyy. People's Commissar of Posts and Telegrams N. P. Avilov (Glebov) participated in the talk.

As recorded in Lenin's biographic chronicle, the Sovnarkom chairman talked with the soldiers' delegation to which it submitted the Sovnarkom's explanations. This is recorded in the Sovnarkom outgoing documents for 12 November (No 75): "To the Committee of the 49th Army Corps, answer to the resolution with decrees promulgated by the congress of the 49th Army Corps to the Council of People's Commissars" (USSR TsGAOR [Central State Archives of the October Revolution], f. 130, op. 1, d. 56, l. 16 back).

However, excerpts of typewritten copies of the document found in Sovnarkom files do not provide a full idea of its content; nor is the accuracy and reliability of the text guaranteed. Meanwhile, in its 14 November 1917 issue, the menshevik newspaper DEN' carried false information on the talks between the Sovnarkom and the corps delegation, the purpose of which was to misrepresent to the soldier masses the political situation in the country. "...Glebov," the anonymous note stated, "depicted the situation of the new government in rather dark colors. The new government...is isolated, hanging

in the air. Despite all efforts and steps taken by the government, virtually nothing has been achieved in terms of concluding an armistice."

The text of the Sovnarkom explanation (a certified copy on Sovnarkom stationery with official processing markings consistent with the entry in the outgoing documents log) on problems of the power and the situation in the country was discovered by Senior Scientific Associate V. M. Shabanov among other papers of the Committee of the 49th Army Corps, in the course of the work by associates of the Central State Military-Historical Archives (TsGVIA USSR) on preparations of a collection of documents entitled "The October Revolution and Headquarters."

Following is the full text of this explanation:

"To the Committee of the 49th Army Corps.

"In answer to the decrees issued at the Congress of the 49th Army Corps, the Council of People's Commissars states the following:

"1. That in Petrograd, Moscow and other more or less large centers of the Russian republic, in which the power has passed into the hands of the soviets of worker, soldier and peasant deputies, the situation is calm. In places where the transfer of power to the soviets of worker, soldier and peasant deputies is still subject to a struggle, naturally, the stubborn opposition to workers, soldiers and peasants by the bourgeoisie and the supporters of Kerenskiy's power may be noted; naturally, the full victory of the workers, soldiers and peasants puts an end to civil war;

"2. That the Council of People's Commissars agrees to the creation only of a cabinet exclusively answerable to the program adopted at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Worker and Soldier Deputies and the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Worker and Soldier Deputies elected at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Worker and Soldier Deputies, and that it is only the stubborn unwillingness of the right wing of the socialist parties to accept the will expressed at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Worker and Soldier Deputies that is the reason for failure to establish the desired organization of soviet power;

"3. That convening the Constituent Assembly at the stipulated time has been secured and that elections will be held on 12 November;

"4. That the Decree on Peace was formulated at the Second All-Russian Congress and that the Council of People's Commissars has already taken decisive steps to initiate armistice talks on all fronts;

"5. That the transfer of all the land to the land committees was decreed at the Second All-Russian Congress and is being implemented with exceptional energy;

"6. That the plan for the democratization of the army and navy was made public on 8 November of this year and will be ratified in the immediate future;

"7. That all counterrevolutionary efforts to hinder the creative work of workers, soldiers and peasants are being blocked with most decisive measures and that the strictest and fairest revolutionary trials await all instigators of counterrevolution;

"8. That the law on the death penalty was abolished by the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Worker and Soldier Deputies;

"9. That the plan on implementing worker control over production will be ratified and published in the next few days.

"The original document was signed by the following:

"Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

"The Administrator of Affairs of the Council of People's Commissars and for the Secretary of the Council of People's Commissars

"True copy of the original: for the secretary, Z. Grudskiy."

(Certified typewritten copy)

(TsGVIA SSSR, f. 2273, op. 5, d. 50, ll. 136-137).

The explanation provided by the Sovnarkom made a tremendous impression on the delegates of the 49th Corps. What made it particularly convincing was the fact that the Soviet government had already undertaken practical steps to implement the measures stipulated in the declaration. Thus, the statement on the steps taken to stop the war was supported by the real fact that one day before the delegates had met with Lenin, Sovnarkom representative Krylenko had left for the front to organize armistice talks with the German command.

Lenin had answers for the other demands formulated by the soldiers as well: the power had been assumed by the soviets in the capitals and the other more or less major centers in the republic and the victory of the workers, soldiers and peasants was hastening the end of the civil war. Elections for the Constituent Assembly, endlessly postponed by the bourgeoisie and the provisional government, began on 12 November. The decree on putting all the land at the disposal of the land committees was being energetically implemented.

We know that the delegation of the 49th Corps submitted the congress's decree to the central committees of the conciliationist parties as well. In its answer, the Central Committee of the SR party submitted to the delegates a resolution of the All-Russian Conference and the Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Peasant Deputies, signed by two of its members: Rakov and Berg. It contained views on "ending terrorism" and the demand to disband the military-revolutionary committees which were being groundlessly accused of violating "civil freedoms." It was only at the end of their answer that the SR briefly mentioned the need for "universal peace" and the solution of the

agrarian problem, as though the Soviet government was not dealing with these problems.

The declaration of the Central Committee of the Menshevik Party was also filled with anti-Soviet slander. On its behalf, the notorious former liquidator Yermolayev was calling upon the people and the army "to support and defend the Constituent Assembly against the bolsheviks." Sharply negative assessments were provided in answer to all steps taken by the Soviet government in the interests of the working people. "We too favor the transfer of the landed estates--prior to the Constituent Assembly--to the land committees," the mensheviks stated, as though it was not they who had blocked this step during the entire 8 months of the existence of the provisional government. All of a sudden, they were displaying an odd concern for the protection of landed property. "As to tools, their amount in Russia is so small that confiscating them from the landowners would be of little significance to the peasant masses" (TsGVIA SSSR, f. 2273, op. 5, d. 50, ll. 134-135).

A meeting of representatives of front units and formations was held in Petrograd on 14 November, attended by the delegates of the 49th Corps units. The document of this meeting has been preserved. It proves that the soldiers were satisfied most of all with the explanation obtained from the Council of People's Commissars. They rejected the anti-Soviet fabrications of the conciliationists and took as a basis precisely Lenin's stipulations. The resolution adopted at the meeting read:

"1. To welcome the new regime of soviets of worker and peasant deputies of the Second Congress of Soviets and, as representing them, and the Council of People's Commissars, who are expressing the will of the people and safeguarding the interests of the toiling masses.

"2. To voice a categorical objection to the representatives of the overthrown regime, who are trying to return the country to the fatal policy of coalitions through civil war, and to demand of them an immediate end to the civil war and obedience to the will of the people.

"3. We, frontline soldiers, demand that an end be put to any persecution of the people's regime as represented by the Council of People's Commissars and consider as the only culprit for the civil war the bourgeois classes and the parties supporting them."

The front representatives demanded of the Soviet system the immediate disbanding of the "Committee for the Salvation of the Homeland the Revolution," being an agency for the promotion of civil war and counterrevolution, and the immediate disbanding of all assault battalions, military academies and schools and other counterrevolutionary organizations; the trying by a military-revolutionary court of officers and soldiers "who have actively opposed the revolutionary people's system or who have called and are calling on others to this effect;" to take most decisive measures against criminal sabotage on the part of senior officials.

By the middle of November, after the reelections in the 49th Corps, all soldier committees with their conciliationist policy were eliminated. A new congress of representatives of the corps units was held on 27 November, which consolidated the conversion of the corps on the side of the Soviet system and its full democratization.

In tracing the events of this history on the basis of preserved documents, we can see how timely was the strike dealt by the October Revolution against the main bulwark of the counterrevolution: the provisional government.

Based on the experience of the socialist revolution in Russia, Lenin drew a lesson according to which the proletariat, after seizing state power, must immediately disband the old state apparatus which serves the interests of the bourgeoisie and put all the power into the hands of the soviets. "It is thus that immediately, in one fell swoop...the proletariat wins back from the bourgeoisie the huge mass" and the exploited people, whom the bourgeoisie, "including its supporters Chernov, Kautskiy, Martov and company...have deceived and who, by acquiring a soviet system acquire for the first time a weapon in the mass struggle for their interests and against the bourgeoisie.

"Secondly, the proletariat can and must immediately or, in any case, quite soon win over from the bourgeoisie and the petit bourgeois democrats "their own" masses, i.e., the masses which follow them, through the revolutionary satisfaction of their most vital economic needs with the expropriation of landowners and the bourgeoisie" (op. cit., vol 40, p 13).

At that time, the Russian army consisted primarily of peasants. However, it also consisted of the most educated segment of the peasantry, which had experienced the entire horrors of the war (see op. cit., vol 36, pp 83, 105), and whose politically most active part were members of the soviets of worker and soldier deputies (see op. cit., vol 35, p 163). These soldiers, who saw in the proletariat a reliable leader, were practically implementing Lenin's idea of an alliance between the working class and the peasantry. The study of data on elections to the Constituent Assembly, made by Lenin, confirmed that it was the proletariat which was the leading fighter for Soviet power, the overwhelming majority of which followed the bolsheviks. Whereas the population of the country at large gave the vanguard of the proletariat 25 percent of the vote, this vanguard garnered nearly one-half of the army vote. All of this allowed Lenin to consider the army a "progressive fighter--along with the workers--for freedom, land and peace and the total liberation of the working people from all oppression and all exploitation" (ibid., p 150). In the course of this struggle, the soldiers' masses acquired a true leader in the Leninist Bolshevik Party.

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TODAY ONE CANNOT BE A MARXIST WITHOUT BEING A LENINIST

AU112105 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6, Apr 85 (signed to press 12 Apr 85)  
pp 39-42

[Article by Horst Schmidt, chairman of the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin--capitalized passages published in italics in original]

[Text] The editorial collegium of the journal KOMMUNIST requested Comrade H. Schmidt to answer the editorial staff's questions on the role of V. I. Lenin and Leninism in his formation as a communist and in the struggle of the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin (SEW) for peace, social progress and socialism. The answers that were received are published below.

At this time the 115th anniversary of the birthday of the great leader of the peoples of Russia and the international proletariat, Vladimir I'lich Lenin, the founder of a new type of party and of the world's first workers' and peasants' state, is being marked. In this connection, your question on the role of Lenin and his life and work in my formation as a communist is understandable.

I should like first of all to note that my youth coincided in time with the rule of Hitler's fascism in Germany. I grew up in an antifascist family of leftist orientation, which suffered frequent persecution and oppression. In spite of this, meetings and gatherings of members of the antifascist underground were often held in our family, especially after the start of World War II. Among the people who came to our house there was a considerable number of communists. Although I was only 14 to 16 years old at that time, they always treated me with great trust. And for this reason I came into contact with scientific socialism relatively early, considering the conditions reigning in Nazi Germany. The communists gave me illegal literature to read, including the works of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin, which the Communist Party of Germany was continuing to disseminate even at the gravest of times. They introduced me to the "Manifesto of the Communist Party" and helped me to realize that it was precisely Lenin who developed Marxism with application to the era of imperialism.

I well remember how at that time--still during the time of fascism--I read the work "The Struggle Against Social Democrats Who Imitate the Constitutional Democrats and Party Discipline" in a small old volume by Lenin. Lenin's words on the role of the workers class and its party, which serve me as a guideline even today, were imprinted on my mind forever: "The strength of the workers class is organization. Without organization of the masses, the proletariat is nothing. Organized, it is everything. Organization is unity of action and unity of practical activity. But of course, any action and any kind of activity are valuable only because and insofar as they move forward and not back, and insofar as they unite the proletariat ideologically, raising it and not belittling, corrupting or weakening it. Organization without ideological content is nonsense which in practice turns the workers into the pitiable hangers-on of the bourgeoisie which is in power" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 14, pp 125-126).

After the liberation of the German people from fascism by the forces of the anti-Hitlerite coalition, the 40th anniversary of which we are celebrating this year, that is, after the end of the war during which the Soviet people had to bear the main burden on their shoulders, I began, of course, to study systematically the works of Lenin. Lenin's style of practical work and his analytical, passionate, Marxist approach to all questions of political, economic and social development made a very strong impression on me. To read and think over Lenin's works again and again, and to take from Lenin everything needed for the contemporary struggle, means always to receive help that is invaluable to us.

I say today with the deepest conviction that there has been nobody in the world who has had such a great influence on the fate of the entire world and who has done so much to liberate working people from the yoke of exploitation and for the struggle for socialism and communism as Lenin has. Thanks to his activity, the conclusions of Marxist social science have been confirmed by reality: The world's first socialist state of workers and peasants was created under his leadership in the most difficult of conditions. The entire history of the 20th century and all of the outstanding revolutionary accomplishments of our time are indissolubly linked with Leninism. Lenin's theory and practice always formed a united whole. He consistently developed the revolutionary teachings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, he raised Marxism to a new level, and enriched both Marxist philosophy and political economy, and the theory of scientific communism, with tenets and directions of historic significance on a worldwide scale. And for me, the main conclusion of all that was accomplished by Lenin consists in the following: Today one cannot be a Marxist without being a Leninist. You are either a Marxist-Leninist or you are neither one nor the other.

Lenin always stressed that the world revolutionary process is a complex and multilevel phenomenon. This tenet is wholly confirmed by the contemporary international situation. Our growing party considers itself a firm and inseparable component part of the world communist and workers movement. The SEW is a proletarian party which stands firm on the platform of Marxism-Leninism, and a party which, despite all the difficulties of the struggle, is full of optimism. In close alliance with a wide range of the population of West Berlin, it makes its contribution to the solution of the central task of

our time, which agitates all people on earth, that is, the task of preserving peace. In view of the arms race, which the imperialism of the United States is intensifying, of the siting of first-strike nuclear weapons, Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, and of the Reagan administration's plans to prepare for "Star Wars," it is becoming increasingly clear to the masses of peoples how serious the situation in the world is. This circumstance increases not merely the role of the Marxist-Leninist party. First and foremost, it increases the party's responsibility. In the present dangerous situation, our party is invariably guided by the Leninist tenet which holds that the struggle for peace is difficult and complex, but also extremely necessary and pressing. The Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin considers the most important task of the current decade to be to resolutely oppose the preparations for war being made by the most aggressive circles in the United States and NATO.

We welcome the start of negotiations between the USSR and the United States in Geneva. But we have no illusions, and we are striving not to let illusions arise among the masses, about the fact that progress in these negotiations, which are aimed at halting the arms race, at the renunciation by the United States of its plans to militarize space, and at the reduction and liquidation of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe on the basis of parity and equal security, can be achieved only if the Reagan administration feels growing pressure from the popular masses. In this case, too, we learn from Lenin, who never lost sight of the aspiration inherent in imperialism for world domination and war, which is now visible in classic form in the policy of the White House.

Following the ideas of the Leninist Decree on Peace which demonstrated the unity of the causes of socialism and peace, we, the communists of West Berlin, strongly support the proposals of the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community for the total halting of the arms race on earth and for its prevention in space. An increasing number of people of good will are with us in this matter. We now officially cooperate in the antiwar movement with more than 200 organizations in our city: with parties, trade unions, social associations, youth and women's unions, civil initiative movements and various groups of the struggle for peace. We resolutely refute the thesis of the alleged "equal responsibility" of the Soviet Union and the United States for the arms race, and also the pseudotheory of the "two superpowers." It is quite obvious that only imperialism, motivated by its innate aspiration for profit and domination, has an interest in the arms race. In contrast to this, in conditions of socialism, no one gets rich from the production of weapons; neither does socialism lay any claims to the territory of other states.

Acting in the spirit of Leninist teaching, our party links the struggle against Reagan's arms race policy in the closest possible manner with the mobilization of the masses for the struggle for the social rights of working people. There is now a constant army of unemployed people--more than 10 percent of the able-bodied population--in West Berlin. The trade unions note with concern that in a city hit by chronic unemployment, a growing stratum of "the new poor" has appeared. Hundreds of thousands of people are forced to live on incomes lower than the subsistence minimum. As a result, working people are realizing to an ever fuller extent the falseness of the capitalist

thesis of the "self-regenerating powers of the free market economy," and questions of our social-political system are being moved ever more into the center of social discussion. In these conditions it is easier for the party to overcome trade unionist consciousness {tred-yunionistskoye soznaniye} within the ranks of the workers class and, by revealing the essential nature of capitalist social relations, to strengthen the class awareness of working people. The party is marching in the vanguard of the struggle against dismantling the social achievements of the working people, basing itself on unity of action with their social-democratic class colleagues: SEW members actively work in the trade unions.

The present situation gives rise to many new possibilities of showing the advantages of socialism over capitalism in a more graphic manner to the city's working people. For this reason we are paying more and more attention to propagandizing the achievements of real socialism.

In conclusion, I should like to touch upon two other Leninist principles which are immutable for our party. These are democratic centralism as the main law of internal party life, and proletarian internationalism as a firm component part of our everyday practical work, our agitation and propaganda and of the education of party members in the spirit of convinced adherence to the Marxist-Leninist world outlook.

In his work "Our Program," Lenin defined the task of the revolutionary proletarian party in the following manner: "...Not the composition of plans to reorganize society, not preaching to the capitalists and their hangers-on about the improvement of the workers' position, not the hatching of plots, BUT THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE OF THE PROLETARIAT AND LEADERSHIP OF THIS STRUGGLE, THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF WHICH IS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF POLITICAL POWER BY THE PROLETARIAT AND THE ORGANIZATION OF A SOCIALIST SOCIETY" (ibid., vol 4, p 183).

The Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin is in complete solidarity with this characterization of the party's role. We proceed from the fact that negotiation of party spirit and party discipline, as Lenin noted in "Left-Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder," "is equivalent to total disarmament of the proletariat IN FAVOR OF THE BOURGEOISIE. This is equivalent to precisely that petit bourgeois atomization, instability and incapacity for staying-power, unification and concerted action, which will inevitably destroy any proletarian movement if it is pandered to" (ibid., vol 41, pp 26-27).

The monopolistic bourgeoisie pronounces an anathema against democratic centralism, the fundamental principle of a Marxist-Leninist, and "recommends" the path of "liberalism" to the communists. But, true to Leninist teaching, our party unwaveringly stands by the fact that cohesion and unity of will and action are the source of its strength in the class struggle.

As far as proletarian internationalism is concerned, it is not a grand formula but everyday practice for the SEW. In our city, the population of which is 1.8 million, live representatives of 156 nationalities, mainly foreign workers. This fact alone predetermines the internationalist positions of our party and obliges us to fight for the vital interests and future of foreign

working people just as persistently as for the interests of our own population.

At the same time as we stand up for the rights and demands of the proletariat and other strata of the city's population, we are fulfilling the most important international task connected with the class struggle in the international arena, which is, while struggling against one's own bourgeoisie, simultaneously to strengthen solidarity with heroic Nicaragua, with the peoples of South Africa, Latin and Central America, and other regions, who are striving for their national and social liberation, and with all forces on this planet acting for peace, democracy, and socialism. We accomplish this task by employing all possible actions, public pronouncements and collections of funds. Our internationalist relations with the Soviet Union, the GDR and other socialist states, are particularly firm and indestructible.

We have always considered and continue to consider the starting point of our activity to be the remarkable Leninist idea according to which propaganda alone and agitation alone are not enough to make the workers class and working people begin to fight resolutely for a fundamental change in the conditions of property and power. The masses' own political experience and growing activity by the workers' class and its allies against imperialism and war are necessary to achieve this goal.

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## LESSONS BY PIONEERS OF ARTISTIC LENINIANA

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6, Apr 85 (signed to press 12 Apr 85) pp 43-54

[Article by Candidate of Philological Sciences V. Dmitriyev]

[Text] Leniniana, with its very rich experience and permanently innovative approach, created by the masters of Soviet culture, has accumulated truly fruitful ideological-aesthetic traditions. To understand more profoundly and become more precisely aware of this experience means not only properly to assess accomplishments but to approach more confidently the future and to offer prompt support to artistic solutions and principles governing the approach to this topic, which could lead to new and considerable discoveries in Soviet artistic and literary Leniniana.

In September 1918, Kako Oba, editor in chief of TOKYO ASAHI, published an article in his newspaper in which he substantiatedly claimed that "Lenin is a new type of hero, born of the new age, for he is "in the thick of the masses, he lives and works with them" and because all of Lenin's thoughts and actions "are based on a strictly scientific foundation and dictated by it alone rather than by subjective wishes which characters and leaders have tried to embody in life by applying their power and force." Artistic Leniniana, with its specific means of depiction, proves in a variety of vivid ways that Lenin, in the words of A. V. Lunacharskiy, was "the beloved son of history.... He sensed in its heart what it wanted and where it leads."

At different times and under different circumstances Lenin was seen, heard, talked with or one way or another been in touch with thousands of people. However, even the most perspicacious among them were largely puzzled by his unique political perspicacity, clarity of proletarian national feeling displayed by an entirely new type of leader, who dealt with others in such a simple way, but who was also an unusual person and whose great words brought together the great accomplishments of millions of people and turned a new page in history.

The poet S. A. Yesenin sensitively presented the dilemma which arose in art in this connection.

Shy, simple and dear,  
He stands before me like a sphinx.  
I shall never understand the power  
With which he was able to shake up this earth.  
But he did....

The sphinx, as we know from ancient mythology, offered to everyone a puzzle which was quite difficult but which had to be unraveled. And it was art--initially timidly and uncertainly and, subsequently more boldly--which undertook to resolve it. To achieve a superficial similarity of the depiction as clear proof of the living leader is an essential but not the most difficult problem. The main speaker has been and remains the artistic understanding, the sensitive capture and accurate transmission of the inner world of the character through his external manifestations, so that through the image Lenin's personality may be illumined by history and broadly reveal itself.

We justifiably consider as the pioneers of artistic Leniniana those who, in the early period of searching along an essentially new direction of creative work at that time, were able to make a vivid and innovative contribution to creating the image of the leader and who thus found themselves among the initiators of the fruitful traditions of the development of the Leninist topic in the various types and genres of literature and the arts.

We know of initial attempts at Leniniana dating back from the turn of the century. There was the amateur drawing by A. A. Ryzhkova, made in Paris, at the beginning of 1903, when Lenin was giving lectures organized by Russian political emigres at the Russian Higher School for the Social Sciences. Incidentally, political cartoons were quite popular at that time among emigre circles. One such cartoon which has been preserved was masterly drawn by E. E. Essen under the impression of daily events: Plekhanov wearing fashionable galoshes is sailing to the right, to the menshevik shore, while Lenin remains on the left, among the workers, against a background of plant buildings. The caption was "What Not To Do." Three cartoons with a common caption, "How the Mice Buried the Cat," beautifully drawn by P. N. Lepeshinskiy, Il'ich's friend and fellow worker, which mocked the mensheviks, enjoyed great popularity.

Generally speaking, artistic Leniniana began precisely in graphic art. This beginning is greatly instructive to this day, perhaps for the fact alone that our customary visual concept of Lenin is essentially based, in addition to photographs, on few documentary motion picture frames, and mainly on the work of artists who had the opportunity to paint or sculpt Lenin from nature. More than 500 paintings of Lenin addressing meetings and sessions, writing, talking, or listening to speakers, are known. Some of them will be discussed later.

Gradually, poetic Leniniana was born as well, initially in the bolshevik underground and, subsequently, through the efforts of proletarian and, following them, the peasant poets. For example, many poems were written by Dem'yan Bednyy in which Lenin's character is depicted quite specifically. Their creative history is interestingly described in the recently published monograph by N. V. Gamaliy "Pishu i Dumayu ob Il'iche" [I Write and Think About Il'ich].

Nevertheless, the major artistic accomplishments of basic importance of the first graphic discoveries in Leniniana belong primarily to the period between the start of the 1920 and the end of the 1930s. It was precisely at that time, when socialism, which had become reality, proved for the first time clearly the brilliance of Lenin and Leninism, that the pioneers of the Leninist topic in literature and art were able to accomplish their main work, which became a life-generating example to those who followed in the path of artistic Leniniana.

## I

Sketches and portraits of Lenin drawn from nature, the best among them, in any case, are valuable not only from the artistic but from the historical viewpoint as well.

For example, the first artistic depiction of Lenin returning from exile in April 1917 is a portrait painted at the former Kshesinskaya Palace, where the then soldier in an armored division (and subsequently professional painter) M. M. Beringov, observed and painted Lenin in the course of discussions of the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a type of system.

We know that on the night of the storming of the Winter Palace, avoiding pursuing sleuths, Lenin arrived at the headquarters of the revolution with an unusual appearance--he had shaved his beard and moustache. It was thus that painter M. L. Shafran saw and painted him in Smolnyy on 25 October 1917. This sketch is the only artistic proof of what the leader of the revolution looked like on the first morning of the Soviet Republic.

Lenin was painted from nature by N. I. Al'tman, M. V. Dobuzhinskiy, F. A. Malyavin, I. K. Parkhomenko, L. O. Pasternak and many others. Observingly noting the external and colorful features, the painters tried to capture more profoundly the manifestations of the inner essence, the scale of the personality of the leader. The development of graphic Leniniana progressed from details to character summation, which made it accurate and aesthetically significant.

"Only later did I realize how right Lenin was by refusing to pose. During talks, telephone conversations or at work, Il'ich's expression changed all the time..." (N. I. Al'tman). Lenin never posed for those who were especially assigned to paint his portrait, but went on with his work.

The highest achievements in graphic Leniniana at its birth are linked with the names of at least three major painters: N. A. Andreyev, I. I. Brodskiy and I. D. Ivanov, who used the pseudonym Shadr.

Brodskiy painted Lenin at the meetings of the Second Comintern Congress and, subsequently, the All-Russian Party Conference, which was held at the Kremlin. Recalling these days, he wrote in his autobiography that "to me, like to other painters who had accepted the revolution and dedicated all our work to the proletariat, October 1917 offered the opportunity to paint a series of portraits and compositions which reflected the greatness of our age and to

describe calmly and simply, in the language of realistic art, the great accomplishments and days of the proletarian revolution, its leaders, heroes and rank-and-file soldiers."

By no means did everyone accept and understand such aspirations at the time. For example, after painting "V. I. Lenin Addressing a Worker Meeting at the Putilov Plant" (the painter wanted to present the leader as though rising above the masses yet, at the same time, being part of the masses. He tried to depict the single spiritual thrust of the progressive collective of Petersburg's proletariat during Lenin's speech), Brodskiy was boycotted on an organized basis by formalists and aestheticizing painters and snobs. However, the workers took Brodskiy's side and he was firmly supported by Kirov. Let us recall that this painting was awarded the Grand Prix at the 1937 International Exhibit on "Art and Technology in Contemporary Life," which was held in Paris, among other merits for its purely artistic qualities.

Brodskiy worked in different styles. The canvas "V. I. Lenin at a Demonstration," which is painted on a realistic scale and, at the same time, imbued with a spirit of revolutionary romanticism, coexists side by side, so to say, with a portrait against a landscape, combining psychological depth and motifs of ordinary realism ("V. I. Lenin Against the Smolnyy Background. 1917"). Finally, the peak of this painter's creative efforts is the canvas "V. I. Lenin in Smolnyy," which was painted in 1930. All of this has become part of the gold stock of graphic Leniniana.

A commission to perpetuate V. I. Lenin's memory was set up under the USSR Central Executive Committee after the death of the great leader. It approved the still-familiar masterpieces of Leniniana such as, above all, the works of N. A. Andreyev, V. A. Andreyev, G. D. Alekseyev, V. V. Kozlov, S. D. Merkurov and some others.

During the days of the funeral, 25 painters worked at the Hall of Columns of the House of the Unions, during the funeral ceremonies, invited by the commission. They included A. S. Golubkina, G. N. Gorelov, A. I. Kravchenko, S. V. Malyutin, S. D. Merkurov, V. N. Meshkov, K. S. Petrov-Vodkin and K. F. Yuon.

I. D. Shadr, who was making a mold of Lenin, recalls the following: "I stood aside and froze. The first thing I felt was panic. I vaguely remember people carrying my clay, a bucket of water and an easel which were placed by the casket. I was molding at a time when no decision had been made as to preserving the body. I was molding in the face of history, at a time when my work may be the only document for the study of the portrait of Lenin. I was molding surrounded by millions of critical eyes, which were curiously and jealously comparing my mold with the original.... I began to work. I molded in natural size. The clay under my hands easily and obediently bent to my will. Lenin's head rested on a scarlet satin pillow, slightly leaning toward a shoulder. The face was a kaleidoscope of Lenin's feelings. This was the living Lenin, the greatest of all humanists..."

Shadr, who worked at the side of the leader's casket for 46 uninterrupted hours, pledged to himself to create a monument which would perpetuate the

living Il'ich. His high relief is a work of tremendous historical and artistic value.

Among all the pioneers of graphic Leniniana, hardly anyone has been able to do such tremendous work and achieve such significant results as N. A. Andreyev. This sculptor dedicated the last 14 and creatively most mature years of his life to the profound artistic interpretation of the image of the leader. He created more than 400 works many of which are true masterpieces. He had seen and heard Lenin and had communicated with him directly more than the other masters of the graphic arts. We are familiar with 325 sketches of the leader made by Andreyev, the overwhelming majority of which were from nature; further work with them became the base for the outstanding sculptural masterpieces of this artist.

It would be no exaggeration to say that Andreyev's Leniniana is, to this day, a true academy of skill, as wrote sculptor N. V. Tomskiy, for example: "To me, throughout my long years of work, Andreyev's portraits were the finest tuning fork against which I tested myself and my ideas. Such was the impact of the sharpness of interpretation in Andreyev's portraits.... Having absorbed in the course of his work with the original a tremendous stock of live impressions, Andreyev was able to share them with the viewers and, especially, the painters."

The greatest successes of many of those we mentioned and, subsequently, of new masters of graphic Leniniana were achieved during the second half of the 1920s, in the 1930s and later.

In the graphic arts the pioneers' work was taken up by I. E. Grabar', P. V. Vasil'yev, V. A. Serov, A. M. Gerasimov and S. V. Gerasimov. It was precisely in their works that the path was earmarked, subsequently followed in graphic Leniniana. Briefly, it is a path of historical-biographic surges of an image, which is today dominant. The successes achieved in this area are unquestionable. Nevertheless, we cannot consider this the only possible way.

On the one hand, it is an unquestionably valuable fact that the possibilities of plot-topic and, perhaps, composition solutions became inordinately broader. Many pages of Il'ich's biography, starting with his childhood, became the target of the close attention of the painters. Works on the leader were created in various cities and republics throughout the country, particularly in places directly related to Lenin's stay. This circumstance is increasingly becoming an organic part of the spiritual, the creative biography of local painters. Recent examples are the original canvases by Pskov resident A. D. Kirillov "V. I. Lenin and the Pskov ISKRA People. 1900," and "Lenin in Pskov 1900."

It is thanks to this kind of artistic stock that the need for an image synthesis, similar to the one reached in contemporary monument sculpture of the leader is particularly needed. The depth and scale of summation are the strongest features of the pioneers of Leniniana in painting. Their lessons are quite useful today. Along the path we discussed and which has unquestionably proven its worth in the best works, we must thoroughly support the aspiration of the graphic artists to synthesize summations in creating the

character of the great leader on the level of historical and artistic accomplishments currently attained.

After Il'ich's death, one of the first graphic artists to turn to the Leninist topic was B. M. Kustodiyev, who drew a series of splendid illustrations for the book "Children on Lenin." N. N. Zhukov created an extremely rich graphic Leniniana. Ye. A. Kibrik, D. A. Shmarinov and others have also made their contribution to this branch of graphic Leniniana.

Engravings and, to a certain extent, etchings substantially developed in Leniniana starting with the end of the 1920s. In particular, the color etching by I. I. Nivinskiy entitled "ZAGES," created in 1927, is virtually the first attempt in this genre. One of the best engravings on wood, "V. I. Lenin, the Great Leader of the Proletariat," was completed by P. A. Shillingovskiy in 1928, followed by others of his works on this topic. The engravings by P. N. Staronosov "V. I. Lenin Atop an Armored Car" and "V. I. Lenin Engaged in Propaganda Work Among Workers at a Conference of a Social-Democratic Group in Petersburg. 1895" and the portrait engraving on wood "V. I. Lenin" and others, created in the mid-1930s, are interesting above all in terms of topic, composition and technique. It was during that same period that A. I. Kravchenko as well successfully worked on the Leninist topic.

Poster art should be discussed separately. Unfortunately, it is unfairly rarely written about. Yet it is precisely here that today Soviet classical tradition has had an exceptionally successful and varied development. It was started in 1924 by a then young Ukrainian artist, A. I. Strakhov, whose poster "V. I. Lenin" immediately gained public recognition, including abroad, and is still striking with its amazingly inspired and laconically spare yet expressively saturated solution, which is profoundly meaningful, impressive and consistent with the new age.

In the contemporary world poster art, works on the Leninist topic by Soviet poster artists V. S. Ivanov, I. M. Toidze and A. I. Toidze, N. S. Babin, M. A. Getman, V. S. Karakashev and L. Ya. Levshunova, A. M. Lemeshchenko, O. D. Maslyakov, O. M. Savostyuk and B. A. Uspenskiy, A. A. Saldre, V. V. Sachkov and many other first-rate masters are unequalled in terms of execution, relevance and effectiveness.

On 22 January 1924, the workers at the Glukhovskaya Manufaktura, near Moscow, and the peasants in the surrounding villages and hamlets gathered with their families to attend the solemn inauguration of the first monuments to Lenin in the world. By a sad coincidence, the funeral meeting became the ceremony of the inauguration of this monument created by F. P. Kuznetsov, a worker at the factory club.

This talented person worked from memory, without drawings. The figure was cast of reinforced concrete, by sections. Kuznetsov introduced something new in his treatment of the topic; at the same time, like any other amateur, as a whole he was guided by an already existing model. By then the sculpture of Vladimir Il'ich, made by F. K. Lekhta, shown in Moscow in 1923 at the All-Russian Agricultural and Craft Industry Exhibit, which, incidentally, had been visited by Lenin, had gained some fame.

The first composition sculpture, which became a monument and was entirely professional, was completed in 1924. It was the work of G. D. Alekseyev. As a participant in the 1905-1907 revolution, he had immediately undertaken to implement Lenin's plan for propaganda through monuments. Alekseyev, who had met Lenin, was the first to mold from nature such an expressive sculpted portrait of Il'ich that the work became extraordinarily popular even while the leader was still alive and, on the insistence of the local party cells and collectives of working people, could be found in many parts of the country. It is not astounding that it was precisely Alekseyev who then sculpted the figure of the leader, which became an essentially new artistic solution.

Nor is it accidental that A. V. Shchusev used this sculptural composition in designing the whole of the Kazan Railroad Station in Moscow, where the monument stands to this day; a similar composition may be found in many other cities. Essentially, this was the earliest and, as was acknowledged at that time, a successful effort to create a monumental image of the leader of the revolution. The author named his work "The Leader Is Calling."

In his monograph "Obraz V. I. Lenina v Sovetskom Izobrazitel'nom Iskusstve" [V. I. Lenin's Image in Soviet Graphic Art] (1980), A. N. Shefov proved that it was precisely the figure of the leader-tribune which was embodied in the works of other sculptors as well: unwittingly united within the common stream of creative searching, and independently of one another, their works confirmed the vital social need to see the leader, as presented in the first monuments, only as addressing himself to the people. The same spirit prevails in the original compositions of I. D. Shadr--at ZAGES (1925-1927), S. A. Yevseyev, at the Finland Station in Leningrad (1926-1927) and V. V. Kozlov, at Smolnyy (1927).

Subsequently, Leniniana sculpture became both topically and plastically more varied, as exemplified by sculptures of the leader by M. G. Manizer in Ulyanovsk (1940), V. B. Pinchuk in the Kremlin (1967) and V. B. Topuridze, at the Il'ich Plant in Moscow (1967). Particularly close to the traditions of the pioneers in sculpture among later works are those of M. K. Anikushin, erected at Moscow Square in Leningrad (1970). The daring and firmness of the leader of the revolution are the basic motifs of this original monument.

In later years the topic of the international importance of Lenin and Leninism has been increasingly asserted in Soviet monumental sculpture. Let us cite as an example the memorial by N. V. Tomskiy in Berlin (1970) or the Vladimir Il'ich monument in the Finnish city of Turku (1977) which is the first of its kind erected on the request of the government of a nonsocialist European country and is the work of M. K. Anikushin, or the memorial to Lenin (by R. Kh. Muradyan) in the Ethiopian capital (1983) as well as the monument to the leader of the world's proletariat, by L. Ye. Kerbel', in Havana, in fraternal Cuba (1984). This coming September a V. I. Lenin monument, the work of A. A. Tyurenkov, will be inaugurated in Hanoi.

In the mid-1920s Paul Vaillant-Couturier, the French writer and noted communist movement leader, relying on what little he knew at that time, said: "So far it has been impossible to draw Lenin; the features of his face were so

saturated with the inner content of his character that no pencil could describe this." Somewhat earlier, Soviet poet N. G. Poletayev, had written:

No portraits of Lenin can be seen:  
No such thing has been or is.  
The centuries will obviously complete  
The unfinished portrait.

Looking back, we should acknowledge something else, equally just: the greatly significant accuracy and timidity of early graphic works on the subject of Lenin are the result of an initial effort at mastering the subject and searching for adequate artistic solutions. This is priceless. As we pointed out, it was not by accident that the authors of these outstanding ideological and aesthetic accomplishments were, above all, those who began to work on the creation of this great image while being personally in touch with the leader. Without the support of this creative legacy, we could hardly have had truthful and contemporary-looking works on Lenin even in their latest versions.

2

It is universally acknowledged that Gorkiy's essay on Vladimir Il'ich is the best in this genre of literary portrait. It is brilliant in terms of artistic power and depth of penetration.

Its creative development is instructive. In a second draft (1930) the author referred quite harshly to the first (1924): "What I wrote about him (Lenin--editor) soon after his death, was written in a state of depression, hastily and poorly. Some things I could not write about, restrained by a 'tactfulness' which, I hope, is fully understandable." The point is that since that time, pressured by the logic of life itself, Gorkiy was able to revise and refine some of his views, or so it seemed. In the second draft, the writer significantly intensified the motif of Lenin's principle-mindedness in the political struggle and decisively emphasized the highly humane nature of Lenin's policy.

Gorkiy's essay had and continues to have a most beneficial influence on the development of artistic Leniniana and not in our country alone. Without discussing foreign experience at this point, it is worth perhaps merely mentioning the fact that a spiritual, an ideological closeness links Gorkiy's essay to what has been written about Lenin by Rolland, Shaw, Andersen-Nexe, Barbusse, Brecht, Becher, Feuchtwanger, H. Mann, Eluard, Dreiser, Hikmet, Neruda and other among the most noted writers of the 20th century. John Reed's immortal book "Ten Days That Shook the World" is an outstanding literary-publicistic monument to the Great October Socialist Revolution and its leader.

The author's words themselves could become the epigraph to Gorkiy's essay: "Lenin was great in politics but he was also a real, earthy, simple person." The writer masterly described the one feature through the other--clearly, precisely and interlinked. "Il'ich comes alive with you...", N. K. Krupskaya wrote Gorkiy. "Everything is true. Each sentence in your memoirs brings to

mind a number of similar phrases. Furthermore, you loved Il'ich. Someone who did not love him could not have written this way."

About Lenin with love! Such is the great tradition of artistic Leniniana. Gorkiy's outstanding essay set the tone for subsequent works by Soviet writers. Whoever took up the Leninist topic later was well aware of the need for a particularly fine approach to it, bordering on trepidation.

Writer Yu. K. Olesha has voiced a noteworthy thought on written Leniniana: "We still insufficiently rate how important it is for our art to recreate Lenin's image. It is woven with love and delicacy, cautiously, of the most precious and most magic strings of talent. It is as though an order had been organized consisting of artists whose purpose is to create Lenin's image! Mayakovskiy was the first artist belonging to this order."

In poetry, which was what Olesha had in mind above all, the flow of outstanding talent into Leniniana began immediately after the triumph of the October Revolution. At that point, even those whose artistic searches had not been directly in the mainstream of worker poetry, turned to Lenin.

V. Ya. Bryusov's admission is indicative: "...To us, who had lived in Chekhov's Russia in our youth, current events were frankly magical. Naturally, all of us believed the socialist revolution to be a matter of the distant future.... To predict that the revolution was not so far away and that it had to be dealt with now was something accessible only to a person of tremendous wisdom. This is what I find most striking in Lenin."

After Bryusov's poetry, Leniniana was enriched with the works of N. N. Aseyev, S. A. Obradovich and B. L. Pasternak, whose expressive lines about the leader are aphoristic:

He controlled the flow of thoughts  
And only because of this, the country.

An all-union Leninist roll call involving the multinational Soviet poetry appeared and became widespread. Verses and poems were dedicated to the leader by Belorussian Ya. Kupala, Georgian G. V. Tabidze, Kazakh I. Dzhanugurov, Yakut P. A. Oyunskiy, Armenian Ye. A. Charents, Abkhaz S. Ya. Chanba, Lezgin S. Stal'skiy, Tatar Kh. Kh. Taktash, and others. It is well known that a number of works in languages which had been given an alphabet began under the Soviet period with works on Lenin, such as the Kirghiz, Balkar, Mari, which was started by A. Tokombayev, K. B. Mechiyev and others.

In the course of time, poetic Leniniana was joined by N. S. Tikhonov, M. V. Isakovskiy, S. P. Shchipachev, A. Tvardovskiy and many others. The Leninist topic blossomed like never before in oral folk creations during the 1920s and, particularly, the beginning of the 1930s. This was a folklore which, as Gorkiy pointed out in his address to the First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers, "elevated Vladimir Lenin to the height of a mythical hero of antiquity, equal to Prometheus."

A brilliant revolutionary on a global scale: it was precisely such a rarely meaningful depiction that V. V. Mayakovskiy was able to provide in a poetic form. The classical poem on the leader and other works of Leniniana by one of the initiators of Soviet literature prove that the poet was quite well aware that it was precisely Lenin, with his entire bright and bigger than life personality, who was giving to him, to Mayakovskiy, the inspiration and spiritual strength to accomplish his main poetic exploit, which is what he did. The poet had become internally prepared for it. The poem "Vladimir Il'ich Lenin," one of the best works in world poetry in the 20th century, was written in the course of a few months only.

We find an interesting testimony in the newspaper RABOCHAYA MOSKVA which, in an article entitled "Mayakovskiy's Poem 'Lenin' Facing the Court of the Party Aktiv," reported on one of the first public readings of the new work, given on 21 October 1924 in the Red Hall of the Moscow RKP(b) Committee: "The hall was crowded. The poem was welcomed with the applause of the entire hall.... The tremendous majority of the speakers agreed that the poem was fully ours, that Mayakovskiy's poem was a great proletarian accomplishment. Mayakovskiy answered his opponents after the debates. In particular, he pointed out that he wanted to present Lenin's strong figure against the background of the entire history of the revolution."

We know that Mayakovskiy never met Vladimir Il'ich personally, although a meeting was planned and was scheduled after the recovery of the leader. But then, there was the poem "Conversation With Comrade Lenin." Added to this were "We Do Not Believe!" "Lenin Is With Us!" "Good!" "At the Top of My Lungs," "Leninists" and many others.

"Lenin's heart will always thump in the chest of the revolution," Mayakovskiy wrote. As we pointed out, this poetic baton was taken up in all of our republics. This makes even more indicative and instructive the exigency which was always present in his contemporaries: the idea of the imperfection of their writings and the disparity between the first, albeit outstanding, efforts and the tremendous task which literature and art faced.

Yesenin told his friend P. I. Chagin, at one point editor of the newspaper BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY: "I owe something to the character of Lenin, for what I wrote about him in 'Captain of the Earth' and 'The Law Has Not Been Ratified, the Country Is Rumbling Like a Storm,' is a weak contribution to the memory of a person who did not kick Russia upwards, like Peter the Great, but who kicked our entire earth." Many of Yesenin's projects, including those related to the image of the leader, remained undone due to the death of the poet.

Poetic Leniniana of the 1920s, since we are discussing essentially its pioneers, contains a lesson of permanent value to the present and future generations of creators and, let us add, readers of poetic Leniniana: a lesson which teaches us standards, high exigency, responsibility, inspiration and skill.

Lenin has been depicted in poetry, prose and plays by many outstanding Soviet masters of culture. They encountered creative problems which, although creating many discussions, are being gradually settled through practical experience. Let us briefly mention as an example the question of quoting excerpts from Lenin's texts and documents in a work of art. It is quite complex.

The culminating point in the play "The Death of the Squadron," by A. Ye. Korneychuk is a scene in which a radiogram sent by Lenin is read out loud. "I had the occasion," the author later recalled, "to see many stagings of the 'Death of the Squadron,' and always a storm of applause broke out in the hall after Lenin's document was read. Such is the power of Lenin's words. In working on the play I had realized the emotional charge of Lenin's documents, as though compressing within themselves the experience of a heroic age. The poetry of such documents is truly inexhaustible."

Years later, when the art of the screen and the stage had found ways for the direct representation of Lenin's character by an actor, N. F. Pogodin, one of the founders of theater and movie Leniniana, energetically objected to quotation-mongering: "I realized that despite the great awe caused by Lenin's personality, I should deal with his character as I would with any other literary character. Otherwise, the result would be nil: the character would lose its vital immediacy and quotations would take priority and inevitably become extraneous to the artistic fabric of the play."

It was discovered, as a result, that everything rested on a sense of measure and, above all, on the novelty, talent and creative power of the solution. The scene from "Death of the Squadron" we mentioned was included in the retrospective show presented by the Leningrad Bol'shoy Drama Theater "Rereading...." Half a century after the first staging, the scene in which Lenin's radiogram is read out loud is perceived from a certain distance and, in this respect, somewhat differently, yet with the same sense of emotion: with a lump in the throat. The painful note of high tragedy in the finale of Korneychuk's play moves the modern viewer to the point of tears. Such is the magic of high art, which elevates us to the historical and moral heights of the revolution. In his own way, Pogodin as well turned out to be right. In many other plays, motion pictures, novels and stories about the leader, citations from Lenin's works, abundantly quoted, indeed began to drop out of the context of the work in an unnatural fashion. As a result, some authors developed a sort of citation phobia syndrome, which was subsequently surmounted: an artistically reinterpreted experience according to which excerpts from Lenin's speeches become naturally woven into the fabric of a play, are an intrinsic part of the text.

We know that for a long time, through the end of the 1930s, the unusual and difficult problem of presenting the living Lenin on the stage and the screen triggered a lack of confidence in the very possibilities of playwriting as an art. That same Pogodin was initially confused: "I could not make myself trust the possibility of carrying out this idea.... For one way or another,

you must guide the character and make it act in a certain way.... But how to control Lenin's character?"

The same fully understandable shyness made it doubtful that any traditionally trained actor would be able to become part of Lenin's inner world and find suitable means to express it. Such extensive doubts affected even an inordinately good director such as S. M. Eisenstein. We know that it was for precisely that reason that he refused to use a professional actor in "October," one of his best movies, and an outstanding creation of world cinematography during the silent film period. In this first artistic attempt to show the leader on the screen, it was particularly taken into consideration the fact that Nikandrov, the worker from Perm, who played Lenin, looked exceptionally like Lenin and that, in general, the essential idea was to achieve documentary veracity through artistic means.

Now, when the stormy feelings which this work triggered have become history, we can calmly and most objectively say that Eisenstein was able to compensate for his rejection of a detailed work on the character of Lenin by an actor, with the artistic nature of the overall idea: the fact that, to use a later statement by the director himself, "a revolutionary-biographic film must carry, along with the name of the leader it interprets, something like a concealed subtitle of the topic, which will be the clearest of all." In the film "October," this was the theme of the people's revolution, the people's Lenin. It was precisely this that was highly rated by his contemporaries, including Krupskaya. However, she nevertheless pointed out that the depiction of Il'ich had been unsuccessful. This was the result of the lack of a developed script and great acting talent.

Initially, the actors themselves had little faith that they would be able to absorb Lenin's character and to present it adequately. For example, even when a master of the stage such as A. M. Buchma was offered the role of Vladimir Il'ich (in Korneychuk's play "The Truth"), this outstanding Ukrainian actor spontaneously exclaimed: "To play Lenin? Could one play the revolution?" However, his performance turned out to be quite outstanding.

In attending a rehearsal of the play "Yegor Bulychov and Others," at the Theater imeni Yevg Vakhtangov, Gorkiy was the first to say that actor B. V. Shchukin would be able to play Lenin. Indeed, subsequently Shchukin quite successfully played the leader in the films "Lenin in October" and "Lenin in 1918" and in the play "A Man With a Weapon" at the Vakhtangov Theater.

Although the years 1937-1939, when Leniniana in theater and cinema began, are now far behind us (along with these works, other plays appeared, such as "On the Banks of the Neva" and "The Truth," based on the plays of K. A. Trenev and A. Ye. Korneychuk, and the film by S. I. Yutkevich "Man With a Weapon," in which M. M. Shtraukh played Lenin), the modern masters of the arts and the audiences are familiar with this anxious exigency displayed by the first performers, which led them to their creative victories.

In describing his experience from joint work with Shchukin, director M. I. Romm wrote that "it is being said about Lenin that he was a simple person. This definition says very little. Lenin was also an unusually surprising

person and, as we study his behavior, we invariably reach the conclusion that his character and behavior in ordinary life, in conversation with the family, in talks with friends, and so on, cannot be entirely understood until this behavior becomes a kind of projection of the greatest genius of the revolution."

Attaining Lenin's firm ties with life in its entirety objectively excludes any monotony in artistic Leniniana and includes the possibility of many and different character discoveries and revelations, as should be the case with true art.

The best works of artistic Leniniana are noted for their innovative searches. In the playwright Pogodin, in "Man With a Weapon," Lenin is an organizer in the storm of events; in "Bells of the Kremlin," while interpreting the present he dreams of the country's future. In the film by director S. I. Lyutkevich "Man With a Weapon," "Stories About Lenin," "Lenin in Poland" and "Lenin in Paris," entirely different approaches to the artistic task have been taken and different original solutions found.

Starting with the first outstanding works of Leniniana, it has centered on the character of the active fighter for socialism, who believed in the people's ability to build a new world. This is always the character of a consistent and irreconcilable fighter against what is hostile and alien to socialism wherever it may be and, in particular, against that which hinders our progress in our own environment. Hence the critical, as well as self-critical principle, which is so typical of the life-asserting enthusiasm of Leniniana.

The pioneers of artistic Leniniana were masters at the peak of their forces, most frequently well-established major writers, poets, playwrights, directors, actors, painters and composers. It was this which ensured the high and sometimes highest possible standards of their creations. Subsequently as well, however, already established talents as a rule dealt with the character of Lenin. Among composers, they included D. D. Shostakovich and V. Ya. Shebalin. Prose writers included M. M. Zoshchenko with his beautiful cycle of lyrical stories about Lenin written for children, and M. S. Shaginyan, V. P. Katayev, E. G. Kazakevich and M. P. Prilezhayeva. Shaginyan's Leniniana is inordinately rich. The most profound, philosophically meaningful and most closely related to topical problems of our time is the work of this writer "Four Lessons From Lenin," which is a straight continuation and fruitful development of Gorkiy's tradition.

In recent years, the history of our party is becoming increasingly the topic of depiction in literary Leniniana, for which reason some narrations are justifiably considered not only historical-biographic but political novels as well.

What are today the basic sources for those who work in the field of artistic Leniniana or intend to try their forces in it?

Naturally, they are, above all, the leader's works themselves and his extremely rich epistolary legacy. Still topical, although said a long time ago, are N. K. Krupskaya's words: "Today writers, painters, actors, movie

directors and museum curators...are heatedly discussing how to present Lenin's image most completely and accurately. ...In order to present the living Il'ich...one should study his works as thoroughly as possible." Here is more advice which Nadezhda Konstantinovna gave to the masters of culture, worth recalling: maintain closer ties with the masses "to bring to light what at a particular moment makes Il'ich close to one stratum of working people or another, and the reason for which he continue to live in their hearts."

The biographic chronicle of V. I. Lenin, compiled by the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism, has become a new and valuable aid.

Let us particularly mention memoirs. Many party veterans have set in their memoirs the example of strictest possible exigency concerning each reported fact or sentence about Lenin, in literally every single word in their memoirs. The same type of strict exigency was found in the masters of culture and the pioneers of the new topic. Important in all this was the ethical continuity which was clearly present in the works of the first creators of artistic Leniniana. The men of literature and the arts themselves have written their memoirs on their encounters with the leader. This is another most valuable source for those who wish to make their contribution to graphic Leniniana.

The identification and interpretation of creative experience in Leniniana have been the topics of special studies. This applies, above all, to the books "Pravda Obraza--Pravda Istorii" [The Truth of the Character Is the Truth of History] by V. I. Baranov, "Pravda i Poeziya Leninskogo Obraza" [Truth and Poetry in the Image of Lenin] by N. V. Zaytsev, "Ogni Smolnogo" [The Fires of Smolnyy] by A. V. Karaganov, "Sovetskaya Leniniana" [Soviet Leniniana] by V. M. Piskunov, "Zhiveye Vsekh Zhivykh" [More Alive Than the Living] by N. A. Potapov and the monograph by A. N. Shefov we mentioned.

A historically new artistic generation (and a new audience) has now entered or is entering Leniniana. The efforts made by the contemporary generation and the various experiments have had a different degree of success. However, they are similar in terms of their truthfulness to the profound trends of Soviet Leniniana.

Frankly speaking, few works directly about Lenin have been created of late. Most frequently, it is as though the image of the leader is presented indirectly in creative practice, through the eyes of one of his fellow workers or another, who acts as the main character (such as the many stories in the "Fiery Revolutionaries" series). This way of artistic surges, which is currently dominant, widens the bridgehead of graphic Leniniana, but noticeably predominates over increasingly infrequent appearances of new outstanding works on Vladimir Il'ich himself.

The experience of the old masters of Leniniana has largely retained its significance as an artistic incentive, not to mention the fact that the best works of the pioneers on the Leninist topic continue to have an impressive ideological and aesthetic influence on millions of people. The leitmotif of such works--historical truthfulness and the moral purity of the socialist revolution--remain topical and imperishable.

Time has proved that turning to this great character has resulted in outstanding accomplishments in the entire artistic culture of the 20th century. Along this way, Soviet literature and art have been able successfully to resolve essentially new ideological and creative problems and attain high benchmarks. It is no accident that the birth of artistic Leniniana, actively fighting for lofty humanistic ideals, is related to the names of the cultural giants of our century. Having fully experienced the difficulties and joys of such inspired artistic work, the pioneers have bequeathed to others loyalty to historical truth, multiplied by the depth of penetration and totally unrestrained creative freedom: the freedom to serve the people and class vigilance, combined with strictest possible authorship exigency. It is precisely thanks to Soviet artistic Leniniana that Lenin is always with us.

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## THE GREAT VICTORY. RESULTS AND LESSONS

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[Article by S. Sokolov, USSR minister of defense and marshal of the Soviet Union--capitalized passages published in italics]

[Text] On 9 May 1985, 40 years will have passed from the day when the Soviet people and their armed forces victoriously concluded the Great Patriotic War. We observe this important date of the heroic annals of the Soviet state in the situation of high political activeness and work enthusiasm elicited by the preparations for the forthcoming 27th CPSU Congress. The land of the soviets, led by its tested vanguard, the communist party, firmly and consistently follows the Leninist course of socialism and peace.

Implementing the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the subsequent plenums of the party Central Committee, the working people of cities and villages enthusiastically participate in socialist competitions for the fulfillment of the 1985 plans and of the 11th Five-Year Plan as a whole. They persistently strive to raise the efficiency of the national economy and to accelerate scientific-technical progress. Our fatherland's economic potential and defense might are growing from year to year, the sociopolitical, ideological and international unity of the socialist society is becoming even firmer and the well-being of the people is improving.

The March 1985 Extraordinary CPSU Central Committee Plenum demonstrated with a new force the unshakable unity of the communist party and the Soviet people. The Soviet people are uniting even more closely around the communist party, they unanimously support its domestic and foreign policies and strive to make a worthy contribution to the implementation of its course aimed at accelerating the country's socioeconomic development, strengthening its economic and defense power, further improving the life of the working people and strengthening peace and fruitful cooperation between peoples.

Taking pride in the achieved successes, the Soviet people see the source of these successes in our glorious revolutionary, battle and work traditions. Now, 4 decades after the victory, it is important again and again to look back both at what was experienced during the war years, at what happened after the

war and at the future prospects opening up before our country and the entire world today.

The results and lessons of the past war are of lasting importance for instilling a high degree of vigilance in the peoples and for mobilizing all social forces to rebuff the aggressive intrigues of instigators of war.

The Great Patriotic War was the battle of the world's first country of socialism against the most reactionary shock force of world imperialism, Hitlerite Germany and its allies, a battle that in its scale and bitterness was unprecedented in history. Launching their perfidious attack against the Soviet Union, the bosses of the fascist reich intended to liquidate the Soviet state, annihilate socialism as a social system, and, having seized our country's territory and national resources, to pave their way to world domination.

To carry out its monstrous plans, fascist Germany built the most powerful war machine of the capitalist world of that time. Several European states fell one after another under its onslaught. The Nazi Wehrmacht was fully mobilized and deployed and supplemented by the forces of Germany's satellites and surpassed the Red Army not only in the numerical strength of its fully mobilized troops and its technical equipment but also in its combat experience.

And yet, the Hitlerites' criminal plans to achieve world domination were not destined to be realized. Forces were found which stopped the aggressor and inflicted a crushing defeat on him. The Soviet people and their army, led by the communist party, played the decisive role in the defeat of fascism, the most evil enemy of mankind.

Our country contrasted Nazi Germany's goals of conquest with liberating and just goals: defense of the socialist fatherland, assistance to the enslaved European peoples in the struggle for freedom and independence, their release from the fascist yoke and annihilation of the Hitlerite misanthropic and antipopular political regime.

Our road to victory was hard and long. The combat operations developed on an enormous front extending from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea and continued without interruption for 1,418 days and nights. The beginning of the war turned out extremely unfavorably for the Soviet Union. The sudden powerful attack by the Hitlerite hordes came upon it at a time when the organizational restructuring and technical reequipping that were being carried out in the Red Army had not yet been completed. In the beginning period of the war the Soviet people had to taste the bitter pill of failures and losses. The enemy reached Moscow and Leningrad and advanced to the shores of the Volga and foothills of the Caucasus.

In the face of the mortal danger hanging over our fatherland, the Soviet people displayed unprecedented steadfastness and an inflexible will for victory. "Our cause is just. The enemy will be smashed. Victory will be ours"---this slogan of the communist party rallied and inspired the fighters at the front and the workers in the rear, as well as those who found themselves

in the temporarily occupied territories, to selfless feats in the name of the socialist fatherland.

Mounting a heroic resistance against the enemy, exhausting the enemy's crack divisions in bloody battles and engagements, and destroying manpower and equipment, the Red Army staunchly defended itself and inflicted upon the enemy powerful counterstrikes. Our army and naval forces were gaining combat experience from day-to-day, were growing stronger and more hardened, continued to receive an ever greater quantity of the world's best tanks, aircraft, artillery, rocket launchers and were mastering the science of winning.

The unforgettable battle of Moscow was the decisive military-political event of the first year of the war. It was in the winter of 1941-42 in the approaches to the Soviet capital that the fascist "blitzkrieg" [molniiyenosnaya voyna] plan was finally and definitely thwarted and the myth of the "invincibility" of the German army dispelled. That was the first great defeat of the Hitlerite forces in World War II. The dawn of our victory started on the snow-covered fields around Moscow.

A grateful mankind will honor forever the unparalleled heroism of the defenders of Stalingrad. In the summer of 1942, one of the most grandiose battles of the past war flared up in the region between the Volga and Don rivers. The victory of Stalingrad was the beginning of a radical turn in the course of the Great Patriotic War and the entire World War II. The military might of fascist Germany and its prestige were undermined. At the same time, the international authority of the Soviet Union and its armed forces increased. The crushing defeat of the Hitlerite hordes on the shores of the Volga contributed to the upsurge of the liberation struggle in occupied Europe and to the strengthening of the anti-Hitlerite coalition.

The Red Army's victory in the battle of Kursk was a stage-marking event of the war. Whereas the battle of Stalingrad heralded a decline of the German fascist army, the battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943 placed it before a catastrophe.

As a result of the victory in the Kursk bulge and the advance of the Soviet forces to Dnepr, a radical turn in the war was completed. The enemy suffered losses so great that it could no longer recover from them. The Soviet armed forces captured the strategic initiative and then held it firmly in their hands until the end of the war.

The mass heroism and feats of Soviet soldiers in the battles and engagements by Leningrad, in the northern Caucasus, Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia and the Baltic region and in the liberation of the peoples of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and other European countries from the Nazi yoke will not be blotted out of the people's memory.

The Berlin operation concluded the war against Hitlerite Germany. The fascists resisted with the desperation of the doomed. Nevertheless, early in the morning of 1 May 1945, the red banner was already flying over the dome of the Reichstag. Having suffered a total defeat, fascist Germany was forced to sign an act of unconditional capitulation.

In inflicting a crushing defeat on the enemy, the Soviet people and their armed forces under the communist party's leadership protected the cause of the October Revolution and defended the freedom and independence of their socialist motherland. By routing the Hitlerite invaders, the Red Army fulfilled with honor its liberating mission and delivered the peoples of Europe from fascist slavery. Our forces entered the territories of European states in conformity with the then existing treaties and agreements that were fully in accord with the norms of international law.

The victory over fascism was won with the efforts of many peoples and states that had united for the struggle against Nazi Germany. The military formations and partisans of Yugoslavia waged a selfless struggle against the invaders from 1941 onwards. The Polish and Czechoslovak armies fought bravely together with the Red Army. The actions of the patriots of Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and Hungary, of the participants of the resistance movement that spread widely in the occupied countries will be forever entered in the annals of the antifascist struggle.

The communists, loyal sons of their peoples, selfless fighters for the national and social liberation of their peoples and ardent internationalists were in the front ranks of the liberation struggle.

The peoples and armies of the United States, Great Britain, France, China and other countries of the antifascist coalition made a great contribution to the victory in World War II. We value in a worthy manner the role of our allies in the struggle against fascism. At the same time, it is a historically indisputable fact that precisely the Soviet Union represented the main force which barred to Hitlerite Germany the road to world domination and that the main weight of the war fell precisely on the shoulders of our people and on the Soviet armed forces.

The governments of Great Britain and the United States delayed the fulfillment of the allied obligations which they had assumed. Instead of opening the second front without delay, they limited themselves to carrying out operations in the peripheral theaters of World War II. The allied forces landed in France only when it had become absolutely obvious that the Soviet Union was capable of inflicting the final defeat on fascist Germany even without the assistance of the allies.

The Soviet-German front continued to be the main and decisive front also after the opening of the second front. The successes of the USSR armed forces and their brilliant offensive operations had a determining impact on the course of combat operations on other fronts, including the operations of the allies in Western Europe and on the entire military-political situation in the world. The fate of World War II was decided precisely on the Soviet-German front.

Thus, the Soviet people and their armed forces made a decisive contribution to the victory over Hitlerite Germany and its allies, to the liberation of the peoples of Europe from slavery, and to the salvation of world civilization and fulfilled with honor their patriotic and international duty. This represents their great service to mankind.

Striving in every way possible to pass over in silence and distort the Soviet Union's role in the war, the bourgeois falsifiers of history try to explain the defeat of Nazi Germany with various kinds of accidental circumstances: the mistakes of Hitler as a political and military leader, unfavorable weather and climatic conditions in the USSR and the like. These attempts can withstand no serious criticism.

THE SOVIET UNION'S VICTORY IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR WAS A LAW-DETERMINED PHENOMENON. THE SOURCES OF THE STRENGTH AND MIGHT OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND ITS ARMED FORCES LIE IN THE VERY NATURE OF THE SOCIALIST SOCIAL AND STATE SYSTEM, IN THE SOCIALIST ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND IN SOCIALISM'S INDISPUTABLE ADVANTAGES OVER CAPITALISM. The Great Patriotic War convincingly demonstrated that the Soviet state founded by Lenin and based on the monolithic unity of the communist party and the people, the indissoluble alliance between the workers class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the working intelligentsia, and the international unity of all nations and nationalities in the country, is the most stable state in the world.

During the bleak years of the struggle against fascism the whole world was once again convinced of the profound truth of Lenin's words that the people defending its Soviet power, its just cause and its future would never be conquered.

Through the will of the communist party and the millions and millions of Soviet people the entire country was turned into a united combat camp and firm unity between the front and the rear, the party, the people and the army was ensured. THE USSR SOCIAL AND STATE SYSTEM, AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF SOCIALIST SOCIETY MADE IT POSSIBLE TO INVOLVE THE BROADEST POPULAR MASSES AND ALL OF THE COUNTRY'S INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ENEMY.

The indissoluble friendship and fraternity between the peoples of the USSR was a great source of the combat might of our country and the armed forces. While preparing for aggression, the fascist leaders regarded the Soviet Union and its army as an artificial union of nations and nationalities. They counted on disarming the Soviet multinational people morally, kindling anti-Russian sentiments in the non-Russian soldiers and destroying the friendship between our peoples. However, the Hitlerites seriously miscalculated. The threat of enslavement looming over the socialist motherland not only did not separate the peoples of the USSR or shake their confidence in victory, but, on the contrary, rallied all the Soviet people together even more closely. The friendship between the peoples of the USSR was strengthened and tempered in the crucible of severe ordeals. History knows no other example when patriotism and internationalism assumed such a nationwide nature as at the front and in the rear during the Great Patriotic War.

The outcome of the struggle against the invaders was decided both on the battle fields and in the great battle for metal and grain, fuel and raw materials. The socialist system made it possible to fully utilize the country's economic potential for the needs of the war. In a short space of time the USSR national economy was reorganized for military purposes,

production facilities were evacuated from regions under threat, a coordinated military economy was formed and the production of combat equipment and weapons developed at ever increasing rates. The Soviet socialist economy graphically demonstrated its great stability and mobility and also its capacity for rapid reorganization to meet military needs and its ability to function reliably while satisfying the needs of the armed forces and maintaining the vital activity of the state.

Our scientific and design ideas successfully developed during the war. Effective methods of increasing military production and improving its technology were developed.

By the end of 1942 the Red Army surpassed the fascist Wehrmacht in terms of the number of its artillery guns and tanks 1.5 times, and 1.3 times in its fighter planes. The socialist economy gained the upper hand over the economy of fascist Germany for which the industries of its allies and of many European countries temporarily occupied by the Hitlerites also worked.

THE VICTORY IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR CONFIRMED THE POWERFUL VITAL FORCE OF MARXIST-LENINIST IDEOLOGY. Great ideological conviction, boundless faith in the rightness of the great cause of the communist party, Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism served as an inexhaustible source of spiritual strength for the Soviet people and its soldiers and of their moral-political cohesion and inspired the Soviet people in battle and in work.

The Soviet soldier on the battlefields of the Great Patriotic War demonstrated matchless moral-combat tasks. Neither temporary failures and defeats nor the harsh conditions of camp and combat life shook his will for victory. The great moral spirit of the soldiers and officers in the Soviet armed forces generated an offensive upsurge, steadfastness in defense and conscious discipline.

The peoples of Europe and other continents saw the Soviet soldier as a man of the new world, a soldier-patriot and a soldier-internationalist, whose noble image became a symbol of heroism and the personification of an ardent fighter for the freedom and happiness of the working people the world over.

The humanism of the Soviet soldier was clearly manifest in the conduct of the Soviet soldiers during combat operations on the territory of Germany. We did not identify the German people with fascism. Despite the fact that Hitler's army caused our country incalculable damage, the Soviet soldiers entered Germany not as conquerors and avengers, but as the German people's liberators from Nazism.

What could the Hitlerite invaders offer in contrast to the great communist ideals, our humanism, Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism? Their ideological arsenal consisted of extremely reactionary, chauvinistic, expansionist, misanthropic theories imbued with a spirit of anticommunism, militarism and racism. The Nazi leaders preached that the German people were the "supreme race" and instilled in every German "awareness of his superiority" over other nations and his "right" to dominate them. The war revealed the fanatical essence of the Nazi ideology and the bestiality of

Hitler's army. The soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht appeared before the whole of mankind as murderers, marauders and aggressors. All this predetermined the bankruptcy of fascist ideology.

In contrast to this, the triumph of communist ideology and morals was a clear manifestation of socialism's superiority over capitalism.

THE VICTORY GAINED IN THE BATTLES OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR WAS THE VICTORY OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES formed by the socialist revolution, educated by the communist party and closely united with the people. The war convincingly demonstrated the indisputable superiority of our military organization over the military organization of the aggressor. It confirmed the correctness of the basic tenets of Soviet military science and military art and brought about their further development.

During the war our armed forces conducted more than 50 strategic operations, approximately 250 front operations and thousands of battles and skirmishes, thereby greatly enriching military theory and practice. The experience of the Great Patriotic War, acquired by the blood of millions of Soviet people, still retains its permanent significance.

The offensive operations of the Soviet troops were characterized by their ever increasing scale, skillful selection of the axis of the main thrust, skillful massing of forces and equipment at decisive points, use of methods of routing the enemy appropriate to the situation and high results. Each new offensive operation, as a rule, differed from previous operations in the originality of the plan and the form of the maneuver. The Soviet command successfully resolved such complex problems as ensuring an advantageous correlation of forces, correctly selecting the time to go to the offensive, skillfully organizing the breakthrough of defenses prepared well in advance, secretly forming strike groups and reserves, bringing them into battle in good time, achieving strategic, operational and tactical surprise and gaining supremacy in the air.

Effective ways of defeating the enemy by firepower were found and extensively utilized in the course of the war, such as artillery and air offensives. Considerable experience was accumulated in developing offensive operations, maintaining their continuity, increasing the force of a thrust by means of introducing into the breakthrough operational movement--tank and mechanized--formations and groups and forcing the crossing of water obstacles. Operations to surround and destroy large German fascist groups were models of high military art.

The Soviet troops demonstrated great skill when organizing and conducting defense operations and combat. Their aims were achieved through the timely preparation of defense lines and positions, great activeness on the part of the defending units and formations, the conducting of powerful counterthrusts, the maneuvering of forces and equipment, the skillful use of artillery, aircraft, antitank weapons and engineering troops and the formation of essential reserves.

Firm control of the troops, organized interaction and operational, combat and rear supply contributed to successfully conducting offensive and defensive operations and engagements.

The unprecedented scale of the war posed the Soviet generals difficult tasks. And, despite all the complexities and difficulties of the situation, they resolved these tasks skillfully and creatively. The most prominent victories of the Great Patriotic War are connected with the names of generals and commanders such as G. K., Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevskiy, S. K. Timoshenko, S. M. Budenny, K. Ye. Voroshilov, B. M. Shaposhnikov, A. I. Antonov, I. Kh. Bagramyan, N. F. Vatutin, N. N. Vornov, L. A. Govorov, A. G. Golovko, A. I. Yeremenko, I. S. Konev, N. G. Kuznetsov, R. Ya. Malinovskiy, K. A. Meretskov, A. Novikov, F. S. Oktybrskiy, I. Ye. Petrov, K. K. Rokossovskiy, F. I. Tolbukhin, V. F. Tributs, I. D. Chernyakhovskiy and many others who grew and reached manhood in the course of bitter battles and engagements. They surpassed Hitler's generals in every element of strategy, operational art and tactics.

The successful conducting of many battles and engagements was made possible thanks to the intensive work of the General Staff, the Main Political Directorate and other departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense.

Our glorious officers demonstrated great organizational qualities and the ability to gain victory over the enemy under the most complex conditions. We pay a tribute of deep respect to the courage and steadfastness of the Soviet soldier, who bore the great weight of the war on his shoulders. The Soviet troops demonstrated selflessness, unprecedented courage and steadfastness and the ability to successfully conduct combat operations both in defense and in attack. They were distinguished by a high standard of military training, sharpness, initiative, the desire to fulfill their combat tasks at any price, mutual assistance in battle and the ability to make full use of the fire power and maneuvering potentials of their weapons.

Of course, these qualities did not appear immediately. All who led subunits, units and formations and personally participated in the bitter struggle against the enemy with weapons in their hands persistently learned the art of waging war in the course of the war itself.

Soviet partisans and participants in the underground made a significant contribution to the victory over the fascist invaders. Their operations in the enemy's rear were coordinated with the army's combat operations. From the very first days of the Great Patriotic War the partisan movement assumed a nationwide nature and was an inalienable part of the Soviet people's great patriotic achievements during the bleak war years.

An important role in gaining victory over Hitler's Germany was played by the skillfully organized and equally skillfully implemented STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP OF ARMED STRUGGLE. This leadership was founded on the Leninist principle of unity of political, state and military leadership. All the most important problems of leading the country's defense and the armed forces were resolved by the party Central Committee, the Central Committee Politburo and the State

Committee for Defense headed by I. V. Stalin via the Supreme Command Headquarters and its working organ--the General Staff.

The leadership of military operations was based on the firm foundation of Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army and was of a creative nature. It was distinguished by an organic combination of centralized control and intelligent initiative on the part of commanders in the field, the correspondence of adopted decisions to the existing military-political and operational-strategic situation, thoroughness in preparing for military operations, persistency and determination in achieving set aims, close connection with the troops and constant concern to maintain their high morale.

THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR WAS AN UNEXAMPLED FEAT BY ALL OUR PEOPLE--THE MILLIONS OF SOVIET PEOPLE AT THE FRONT, IN THE REAR AND ON TERRITORY TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED BY THE ENEMY. The noble, lofty aims of the war gave birth to thousands upon thousands of heroes who did not begrudge their lives in the struggle against the hated enemy. More than 11,000 soldiers in the army and navy were awarded combat distinction of the highest degree--the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and more than 7 million were awarded orders and medals.

Mass heroism was shown by rear workers, the workers class, the kolkhoz peasantry, the working intelligentsia and Soviet women and young people. They worked as if there were no limits to human possibilities and, despite incredible difficulties, honorably fulfilled their patriotic duty and supplied the front with weapons, ammunition, equipment and food supplies. Our people will always remember their great feat of labor with immense gratitude. During the war years 198 rear workers were made Heroes of Socialist Labor and 204,000 were awarded orders and medals. More than 16 million were awarded the medal "For Valiant Labor in the 1941-1945 Great Patriotic War."

THE GLORIOUS COMMUNIST PARTY WAS THE INSPIRER AND ORGANIZER OF OUR VICTORY IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR. Foreseeing the possibility of imperialist aggression, the party adopted the necessary measures in the prewar period in order to ensure a reliable defense of the Soviet state.

Implementation of the grandiose Leninist plan for building socialism--industrializing the country, collectivizing agriculture, developing science and culture and strengthening friendship between the peoples of the USSR and the moral-political unity of Soviet society--created a firm foundation for our defense capabilities and the combat might of the Soviet armed forces.

From the very beginning of the war the party was the sociopolitical force which rallied, organized and inspired millions of Soviet people to feats of arms and labor. It channeled the efforts of the people and the armed forces into routing the enemy through the whole of its multifaceted political and organizational activity, inflexible will and revolutionary energy.

The communist party was truly a militant party. As always, its combat staff was the Central Committee, which firmly adhered to Lenin's behests in its activities. The best sons of the party were sent to the most difficult and dangerous, decisive sectors of the struggle against the enemy. They were models of great ideological steadfastness, courage and unity of word and deed,

cemented the front ranks and the rear workers and were their conscience and their soul. The slogan "Communists Forward!" was the law for everyone. Through personal example and their ardent party words they inspired and led the Soviet people to victory at the front and in the rear.

Nearly one-third of the members of the Central Committee, many secretaries of central committees of union republics, kraykoms, obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms and many prominent party workers were at the front.

Three million communists died the death of the brave on the battlefields, but new patriots and internationalists replaced in the party formation those who were killed. About 3.5 million persons were admitted to party membership during the war years. And this fact is the most convincing evidence of the Soviet people's boundless love for their party and a testimony to its greatest authority among the masses of people.

The cohesion of all Soviet people under the banner of the communist party is one of the most important sources of invincibility of the socialist state and was a decisive condition for its victories of worldwide importance in the past war.

The Leninist Komsomol was the party's reliable helper in solving the tasks at the fronts and in the rear. From the first to the last days of savage battle against the Hitlerite aggressors, the fatherland's young patriots bravely fought shoulder-to-shoulder with their older comrades, astounding the world with their fearlessness and selflessness. Nearly 5 million soldiers joined the Komsomol ranks. Many thousands of Komsomol members were partisans and underground fighters in the enemy rear. And everywhere, fighting against the fascist occupiers, they demonstrated their great political maturity, combat solidarity and boundless devotion to the cause of communism.

THE PAST 4 DECADES HAVE EVEN MORE STRIKINGLY AND FULLY DEMONSTRATED THE WORLDWIDE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF OUR VICTORY. Having routed the aggressors and defended their fatherland's freedom and independence, the Soviet people gained the possibility of resuming their peaceful socialist construction. The grave wounds inflicted by the war were healed in a short time as a result of the heroic efforts of the party and people. In the difficult conditions of "cold war" unleashed against us by the imperialists, the Soviet Union succeeded in advancing to the foremost levels of socioeconomic development. Thanks to the firm and consistent policy of the communist party, the Soviet society's political system, the socialist democracy, is steadily developing and the all-people's state is strengthening. The Soviet Union's authority has immeasurably increased and its international positions have been strengthened.

The defeat of German fascism and, subsequently, of Japanese militarism had a most profound impact on the entire course of mankind's development. The world capitalist system was weakened to a significant extent and the general crisis of capitalism was deepened as a result of the defeat of that most reactionary detachment of international imperialism. The peoples of a number of European and Asian countries overthrew the power of capitalists and landowners and embarked on the course of building the socialist society. The world socialist

system was born, which is growing and becoming stronger, and which has now turned into the main force of historical progress.

The liberation struggle against the German fascists and Japanese aggressors raised the class self-awareness of the proletariat; the influence of communist and workers parties also increased. Favorable conditions were created for the struggle of working masses and enslaved peoples for their social and national liberation. The national liberation movement spread and deepened. The shameful colonial system of imperialism collapsed. More than 100 independent states have been founded in former colonies and semi-colonies in the postwar period. The positions of progressive, democratic and peace-loving forces in the international arena have been strengthened to the detriment of the forces of imperialism, reaction and war.

What does the war experience teach, what are its most important lessons?

The experience of the Great Fatherland War demonstrated that there are no forces in the world that could destroy socialism and turn back the wheels of history. By encroaching upon the most progressive social and state system, German fascism thereby signed its own death sentence. Now, when the Soviet Union has entered the stage of developed socialism and when the world socialist system has grown into a mighty force, all attempts of imperialism to bar the road to social progress are doomed to failure.

In the contemporary period in which the transition from capitalism to socialism represents the main content of development, the military adventures of imperialism are turning against itself. Imperialists calculated that the country of socialism would be destroyed or irreparably weakened in World War II. But in reality it was the capitalist system that suffered enormous losses. Several European and Asian countries in which the socialist system consolidated itself, have broken away from the capitalist system. It goes without saying that this does not mean at all that communists consider war as a factor accelerating social progress. However, the imperialist aggressors of the present day should not forget the lessons of history.

Our victory confirmed especially forcefully that the imperialist plans for establishing the world domination could not be realized. Such plans had failed also in the past. However, in the earlier periods there had been no such wide, powerful and ever-growing direct influence of the popular masses on the course or historical progress and on solving the most urgent problems of war and peace. The successes of the socialist community and the range and force of the international communist and workers movement and of the national liberation and antiwar struggle resolutely resist the hegemonist aspirations of the reactionary imperialite forces. This inspires confidence that mankind will be able to curb them and stop the raging of militarism.

Historical experience teaches that precisely imperialism promotes militarism and that it was responsible for two world wars that subjected mankind to countless sufferings.

Fascism was grown, placed in power and armed by the German and international monopolist capital that used it to suppress the communist and workers

movement, prevent social revolution and intensify exploitation of the working people. The ruling classes of the United States, Great Britain and France aimed at using German fascism as the main strike force against the USSR.

Despite the fact that the sphere of imperialist domination has been reduced, the predatory nature of imperialism has remained unchanged. The tendency toward militarism is becoming more and more manifest in the policy and ideology of the ruling circles of the United States and its NATO allies. The contemporary imperialist reaction continues to be distinguished by militant anticommunism, anti-Sovietism, chauvinism and racism, demagoguery, the use of extreme forms of coercion against the workers class and all working people, international terrorism and aggression against independent states.

Being guided by their class hatred toward the Soviet Union, the countries of the socialist community and the national liberation movement and scorning the rights and aspirations of peoples, the reactionary forces of the United States and other imperialist powers have set themselves the goal of achieving the unachievable, that is, barring the road to the progressive changes taking place in the world, replaying the historical battles of the 20th century, carrying out a social revanche on a worldwide scale and recapturing the role of the ruler of destinies throughout the entire planet. To dispatch communism "to the ash heap of history" and "destroy socialism as a sociopolitical system"--this is how the official representatives of the incumbent American administration formulate the goals of current U.S. policy.

Openly placing their stakes in crude force, the United States and other NATO countries are unrestrainedly heating up the arms race. Never before in the history of the United States has the country's military budget in peacetime grown as swiftly as in recent years. The lion's share of the enormous appropriations is allocated for the development of offensive strategic nuclear forces as the main means of carrying out the so-called disarming strike against the Soviet Union. Special emphasis is placed on the implementation of a long-term program of perfecting the ground-, sea- and air-based nuclear missile forces. A large-scale program of preparing for and waging chemical and biological wars is being implemented.

In the next few years the United States plans to sharply increase the effectiveness of conventional strike weapons. Automated high-precision weapons are being intensively developed and the armed forces are being equipped with them for this purpose. Research work connected with the development of weapons based on new physical principles is in progress.

The American plans for the militarization of outer space are especially dangerous for the cause of peace. No assurances that these plans are allegedly intended only for the defense of the United States can camouflage their aggressive essence. The "Star Wars" plans are an attempt of the United States to acquire the potential of carrying out a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union with impunity by covering itself against retribution with an antimissile space "shield."

The United States is setting up new military bases and deploying forward-based groups of forces in various regions of the world and is persistently drawing

its allies into the orbit of the arms race. The ongoing siting of new American first-strike nuclear missiles in a number of West European countries, the growing military preparations of the United States in the Far East and Japan's intensifying militarization are a cause for serious alarm. The scale of NATO exercises held in the immediate proximity of the borders of the USSR and other states of the socialist community is constantly growing.

Imperialism and the forces of reaction and war are deliberately intensifying antagonism with the forces of socialism and peace. The atmosphere of anti-Sovietism and the myth of the "Soviet military threat" are used to instill in the people of capitalist states the idea of inevitability of war against the USSR and the other countries of socialism as well as the idea of "legitimacy" of such a war.

Adventurism and readiness to risk the vital interests of mankind for the sake of achieving antipopular, mercenary goals of capitalist monopolies--these are the distinguishing features of the foreign policy course of the leading imperialist power, the United States and its allies. Having failed to draw due conclusions from historical experience, the American administration has proclaimed a "crusade" against socialism. With its aggressive actions it is placing the peoples of the entire planet before the threat of a new world war.

The will of destiny has placed the highest responsibility on the present generation, the responsibility of not allowing a new world conflagration and of preserving life on earth. IT IS NECESSARY TO STRUGGLE AGAINST WAR BEFORE IT BEGINS--THIS IS THE MAIN LESSON OF THE GREAT FATHERLAND WAR, it is stated in the CPSU Central Committee's resolution "On the 40th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Fatherland War 1941-1945."

Persistent and constant struggle for peace, against the threat of war and to curb the arms race is the pivotal direction of the CPSU's and Soviet state's foreign policy activity. Defending peace and earth has been an immutable noble goal of our country during the entire period beginning with Lenin's Decree of Peace and extending to and including the Peace Program for the 1980s worked out by the 26th CPSU Congress, as well as the USSR's contemporary peaceful initiatives in the world arena.

The communist party and the Soviet government firmly proceed from the position that any disputed world problems can be resolved through negotiations. A world conflict would mean an end to human civilization. In the USSR there are no classes or social groups which would be interested in the arms race, in unleashing a war. Our country also has no need to expand its borders.

The states of the socialist community, united by the community of their goals and ideals in the struggle for peace and socialism, act in the world arena in a united front with the Soviet Union. Peoples of the world cannot but see how great the role of the land of the soviets and of the entire community of socialist countries is in defending the primary human rights, the right to life. Precisely the Soviet Union and our allies are the main bulwark of peace on earth.

Today it is not only the countries of the socialist community but also the fraternal communist parties throughout the world, the international workers movement, the liberated and developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America that have become a great force in world politics, the Nonaligned Movement--that is adopting more and more distinctly anti-imperialist positions--and the mass antiwar movement, that are acting on the side of the cause of peace.

The Soviet Union firmly and consistently advocates joint actions with Western countries to prevent a new world war. The USSR's approach to conducting affairs with the United States and other countries is exclusively constructive. All initiatives of the Soviet Union in the world arena and all foreign policy statements by our party and state leaders are permeated with one concern, the concern to prevent war and ensure general peace. Our deeds also confirm this: the USSR's obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons; the proposals on the immediate freezing of nuclear arsenals, on complete and general banning of nuclear weapons tests, on limitation and reduction of strategic weapons and on preventing the militarization of outer space; the joint initiative of the socialist countries regarding the conclusion of an Agreement on Mutual Nonuse of Military Force in Relations Between the States of the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Alliance; and many others.

The Soviet peace-loving foreign policy is clear and understandable to the peoples of the world, and it corresponds to their innermost aspirations and their vital interests. It evokes a deep response and wide approval across the entire planet.

The agreement with the United States, achieved at the USSR's initiative, on opening new Soviet-American negotiations on questions of space and nuclear (strategic and medium-range) weapons which will be discussed and resolved as interconnected questions, attests to our devotion to the cause of peace and the security of peoples. To ensure the success of the negotiations, both sides must show good will, readiness for reasonable and mutually acceptable compromises and strict observance of the fundamental principle of parity [ravenstvo] and equal security.

The Soviet people believe that there are no international problems which could not be settled for the sake of the general human goal, the goal of preserving life on earth.

The Soviet Union is ready to seek the most radical measures and honestly intends to go its half of the way toward them. This is attested to by the decision of the Soviet Union to introduce a moratorium on the deployment of its medium-range missiles and to stop the implementation of other countermeasures in Europe, which was announced by Comrade M. S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in his interview with the editor of the newspaper PRAVDA. The world public expects a constructive attitude toward negotiations from Washington, and hopes that the United States will go its part of the way with full recognition of the responsibility placed on both big powers.

Our country holds the conviction that peaceful coexistence and comprehensive cooperation between the states belonging to different social systems are completely possible. The joint actions of the anti-Hitlerite coalition and the combat alliance of the peoples and armies of the USSR, the United States, and other Western countries in the years of the struggle against fascism are a direct confirmation of this. One of the main lessons of the past war is that, at that time, the Soviet Union and the United States jointly repulsed those who reached out for world domination.

The experience of World War II teaches us that only the united actions of all peace-loving forces in cohesion can remove the threat of war that now hangs over people and stop the folly of the arms race. The experience of detente at the beginning of the 1970s also attests to the possibility for this.

Strict respect for and observance of the principle of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders by all states represent an indispensable guarantee of peace and of prevention of a new war.

West German revanchists and their transoceanic protectors are spreading doubts about the final nature of the borders established between European states after World War II. However, attempts by the enemies of peace and socialism to revise the postwar realities that resulted from the Great Victory of fascism are in vain. Peoples have paid too high a price for them.

Present-day European borders were established by the decisions of the Crimean (Yalta) and Berlin (Potsdam) conferences between the leaders of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain in 1945. They are the result of the mutual obligations of the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. They were politically and legally consolidated in the 1970s in treaties and agreements concluded by the Soviet Union, Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia with the FRG. The stability of the European borders was confirmed by the Helsinki Final Act. No one can encroach on the Yalta and Potsdam decisions, which have formed the basis of European and world peace for 4 decades now.

We, the Soviet people, have profound faith in the triumph of reason and in the fact that a policy of detente and peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems will become the basis of their mutual relations, and also that such a policy will rid mankind of the unclear threat hanging over it.

The Soviet Union is doing everything to prevent a new world war. At the same time, it cannot help but take into account the open challenge thrown down to us by imperialism. Whereas the experience of World War II has not profited imperialist reaction, it has taught the Soviet people a great deal. The grim lesson of the war warns us of THE NECESSITY TO CONSTANTLY MAINTAIN HIGH VIGILANCE SO THAT NO AGGRESSOR TAKES US UNAWARE. THE GROWING MILITARY THREAT FROM THE UNITED STATES AND ITS NATO ALLIES REQUIRES US TO STRENGTHEN THE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF OUR MOTHERLAND AND THE COMBAT MIGHT OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES.

Unity of peaceableness and constant combat readiness, which guarantees the immediate repulse of any aggressor, is the cornerstone of Soviet policy.

While fulfilling the tasks of peaceful construction, the communist party and the Soviet state are also forced to concern themselves with strengthening the country's security. The economy of socialist society and our country's powerful scientific-technical potential make it possible to effectively fulfill a broad range of tasks in the sphere of military construction.

The Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community will not permit imperialist reaction to break the military-strategic balance between the USSR and the United States, and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Considerable effort and resources have been required of the Soviet people and the peoples of other socialist countries to achieve this balance and we will not permit it to be broken. Maintaining this balance keeps the adventurist aspirations of the aggressors in check.

In contemporary conditions and in the face of the threat of war, the Soviet people regard it as their sacred, patriotic duty to strengthen the economic and defense might of the motherland through shock work. Active participation in socialist competition to fulfill plan tasks and economize materials and resources, a high degree of organization and discipline, the deepest interest in the affairs of state and readiness to overcome any difficulties for the sake of the fatherland--all this reflects the sense of being master of one's country, which is characteristic of the Soviet individual and has been cultivated in him by the socialist system. Successful fulfillment of the tasks of the 11th Five-Year Plan will still further strengthen the economic foundations of our defense capabilities and of the combat might of the Soviet army and navy.

In a situation where aggressive imperialist circles are systematically organizing hostile ideological campaigns and diversions against the USSR and fraternal socialist countries, the communist party conducts tireless ideological work to educate the working people in a spirit of Soviet patriotism, proletarian, socialist internationalism and friendship between the peoples of the USSR. The party organizations are concerned with forming in every Soviet individual precise class positions, great political vigilance, irreconcilability toward imperialism and firm belief in the rightness and invincibility of socialism.

The party constantly works to increase the effectiveness of military-patriotic education for the working people and primarily for young people. Cultivating a feeling of life for the motherland and unshakable readiness to defend socialist achievements is a constant task of all our ideological work. Army and navy personnel also make a definite contribution to military-patriotic and mass defense work.

Thanks to the fatherly concern of the communist party and the Soviet people, the combat might of the armed forces has increased immeasurably. Today the Soviet Army and Navy are far from what they were at the end of the Great Patriotic War, with their organizational structure perfected, and their mobility, strike force and fire power increased. The army and navy now harmoniously combine various types of the armed forces and arms of service. The basis of their combat might is the Strategic Rocket Forces. They are constantly in a state of high combat readiness.

Our people well remember how perfidiously the fascists unleashed the war against the USSR. In preparing their aggression, Hitler's strategists counted on surprise, on the crushing power of the first strike by large masses of aircraft, tanks and motorized infantry and on the swiftness of their operations. The treacherous and bandit-like invasion of foreign territory without a declaration of war has become a sort of norm for imperialist aggressors. The element of surprise has always played a certain role. Now, however, it is becoming a factor of the greatest strategic importance. And we are forced to take it strictly into account. That is why the demands made by the party and government on the combat readiness of the army and navy are so high. It is important to keep vigilant watch over the military preparations of potential opponents, and to be able to reveal their intentions and take the necessary countermeasures at the right time.

Closest attention is being paid to increasing combat readiness in the troops and fleets. As they approach the 40th anniversary of victory and the 27th CPSU Congress, Soviet soldiers are tirelessly perfecting their combat skills and field, air and sea training, and are persistently mastering formidable weapons and contemporary military equipment. Fulfilling their soldier's duty, they are striving to increase the numbers of experts in military affairs, outstanding soldiers and qualified specialists and also to always be on the alert and keep their powder dry.

The Soviet armed forces fulfill their sacred duty to defend the achievements of socialism shoulder-to-shoulder with the armies of the socialist countries, their class brothers and their comrades-in-arms. From year to year the Warsaw Pact Organization, the 30th anniversary of which we shall shortly be celebrating, becomes stronger. The unity of the states of the socialist community and the combat unity of their armed forces are a reliable guarantee of the security of each individual country of socialism and of their world community as a whole.

The main foundation of Soviet military buildup, and the main and decisive source of the high defense capability of the Soviet state and of the combat might of its armed forces, is the leadership of the communist party. There is no sphere of military affairs where the constant beneficial influence of the party, its Leninist Central Committee and the Central Committee Politburo is not felt.

The contemporary stage of our country's development is characterized by further intensification of the CPSU's political, theoretical and organizational activity and by the increasing of its leading role in all spheres of life of Soviet society.

Steadfastly implementing the Leninist precepts on defense of the socialist fatherland, the party is developing and implementing a military policy which embraces a wide range of problems. These include: development of theoretical foundations for military buildup, a complex of measures to supply everything necessary to the army and navy; the development of military science and military art; and also the training and deployment of military cadres.

The army and navy party organizations are the cementing force of the armed forces and a powerful vanguard in the struggle to implement the party's policy. Communists are the pioneers of all that is new and progressive in military affairs and are an example for the entire personnel.

One of the main directions of the CPSU's activity in the army and navy is the development of the soldiers' communist ideological attitude, political awareness, boundless loyalty to the socialist motherland, to the Soviet people and to the ideals of communism, the development of a high degree of moral firmness and of ability to preserve an unbending will toward victory in the most difficult conditions.

The formation of such qualities in the personnel is achieved through the whole tenor of our socialist society and of army and naval life, and by the entire system of combat and political training and military education. The paramount role in this is played by party-political and ideological-educational work. It always was and continues to be a powerful weapon of the party and one of the forms of the CPSU's leadership of the armed forces. Its effectiveness was tested more than once in the fire of battles in the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars. Today, too, it guarantees the high moral-political state of personnel, their correct understanding of and boundless support for the CPSU's foreign and domestic policy, the monolithic unity of Soviet soldiers around the communist party and its Central Committee and a readiness to fulfill any task in defense of the state interests of the motherland.

Victory Day is a festive day which is infinitely dear to our people. Every Soviet person will, with particular warmth and gratitude, pay a tribute of deep respect to the courage and self-sacrifice of those who fought bravely and ably, defending the freedom and independence of the beloved motherland, and of those who worked in the rear for the sake of the great victory.

In solving today's tasks and thinking about tomorrow, the soldiers of the army and navy strive to be worthy of the heroes of the last war. By their high level of readiness to defend the Soviet people's peaceful and creative work they constantly remind the foe of the unforgettable lessons of our great victory. These lessons are a formidable warning to all who are covetous of the property of others, and to all lovers of military adventures.

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## WINNERS' BANNERS

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[Article by Ivan Paderin]

[Text] Toward the end of March 1945, advance formations of the Soviet Armed Forces reached their launching positions for dealing a final blow at the Hitlerite forces on the territory of Germany itself. The time had come to put out the sinister flames of World War II at their point of origin.

The strikes were maturing with the same inevitability as the incoming spring. The main strike in the shortest direction to Berlin was assigned to the First Belorussian Front, commanded by G. K. Zhukov. The main forces of this front were concentrating on the Kustrin bridgehead beyond the Oder. The distance between here and Berlin was 60 kilometers. At that time the Guards Infantry Regiment I was familiar with ever since Stalingrad was moving ahead, in the first echelon of the Eighth Guards Army....

1

Our regiment had two flags: the flag of the guards and the patron flag. The guards flag was presented to us after the battle for Stalingrad and the patron flag was presented by the workers of Tomsk, at the time our regiment was formed. In the course of the battles for widening the Oder bridgehead south of Kustrin, the flags were kept in regimental headquarters under guard. However, the time came to take the flags to the front end, at the starting line for the attack. At 2 am, on 16 April 1945, the guards were dismissed and the unfurled flags were taken along the trenches and dugouts of the regiment. The guards flag was carried by regimental flag bearer Sgt Nikolay Masalov, a broad-shouldered, courageous Siberian; the patron flag was carried by Sgt Vladimir Bozhko, from the Kuban, who was deputy commander of the provost marshal's platoon. They each had two assistants, chosen among the firmest, for the flag could not fall down during the attack. Ahead, holding the guards flag, marched Nikolay Masalov, followed by me, for the deputy regimental commander for political affairs was now to be behind the flag; also with me was Major Iosif Dreysler, representative of the division political department.

We walk slowly, saving our strength for the forthcoming clash. Fifty minutes separate us from the beginning of the storming of the Seelow elevations. The

valley is filled with thick fog and the rumbling of tanks, tractors and self-propelling vehicles. In the darkness, the guardsmen, huddling in the front trenches, feeling the approach of the hollies of the regiment, present arms. We silently pass ahead of them. What is there to say, what words could express the feelings, the thoughts which come over the people when the banners appear on the front end?

We stop at the point where the flanks of the First and Second Battalion are joined. Once the artillery fire begins to disperse the fog, from that point the flags will be seen by the entire regiment. We must be in the beam of the searchlights. So far no one in the regiment was aware of the use of searchlights in an attack. The brief statement was: "Do not look around but only ahead of you!"

Five minutes are left before the start of the artillery barrage. The ears buzz from the tense silence and many thoughts cross the mind.... Once the attack starts there is no time for thinking, for which reason now, during these final minutes preceding the combat one feels an urgent need to check one's spiritual reserve, to find and discover in one's soul those same valves which had so far remained hidden and to answer the question: with what baggage have you and your regiment come to this line and what is one to believe and what to reject?

If a soldier loses faith in his ability and the power of his weapon he will inevitably become an enemy target in battle. The entire essence of political work at the front is to prepare the soldier for comprehending the exploit and convince him that if he acts skillfully and decisively the enemy will be defeated; to be ready for the most difficult trials, self-reliance and helping his comrade in a situation of mortal danger; if all of this is forgotten the soldier is doomed to inevitable death. Such is the harshness of the unwritten law of life in combat and we, political workers, did not conceal it for the simple reason that the political worker does not control the battle, he leads the people into battle.

Here, 60 kilometers outside Berlin, once again we did not conceal that a fierce battle lay ahead. It was fierce, for the leaders of the Third Reich, feeling the inevitable failure, had decided not to spare those whom they were throwing ahead to defend their lair.

The dead are silent, the German generals in the headquarters of German land forces insinuated, as they planned the battle for Berlin. "The Zone of Death for Millions of People" was the name they had given to the area between the Oder and the walls of Hitler's capital, while Berlin was considered a "volcano of fire." It was surrounded by three defense lines with three intermediary positions. Pillboxes with machine guns and automatic rifles were deployed on all elevations and crossroads. Potato fields and meadows were thickly "planted" in antipersonnel and antitank mines. Barbed wire was strung and explosive "surprises" were laid along copses and gardens. Bridges and viaducts were powerfully mined with trotylene. Mines were planted under the asphalt lining of roads and squares. Death lay hidden in each square meter of the entire area from the Seelow Heights to the Tiergarten. All towns, villages and even summer home settlements on the way to Berlin had been

converted into defensive positions. Stone houses had become garrisons for machine gunners, like fortresses. "Hitler's knights"--the Volksturm, armed with antitank grenades--had occupied balconies, roofs and basements. These antitank grenades, greyish colored, reminded us of a human skull implanted on a meter-long pipe. It could pierce any tank armor at a distance of 60 to 70 meters. The stricken crew would immediately lose control and the tankmen would be burned alive inside the tank.

Fourteen divisions had been gathered against the Kustrin bridgehead, including five motorized and one tank. There were 60 guns and howitzers and 17 tanks and assault guns per front kilometer.

An area of strong fortifications, some 50 kilometers deep, had to be breached to reach Berlin; three rivers--the Niesse, Spree and Dahme--and dozens of canals--had to be crossed along with an innumerable number of ditches, ravines and valleys which had turned into lakes as a result of the spring thaw.

In the final battle, the Soviet soldier had truly to go through fire, water and copper pipes, as in the fairy tale.

After hearing a report on the enemy installations, soldiers, sergeants and officers were preparing themselves to surmount them. Everyone sought a specific solution, consistent with his ability and combat experience, and the task of the political worker was precisely to blend together these efforts in the combat capability of the crew, the subunit or the entire regiment. The ugly truth about the enemy mobilizes rather than dampens combat strength. The enemy is strong but we have come here to destroy him....

How loudly the seconds ticked on the wristwatches! The final seconds.... Above us are the regimental flags. Suddenly, thousands of weapons open fire. It was as though there was no night fog. The entire valley, from the Oder to the Seelow Heights, began to breathe fire, as if the entire bridgehead was pulsing like sunspots in order to provide a successful start for the storming of the Seelow Heights and to suppress the enemy resistance points.

The searchlights were turned on 30 minutes later. Our flags were caught in the crossbeams. We ran with them through the no-man's land toward the walls of the powerful Saxendorf fortified point. Scathing machine gun fire awaited us. The enemy would be aiming at those who were ahead. People, right and left, were trying to catch up with us. I could see the backs of my fellow regimental comrades in the searchlight beams. They wanted to block the points which could stop the progress of the flags. Thank you, thank you loyal comrades! No machine gun would be able to stop us. Saxendorf, crushed to smithereens by our artillery, lay behind. The attacking chains were jointly rushing toward the elevation's foothills.

Smoke, fumes, heaving earth. The beams of the searchlights stop in front of this wall and lose their power. Suddenly there was a spell. It dragged on. The flags stopped at the front line. Our small assault groups and tank detachments went into action. The slopes sparkled with heavy machine gun bursts. The Hitlerite machine gunners were firing from concrete lined dugouts, separate from each other, with no communicating trenches. These were

doomed people. At the final stage of the war, the Hitlerite generals had begun to fear contacts among soldiers; the generals feared a chain reaction of panic in the face of the Russians. One would falter, followed by a second, a third...and a mass fleeing would be inevitable. That was the reason for which this "new tactic" had been invented. Our small assault groups spent the entire night rendering these isolated cells harmless. On the morning of 17 April the Il-2 assault planes began flying over the hillsides, destroying those dugouts from the air.

By the end of the day of 17 April the regimental flags were raised on elevation 85.5, 3 kilometers south of Seelow. Radio man Petr Belov hastened there. Immediately, from his observation point, Lt General A. I. Ryzhov saw the flags and asked on the radio: "Who raised them?"

I named the five people.

"Where are you? Fire a yellow rocket."

Several yellow rockets rose above the flags.

2

We liberated a prisoner-of-war camp between the Berlin circumferential highway and Muncheberg. A spontaneous meeting was held. I was lifted up on a tank turret but before I could even say a word a strange shout was heard. A Russian woman prisoner was shouting. Fearing that she would be too late to thank us for her liberation, she ran to us across the entire square. A thick clump of barbed wire stood in her way. In her happiness, seeing nothing, the woman hurled herself and fell into it. I jumped from the tank to release her. She silently looked at me, then, opening her blouse, pulled out a small bundle which she untied and grabbed a handful of dirt which she began pouring on her bleeding wounds.

"What are you doing?" begged the regimental surgeon who had run to her. "Gangrene!"

She looked at him, her eyes now smiling:

"Relax. I heal my wounds with this dirt. It is healing, from Smolensk...."

After this, no speeches were necessary. It was Russian healing soil! We had come here, to Berlin, so that no one would ever again trample on our sacred soil with their filthy boots.

...There it was, Berlin. We saw it on the evening of 22 April. A huge plateau of ruins. From end to end the wide valley of the Spree was crowded with smoking piles. Somewhere in the center yellow streaks of fire and brick dust rose into the air.... Clumps of ashes and soot--a black snow--poured from the sky. The earth, the trees and the squares were all black. It was spring but virtually no green could be seen and it was only occasionally that the pale turquoise color of narrow little meadows was visible. This resembled an earthquake which had lasted nearly 40 days and nights: from the beginning

of March until our offensive, every day thousands of American and British bombers had unloaded their bombs here. However, bombs do not capture a city but merely destroy it. A destroyed city itself becomes a strong barricade, easier to defend. What about advancing?... Try to find your way in the wreckage of an unfamiliar city in which a defense line has been set up and which consists of clumps of walls along and across city streets. Let the military historians decide who was being helped during that stage of the war by American and British bombers. To us, the Soviet soldiers who had come to Berlin, it immediately became clear that stormy and blood-shedding battles lay ahead.

The character of our soldiers is amazing: difficulties just inspire them more. Had such unexpected difficulties not been detected, preparations for the storming of Berlin would have followed their routine as planned. The plan stipulated that crossing the Spree and the storming of Berlin would begin after the pontoon brigades, the artillery and the rear units had been brought forward. This plan was doomed to remain on paper only.

Darkness had barely fallen when regiments and battalions undertook to cross the Spree. One must not wait when the initiative is one's hands. Such is the law of combat. We must frankly admit that the success achieved in crossing the Spree and the beginning of the storming of Berlin were determined less by the operative-tactical plans of headquarters than the combat thrust of the troops, who refused rest and a breathing spell. In war dangers do not wait: they tire the troops more than facing the danger itself.

I was with the Sixth Company, Second Battalion, which included Heroes of the Soviet Union Vladimir Burba and Petr Khlyustin, who were killed at the Wislin bridgehead. We forded the river during the night, on ordinary rowboats supplied by scouts from the other side. We rode in the fog across the wide Dahme. Submachine guns and grenades were on the ready. The boats reached the right bank. Forward! By the morning of 23 April we had reached the Adlershoff District. This was the southeastern part of Berlin, where the military transport airport was located.

Berlin.... On topographic maps it resembles a tortoiseshell: the yellowish squares of the districts crowded together like a shield with serrated edges. Flank fire was coming from everywhere. Blue, twisting lines, looking like swollen veins, divide the city into several sections. These are the canals and the drain channels of the Spree. The green spot in the center is the Tiergarten. Next to it, in the deep shelter under the Reich Chancery, Hitler is hiding. It was this spot that the forces of Army General Berzarin, who was advancing from the east, were trying to reach alongside General Bogdanov's tanks. General Kuznetsov's forces were advancing on their right. This was, so to say, the right wing of the First Belorussian Front. The forces of the left wing of the front, including the tank guardsmen of General Katukov and the guard regiments of General Chuykov's army were advancing toward the center of Berlin from the south and the southeast. It was this wing that the tank units of General Rybalko joined as the representatives of the forces of the First Ukrainian Front. The troops of the Second Belorussian Front, led by Marshal Rokossovskiy along a complex circuitous way, were advancing toward Berlin from the north.

That is what Berlin looked like on the map and these were the positions of the forces of the three fronts according to the communique received on the morning of 23 April.

That day we already began the storming of Berlin's southeastern district. Here American bombers had been particularly zealous: nothing was left of the districts as marked on the map. All the eye could see was wreckage, and walking was as difficult as in the taiga amidst wind-fallen trees. Each rugged block was sprayed with machine bursts. Our troops, the regiments of the Eighth Guards Army in particular, used against the enemy a battle tactic he did not expect. We no longer had platoons or companies. They were on paper only, while the battle was being fought by small assault groups and assault detachments with the common assignment and proper mastery of their weapons. Our troops had acquired extensive experience in street fighting. We had begun to prepare for the storming of Berlin on the streets of Stalingrad in 1942 and the ruins of Zaporozhe in 1943 and had tested our readiness in 1945 in the storming of the Poznan and Kustrin fortifications. The enemy was expecting attacking rows and prepared to meet them with concentrated fire.

At the start of the fighting in the streets of the German capital, regimental Komsomol organizer Leonid Ladyzhenko asked me to be assigned to reconnaissance.

"The scouts are always up front. I would like to find the way to Hitler's chancery before the others."

A day later, Ladyzhenko brought three prisoners wearing officer insignias. On the night of 25 April he reached the southern edge of Tempelhoff Airport with the first assault detachment, without firing a single shot.

On the morning of 25 April the entire regiment approached Tempelhoff Airport. The main forces of the division were gathering to the right, for this huge airfield could not be taken by a single regiment. Mikhail Musatov, division deputy commander, took over the regiment replacing regimental commander M. S. Sheykin, who had become a battle casualty.

While he was trying to determine the situation on the map and at the site, Ladyzhenko and I led a group of submachine gunners from the reserve company with whom we intended to reach the railroad tracks bordering the airfield from the south. We crawled between the tracks, Ladyzhenko leading. I was holding a submachine gun in my right hand and a flair gun in my left. The moment the nine assault planes, which were interacting with the regiment, were to appear, I was to indicate to the fliers the line of attack with a red flare. This was easy. However, the enemy was able to notice the advance of our groups, which made matters more complex. Bursts of machine gun fire were cracking along the tracks. The steel dryly echoed, as though seriously warning us: stay down, bullets are flying overhead.

We reached the switchman's post, ran quickly across the wrecked bridge and stopped behind a mound. The airfield strips were in front of us. Fire and explosions surround us.... The center of the airfield was not to be touched.

The Germans were protecting it for takeoff purposes, whereas we needed it for landing aircraft. The airfield had to be captured without delay, for according to the prisoners, here were the airplanes of Chief of General Staff Krebbs and Hitler's armor-plated Junkers. I did not believe this, but after interrogating the deputy commander of the airfield (whom I captured at dawn) I heard the same statement again:

"Yes, the Fuehrer's airplane is here, fully prepared to take off."

"Would Hitler escape us?" Ladyzhenko kept asking himself. "He may be on his way to the airplane...."

I suddenly began to believe that it was precisely now, at any minute, that Hitler would be hastening to reach his plane....

The engines of our dive bombers rumbled overhead. They approached the target so low that I was unable to indicate the direction of the attack with my flare. The German anti-aircraft batteries opened fire. But what was happening? One of the dive bombers was firing at the anti-aircraft guns while the others, instead of hitting the targets, were about to land right in the center of the field. The fliers probably believed that we had already captured the airfield, for which reason they were landing so daringly. What to do?

At that point Lieutenant Colonel Musatov reached us.

Something incredible was taking place at the airfield. Instead of airplanes, it was our tanks going down the concrete runways at high speed, as though ready to take off. The nine dive bombers, which had landed, opened fire with their machine guns and guns at the roofs of the hangars where fascist machine gunners had nestled.

Musatov calmly observed the events: our detachments were operating secretly; the small assault groups were pushing the German defenses away from the main building. One tank with about 10 submachine gunners became carried away. It shifted to the left and Musatov radioed:

"Solov'yev, Solov'yev, wear to the right!"

The clash ended as unexpectedly and quickly as it had begun: the airport garrison surrendered.

"This is truly a case in which fire and will, propellers and treads of all arms are helping the infantry!" Musatov said when we emerged on the airfield.

Army scouts Jr Lt Aleksandr Tsygantsov and Sgt Vasiliiy Gutsol, who had returned from the center of Berlin, showed us their map with a number of unfamiliar markings in the area where our division was advancing.

"What kind of scribbles are these?" Musatov asked.

"The old Berlin begins behind the airport. Its approaches are defended by SS units," Vasilii Gutsol answered. "Look carefully for piles of cobblestones: tanks are positioned there. Streetcars surrounded by sandbags are pillboxes on wheels with machine gunners and tank grenade launchers."

Three districts were marked with a red pencil and exclamation points.

"These are hospitals. They contain many civilians. Children's reception rooms are marked with exclamation points: these are for the youngest children. These districts should be bypassed and spared artillery fire."

The start of the storming of the central districts of Berlin was scheduled for the morning of 26 April.

The assault detachments were preparing for the offensive. Suddenly, the order came: Stop!

Youngsters were marching from Tiergarten down Kolonenstrasse. There were four square blocks of them with a hundred youngsters in each block. All of them were wearing their black school uniforms, high-collared jackets, and packs. Grenade launchers were on their shoulders. They were hastening to ambush our tanks. What to do with them? Our machine gunners and artillerymen could simply not raise their hands and open fire at these youngsters. Detachment commanders began to ask:

"What to do? To let them advance or?..."

"Refrain from firing and find a way to disarm them."

Smoke grenades were used. A thick smoke screen rose. The youngsters became confused. Those who fell down exploded: they carried trotylene with explosive caps in their packs instead of books. The others turned back. Hitler had thrown them at our tanks. These living mines, however, did not work. We saved them from certain death. Today many of them who are alive cannot fail to forget this....

Another tank battalion was added to our regiment. During the night we had to continue our reconnaissance in battle. All of a sudden, the fascists began to resist with increasing stubbornness. They were neither surrendering nor retreating. What had happened? A German official from the main telegraph office, captured by the scouts, provided the answer.

"The Soviet forces have already surrounded Berlin," he said. "The ring of fire has tightened and there is nowhere to retreat, the gates are shut. Our only hope for salvation is to keep the Russians along the defensive area of the central part of Berlin and fight there until the last cartridge and wait for a miracle, which is bound to happen. The Fuehrer himself is awaiting it and he has not left Berlin. You will not be able to breach this line...."

"Well, we shall see about that," Musatov answered.

At precisely 12 midnight, the tanks rushed into the yard of a house defended by the fascists. Small assault groups rushed into the breach. Carried away by their success, the guardsmen captured one more district in this manner.

Ladyshenko was by my side. He and I moved into the breach after the tanks, walking straight: in the darkness the enemy cannot engage in precise fire at tanks or people.

...In the yard of a six-story building we caught up with a tank. We heard the master sergeant of the support group:

"This will be the ammunition center."

"Comrade Master Sergeant, can I have five hand grenades?" Ladyshenko asked.

"Five is too much, Comrade Komsomol Organizer. We must save."

The master sergeant gave him two.

"No more?"

"I can't give you more."

We ran up the stairs in total darkness. I rushed into a room and almost fell. There were corpses underfoot. This was Fayzulin's work. A strong guardsman, Fayzula Fayzulin, who was ahead of us, had brought down several fascists on the flight of stairs.

I recalled him as a timid young recruit. He joined us with other young reinforcements in the autumn of 1942 at the time of the crossing of the Volga. Before us lay the burning city and mines and shells exploded in the water. Before getting onto the ferry, Fayzulin said some kind of prayer and clearly thought that this would be the last step that he would be taking in his life. But then, it is not said in vain that in battle one must get used to fire, at which point timidity is forgotten. He tempered and strengthened and today there is no more daring submachine gunner than Fayzulin.

The square before the church on Kurfurstenstrasse was defended by SS detachments. Our tank hit a mine near the church and found itself without treads. Seeing it stop, the SS inundated it with fire. There were about 100 of them. An uneven battle began. Driver Sgt German Petrovich Shashkov, from the Volga area, a native of Gorkiy oblast, took over from the gun commander who was killed, and continued to fire. The tank commander was killed by a tank grenade. Shashkov remained alone. Grabbing the handles, he turned the tank on its axles. Another hand grenade hit the tank and the engine compartment took fire. Putting the gears in reverse, Shashkov cut into a semidestroyed wall which, falling, put out the flames and Shashkov continued to fire with the gun and the machine gun. Then he ran short of ammunition and cartridges. The Hitlerites began to knock on the armor:

"Russian, surrender!..."

Shashkov answered them with two grenades he hurled through the hatch.

By the time help arrived, more than 30 bodies in Gestapo uniforms were strewn around the tank. Shashkov himself, burned all over and wounded, was lying on the bottom of the tank, knife in hand. He had strength enough to describe what had happened.

By the evening of 27 April, the regiment was deep inside the district of old Berlin. It stopped in front of Victoria Park, for it had put quite a distance between it and the main forces of the division. The enemy, who had by now come to his senses, naturally tried to destroy the regiment. This, however, was not so easy. No less than a division was needed to surround the regiment.

Initially we tried to establish radio contact with regimental headquarters, which had not changed location, and then with divisional headquarters. However, we were unable to describe the situation. The ether was crowded for there were many regiments in Berlin, and all of them were using the same "regimental" frequency. Furthermore, the radio man warned us that the enemy had triangulated our location and was intercepting all signals.

Finally, the radio man heard the call signal of our division commander. Musakov took the microphone. We heard the voice of the army commander:

"Well done!"

It was Chuykov, who had approved the work of our assault detachments and was letting us understand that the division's attack to widen the breach was being canceled: we were to wait for the "great dawn"--the general attack.

By midday the situation worsened: the enemy rushed three infantry battalions at the assault detachments of our regiment's Second Battalion. We captured a corner room on the second floor of a stone house in a narrow lane.

An explosion was heard and red brick dust started falling from the window.

On our left, on the side of the lane, the wall of a long-destroyed four-story house collapsed. Gradually, rising from the settling haze, Musatov appeared, microphone in hand, as though hewn from red stone. He was by the radio and was preparing to say something on the microphone.

"How are things in the 'rest home'?" Chuykov asked him.

Obviously, the commander could sense that with every passing hour our situation worsened. We were fighting automatic fire and grenades.

The enemy was able to divide the second from the third detachment: the regiment broke up into several separate garrisons. The Hitlerites decided to destroy us piece by piece.

"Hold on!" Chuykov said. "We shall now help the soloists with the help of 'Raisa.' Hold on!..."

We heard the trembling of boots on the staircase. Volodya Ryabov, my orderly, and I rushed out of the room: a string of black uniforms running along the hall. Gestapo men! The crumbling of the wall had forced them to seek a new shelter and they had rushed into this house, not suspecting that this was the command point of our regiment.

Ryabov dropped on his knee and fired a long burst down the hall. I was about to take a firing position against the stairwell when suddenly I came face to face with a fascist officer. He skillfully grabbed my submachine gun and rammed his head into my stomach.

"Hold on!" I shouted at Ryabov, as I fell down. Ryabov fired the last bullets from his submachine gun. A free-for-all developed on the staircase.

"Grenade!" someone shouted from above.

Ryabov hurled the grenade and the fascists rushed down the stairs, hoping to find shelter in the basement, followed by the Volksturm. They had to be stopped at the entrance but Ryabov had no more bullets or grenades. My submachine gun had flown away somewhere.

Obviously realizing why I was not firing, Ryabov crawled from the staircase landing to the threshold, got my submachine gun and returned it to me.

The door opened and Musatov came in. After ending his talk with the commanding officer, he hurled himself into the melee but was stopped on the threshold by Ryabov, who was on his knees. He grabbed Musatov by the legs and stopped him from going: it was dangerous!

Lieutenant Ladyzhenko came running from the upper story. He helped me block the entrance to the basement with fire. Suddenly a long-handled grenade came flying in from the depth of the hall. The blast tore Ladyshenko's helmet off. He lost his balance, spun around the staircase and fell. Automatic gunfire came from somewhere along the hall. The bullets were hitting the wall above our heads. A fascist submachine gunner had assumed a good position, but where, try and guess. Fighting within a building is a difficult matter.... A dark corner, a partition, a kitchen recess could become a strategic position. It was dark for almost all windows had been covered.

A booming artillery volley was heard from afar. The frequent explosions of "Katyusha" shells were hitting the clustered enemy.

"Go on, dear one, hit them!" Musatov explained.

Next to him stood Ladyzhenko. He was almost deaf from the grenade explosion but was obviously enthused by the successful "Katyusha" volley. It is strange to see an enthusiastic man whose face is covered with blood.

The artillery of the main army forces intensified its fire further and further. Thick smoke and shell explosions hit the boundaries of the besieged garrison. The bringing of fresh enemy forces to destroy our regiment came to an end.

The earth heaved under our feet and the Berlin sky was turning pink on all sides. The "great dawn" was coming and so was the final storming of Berlin.

3

My description of the storming of Berlin and the street battles in the capital of the "Third Reich" are based on personal impressions and notes taken 40 years ago. I may not have returned to such details unless....

Unless the military historians and ideologues of the West had stopped the flood of long-obsolete fabrications according to which the victory of the Russians in the battle for Berlin had been attained by quantitative superiority in men and materiel, artillery in particular, which had cruelly and blindly suppressed the Berliners, for shells have no eyes.... Yes, in terms of the number of troops and materiel we were superior. An advancing force must have triple superiority over the enemy.

But then, had Western historians recalled that in the battle in the Ardennes the Americans and the British had no lesser quantitative superiority against advancing Hitlerite divisions and, nevertheless, were defeated, they would have reached the conclusion that it is a matter not only of the number of troops and military equipment. Let us specify at this point that we were advancing on the capital of Germany and were fighting on its streets where, as the saying goes, every stone was shooting. Nevertheless, we won. How? The answer is self-evident. It is the moral strength of the troops that decides the outcome of any battle. On this level our superiority, including the combat skill of commanders of all ranks, was a hundred times superior. That is what the Western ideologues must finally admit.

As to the blind cruelty ("shells have no eyes") this charge should be answered by the following question: What about the thousand "Bostonians" who had dropped bombs on the civilian districts of the city for 40 nights. Could their bombs see? Let us also recall that in street battles the possibilities of the artillery are quite limited and that individual guns must fire at specific targets. In battles within a city everything is decided by small assault groups consisting of daring, skillful and courageous soldiers who can carry out combat assignments by themselves, with intelligence and creativity. Combat friendship, unity and moral and political maturity were what decided the outcome of many clashes with the Hitlerites on the streets of Berlin, and not only there.

Efficient interaction and the desire to force the enemy to terminate his resistance were demonstrated also in rushing the final citadel of the Hitlerite Wehrmacht: the Reich chancery.

The Landwehr Canal was blocking the approaches to the Chancery from the south. On that side of the canal a battalion of the special Leib-Standart Adolf Hitler Brigade was holding defensive positions, commanded by Monke, the obscene Nazi.

The assault detachments of the guardsmen of Stalingrad made their way to the canal but were unable to cross it on the run. Strong machine gun fire coming from the other end stopped our attacks. Toward the evening the engineers managed to remove the mines and disarm two explosive shells stuck under the bridge. Now the tanks could be turned loose. However, the initial attempt yielded no results: a tank is a very large target and the moment it showed up in front of the bridge it was hit by a storm of fire. Antitank guns had been placed deep within the Tiergarten.

The tankmen requested a smokescreen but this too did not help. Only two groups of submachine gunners were able to cross the bridge: the first headed by Leonid Ladyzhenko and the second by former Pacific Fleet seaman Guards Master Sgt Yevgeniy Gorchakov. However, they could not exploit this success. Anyone who tried to cross the canal on the Potsdam Bridge was swept off with machine gun fire. It was the resourceful infantrymen who suggested that a burning tank be driven on the bridge. Little sandbags protected the assault tank from the tank grenades. Solar oil was poured on the bags. The burning tank, which crossed the bridge, rushed into the yard of the corner house. I ran across the bridge, along with the assault detachment of the Second Battalion and climbed to the fourth floor of the house, and saw a huge building which was marked on the map as No 153: the Reich Chancery. It was no more than 400 steps away!

"One more leap...and the morning of May Day would be welcomed in Hitler's Chancery," the guardsmen said, preparing themselves for the attack.

At 3 am on 1 May, however, a cease fire order was received. This order was received by the units which were crossing the canal and were quite close to target 153. At 3:20 German negociators carrying a truce flag showed up on the Hunchback bridge 100 meters from the Potsdam streetcar bridge. They were allowed to cross the canal to our side and sent to Trykov's command post in the area of the hotel at Tempelhoff Airport. The four truce messengers were headed by General Hans Krebbs, chief of general staff of the German land forces....

At 3:55 the negociators reached the command center of the Eighth Guards Army. Soon afterwards came General V. D. Sokolovskiy, deputy commander of the First Belorussian Front. The talks took more than 10 hours. Krebbs was told the following: "No conditions. Unconditional surrender only." At 14:08, on 1 May, Krebbs left Trykov's command center. At 1430 we let him cross the Hunchback Bridge. Krebbs reached Site 153 without a single shot being fired from our side.

Immediately after that, a telephone wire was strung to Site 153....

At that time, I did not know what kind of discussions were taking place on that wire and who was conducting them. But I well remember the tense silence which prevailed in the area of Site 153, at which guns, mortars and the machine guns of our assault detachments were aimed. One could see it in the sights without optical instruments.

What kind of target was this, where was it and how did it present itself at that time?

It was the Reich Chancery, Hitler's headquarters. It was there that the central node of communications was located, from where orders and instructions went to the troops throughout Germany. It was the control panel for senseless bloodshed. It was located on Voosstrasse, No 1/3. It was a single four-story building covering an entire street--huge, sinister, angular, with massive square columns. It had a flat roof with platforms on which antiaircraft guns and machine guns were mounted. On the even-numbered side of the street there were no buildings. Instead, there was a long iron fence with wicked gates leading into a park and a zoo.

After the ultimatum on the unconditional surrender had expired, all weapons opened fire on Site 153. The shelling resumed after 6 pm on 1 May and ended at 12:50 am on 2 May. Under the cover of artillery fire, our assault detachments improved their positions and advanced in some areas. However, they were not particularly active, expecting new negotiators, which is what happened: at 12:40 am, on 2 May, Sgt Petr Belov, radio man at the 79th Guards Infantry Division, received the following text from the German command, in Russian: "Hello! Hello! This is the 56th German Tank Corps. We request a cease fire. At 12:50 Berlin time we shall be sending negotiators across the Potsdam bridge. The recognition sign will be a white flag. Please confirm." This statement was repeated five times. It was transmitted to army headquarters and once again the order was given to cease fire in that sector.

At 2 am on 2 May, negotiators head by a colonel showed up at the Potsdam bridge. The colonel carried a document with the following text: "General Staff Colonel von Dufwing is chief of staff of the 56th Tank Corps. He has been instructed on my behalf and on behalf of the troops under my command to provide explanations. Artillery General Weidling."

At about 6 am three negotiators in civilian clothing walked along the shortest way from the Reich Chancery to the Potsdam Bridge and then to the command center of the 8th Guards Army. One of them was government counselor of the Ministry of Information (Propaganda) Heinersdorf. He was bringing Chuykov an appeal from Dr Fritsche: "As you were informed by General Krebs, former Reich Chancellor Hitler is inaccessible (he had committed suicide--the author). Dr Goebbels is dead. As one of those who are still alive, I ask you to take Berlin under your protection. My name is known. Director of the Ministry of Information (Propaganda) Dr Fritsche."

Soon afterwards, Army Scouts Nikolay Vaygachev and Vasilii Gutsol brought to Chuykov Hans Fritsche himself.

On the morning of 2 May, accompanied by 2 generals, General Weidling, commander of the 56th Tank Corps and commander of the Berlin defenses, crossed the Potsdam Bridge. At Chuykov's command post he signed the order of the surrender of the Berlin garrison. The order was delivered to the communications center at the basement of the Reich Chancery and broadcast on the radio for rebroadcasting throughout Berlin. The firing ceased everywhere and the mass disarming of the Berlin Garrison began.

We entered the courtyard of the Reich Chancery at 9:30 am on the morning of 2 May. Goebbels' corpse was still smoking. The pit in which Hitler and Eva Braun, whose bodies had been burned, was discovered later. All that the leaders of the "Third Reich" left behind was stench.

A deafening silence fell on the streets of Berlin for several hours. The place was crowded by overturned German guns, broken-down armored cars, turretless tanks, helmets, empty shells, staff cars.... It was as though the earth here had been turned upside down and died frozen. Suddenly, everything came alive. At approximately 3 pm, on 2 May, throngs of German civilians appeared on squares and streets. Lines of hungry Berliners, doomed by Hitler to a hungry death, were formed beside Russian field kitchens. The aroma of freshly baked bread and, with it, faith in justice and the right to peaceful life for the industrious German people was what we brought at that time to Berlin. Bread is the solar energy of life. It was thus that the peaceful life of Berlin began.

4

I had the occasion to visit the GDR last spring. I walked the memorable streets, squares and parks of Berlin. At the Tiergarten, at the house in front of the Streetcar Bridge across the Landwehr Canal, I recalled the circle of fire which was raging on that sector on 30 April 1945. I recalled my orderly Misha Dubko, a Belorussian boy, obedient and sensitive. It sometimes seemed that he could guess where the next deadly machine burst would come from.

In moving from one basement to another--in street battles one should not show up on the streets, which are pierced by thick bursts of submachine and machine gun fire--Misha kept following me, as though protecting my back. But then before the rush across the Streetcar Bridge, he ran ahead of me. He jumped out of the basement and...his helmet flew off his head or, rather, toppled on his face. An explosive bullet hit him under his helmet....

I saw Berlin as it was then, a huge bloody wound, like a scab with a bubbling red-colored mass and the sky in clouds of brick dust, and the yellow slashes of the explosions--everything covered in blood. Resting on my arms was Misha Dubko, who had come ahead of me here and had died.

Battles in a city are always bloody. Many were our troops who parted with the dream of a peaceful life in the Berlin battle. Thousands upon thousands.

I visited a memorial in Seelow in memory of the 30,000 Soviet soldiers and officers who died in storming the Seelow Heights; I visited the common graves in Treptow Park, where 7,200 participants in the storming of Berlin are buried; I visited the Schonholtz City Memorial, where 13,200 Soviet soldiers rest, and the Weissensee District, where 1,100 of our fellow countrymen are buried. Memorials and obelisks may be found in Pankow, Martzan, Kolwitz, Lichtenberg--in all parts of the eastern part of Berlin, where Soviet troops are buried. All in all, there are more than 200 large memorial cemeteries on GDR territory. The same could not be said of Berlin's western sectors,

although there too the memory of the liberators should be honored and the people should know the losses suffered by the Soviet troops in liquidating the main citadel of the Third Reich"--the Berlin Nazi Garrison.

A grandiose sculpture of a Soviet soldier-liberator rises on a high artificial hill in Berlin's Treptow Park. This noble soldier, from the land of Russia, who marched with his weapon through hails of lead and across mined fields, crossing water and going through deeply echeloned enemy fortifications, brought the peoples of Europe freedom and the joy of a peaceful life. Although he is the winner, his wounds are still bleeding and the bitterness of the loss has not abated in his chest; the fate of friends and relatives scattered by the war remains unknown; however, in the land of the defeated enemy his actions are not those of revenge or hateful indifference to his surroundings. He is concerned with asserting peace on this land. He thinks of the future, of the fate of that nation which, by the ill will of the Nazi leaders, left hard and bitter memories in mankind. This soldier hugs to his chest a 3-year-old German girl saved from death.

That is how People's Artist of the USSR Yevgeniy Vuchetich has summed up and expressed in this sculpture the spirit and essence of the Soviet people at war with Hitlerite Germany.

This image comes from a number of actual examples. Following is one of them.

On the morning of 29 April, 1 hour before the storming of Tiergarten, our flag bearer Sgt Nikolay Masalov brought the regimental flag to the Landwehr Canal. It was quiet, as before a storm. Suddenly, in this alarming and tense silence, the crying of a child was heard. It was as though this voice of a child asking for its mother was coming from under the ground. Nikolay Masalov sensitively realized that it was a child crying.

"It must be saved. It is under the bridge."

"Are you sure?" I asked.

"It is under the bridge," Nikolay repeated.

"Pass on the flag to your assistant."

Approaching the bridge was exceptionally dangerous. The square was under fire from the left and the right and mines had been set under the asphalt. Nikolay Masalov slowly crawled forward, feeling every lump and crack in the asphalt. He was able to cross the embankment and to hide behind the concrete wall of the canal and jump across it.

A heavy-caliber machine gun opened fire on the right in short bursts. Short bursts are aimed. Had Masalov risked his life in vain? A lump stuck in my throat, and it was as though I had lost my power of speech. The machine guns fell silent and so did the crying of the child. Time froze, I don't for how long. It seemed to me like a long, tortuous hour, for it was I who had permitted Masalov to look for the child under withering fire.

By unspoken agreement, several guardsmen were preparing to go across. They would become targets. How to hold them back? Suddenly, everyone heard Masalov's voice:

"I have the child! There is a machine gun on the right, on the balcony of the house with the columns. Shut it up!"

Never had I seen such united and heavy fire. The regimental guardsmen fired at the house with all weapons. Masalov came out from under the bridge carrying out a 3-year-old girl....

This exploit did not remain unnoticed: Nikolay Ivanovich Masalov was awarded the title of honorary citizen of Berlin. Today he lives in the Tyazhin Railroad Station, Kemerovo Oblast. After the war he worked for 30 years as manager of a kindergarten.

I emphasize: many of our troops, risking their lives, rescued German children, pulling them out from under the fire, and not only in Berlin. This became the starting point in the work of the monument's author.

Here is what Yevgeniy Vuchevich has to say on the subject.

After the Potsdam Conference of Heads of Allied Countries, he was summoned by Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov, who asked him to draw up a project for a sculptural ensemble-monument dedicated to the victory of the Soviet people over fascist Germany. He also hinted that the Potsdam Declaration of the victors had been signed on behalf of the Soviet people by Comrade Stalin. Therefore, Stalin was to be in the center of the ensemble, cast in bronze, grandiose, with the depiction of Europe or a hemisphere in his arms.

The commission was completed quite quickly. Painters and sculptors looked at the main figure in the ensemble. They praised and admired. However, the sculptor was not satisfied. Another solution had to be found. He already had sketches in clay of "Soldier With Submachine Gun," "Soldier With Grenade" and "Victorious Soldier With Flag." He suddenly recalled the exploits of the Soviet troops who, during the storming of Berlin, pulled out German children from the fire zone. The strong and beautiful heroes of the Russian soil!

He rushed to Berlin, he visited Soviet soldiers, he met with the heroes, he drew sketches and took hundreds of photographs. And a new solution matured: "Soldier Carrying a Child on His Chest." He made a 1-meter tall statue. At the feet of the soldier lay a fascist swastika. The soldier held a submachine gun in his right hand while the left was holding a 3-year-old girl.

He molded it and placed it next to the figure of the generalissimo. A soldier and a leader side by side--would that do? It would and this was something to think about. What if a soldier were to be placed in the center of the ensemble? This would make it even better!

The time came to display the models under the light of the Kremlin's chandeliers. First was the main variant: a 1.5-meter-tall sculpture on a massive pedestal; the second, under a transparent paper, was the figure of a

soldier with a girl on his chest--a monument composition. All of these were merely study sketches. The members of the artistic council concentrated on the main figure, as though ignoring the second. Stalin showed up. He softly stepped around the table on which the sketches stood and frowned at the sculpture and asked:

"Listen, Vuchevich, are you not fed up with this person...with the moustache?" He pointed with his pipestem at the 1.5-meter figure.

"It is just a sketch," someone tried to speak up for the sculptor.

"The author may have been wounded but has not lost his tongue," Stalin interrupted. And looked at the figure under the parchment. "What is this?"

"This is also a sketch," Vuchevich answered.

"Also and...apparently not also," Stalin remarked. "Show me."

Vuchevich quickly took off the parchment from the soldier's figure. Stalin looked at it from all sides, then looked at those present, briefly smiling at Vuchevich and said:

"This is the soldier that we shall put in the center of Berlin on a high hill..." he remained silent as though expecting objections and drew on his pipe. Everyone realized that he had not finished but was thinking how to sum up his view, for which reason no one dared object. He went on:

"That is what we have decided.... Let this giant in bronze, the winner, hold on his chest this girl--the bright hope of the people liberated from fascism...."

He then addressed himself to the sculptor:

"Only, you know, Vuchevich, the submachine gun in the hand of the soldier should be replaced with something else. A machine gun is a utilitarian object today and this monument will prevail through the centuries. Put in his hand something more symbolic, such as a sword, for example, something heavy and solid. It was with this sword that the soldier cut up the fascist swastika. The sword is pointing down but woe to anyone who would make this hero raise it.... Agreed?"

"Let me think about it," Vuchevich answered.

"No one is forbidden to think. Think. I wish you luck.... I hear no objection. Nor is there any need for an objection...."

The ensemble-monument to the Soviet soldier, the victor in Berlin, was completed in the summer of 1949. The center is held by a 30-meter-tall figure of the soldier-liberator cast in bronze. How powerful and beautiful he is! The soldier's cape-wrap on the round shoulders, the tense arm holding the sword which brought down the fascist swastika, the firm legs, the blouse under the tight strap, the strict military haircut, the face inspired by the

awareness of performed duty, the eyes looking into the distance--everything in it amazes and enraptures. He is holding against his powerful chest a little girl. He is frightening and good. He is frightening to the bearers of evil. He is good to the helpless.

Now, on the 40th anniversary of victory over fascist Germany, looking at this grandiose monument, we say with a feeling of legitimate pride: "Such are our soldiers, that is what they carried with them on the paths of war and that is what they brought to the peoples of Europe!"

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## COLLECTIVES' RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

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[Article by Yu. Potemkin, general director of the MELZ Association]

[Text] In recent years the party has launched a number of initiatives to perfect the economic mechanism, the purpose of which has been firmly to establish in all sectors of production activities two inseparably interrelated processes: greater autonomy and greater responsibility of the collectives themselves.

In the course of the implementation of these initiatives and as the result of lengthy and painstaking work, we have drawn certain conclusions regarding many of the plant indicators and economic standards applied.

### I

For the past 5 years the collective of the Moscow MELZ Production Association has worked under the planning conditions based on indicators approved with the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree "On Improving Planning and Intensifying the Effect of the Economic Mechanism on Upgrading Production Efficiency and Work Quality." Within that period, a certain amount of practical experience has been acquired in working under the new conditions. Clearly, it would be expedient to sum it up and to express some practical considerations.

The MELZ Association produces color television sets and picture tubes, power light sources and photoelectronic instruments and radio tubes. It is widely known in our country and abroad. It can be said that the association determines to a large extent technical policy in one of the leading economic sectors. Therefore, the search for and implementation within the association of efficient economic management measures is of essential significance both to the sector and to related production facilities.

The formulation of optimal variety plans and stressed assignments regarding basic technical and economic indicators and moral and material incentives are among the most important and difficult problems in perfecting the economic mechanism.

It took a long time to resolve the problem of how to improve the procedure of planning and utilizing the wage fund, thus converting it into an active stimulator of the growth of production efficiency. The conversion to a standardized method for planning the use of the wage fund enabled us, while retaining the existing growth rates of average wages, significantly to lower labor outlays per ruble of standardized-net output (NChP). However, despite the unquestionable advantages of the standardized wage planning method, it failed to take into consideration a number of important factors which affect basic technical and economic indicators, such as the level of assimilation of planned capacities, the level reached in labor productivity and the size of the personnel in relation to planned assignments. The method used for determining the planned wage fund based not only on the increased volume of output and labor productivity but also on the level of assimilation of capacities with the planned size of the personnel helped each enterprise to attain planned indicators within a shorter time.

With each five-year plan the formation of incentive funds for the enterprises and of material incentive for the shops changed in accordance with specific assignments. For example, in the 10th Five-Year Plan enterprise incentive funds were based on economizing on production assets and lowering labor and overall production outlays. In the 11th Five-Year Plan, the number of fund-determining indicators was reduced to two: growth of labor productivity and volume of output. However, retaining stable standards remained a mandatory prerequisite for the collectives.

The indicators governing the formation of material incentive funds (FMP) were even more finely differentiated for the individual subdivisions. For example, in an experimental production facility (shop, sector) which has been assigned to master the production of new items, the standards governing the formation of the material incentive funds were based entirely on the increased volume of output of the new commodity.

The following example shows the way in which priority incentive for more stressed plans is applied in practical terms: in the 1985 plan, FMP standards varied: they ranged from 9 to 15.5 percent of the wage fund for enterprise collectives, and from 30 to 50 percent of planned output for ITR [engineering and technical personnel] and employees in the main plant shops.

Incentives are doubled in each of the applied systems for the formation of material incentive funds--both for individual enterprises and shops--for the production of new equipment and superior quality items. For example, in 1984 about 40 percent of the FMP amounts were obtained by the enterprises for the maximal application of new equipment and improving quality indicators. The share was even higher for the shops of the head plant--about 50 percent.

The size of the actually established incentive funds, based on the results of the work of enterprise and shop collectives, is additionally related to the implementation of contractual and intrafirm obligations to a much greater extent than stipulated in union standards. Thus, the FMP may be lowered by up to 20 percent for violations of intrafirm procurements or the procurement of faulty goods. Conversely, should all contractual procurements be met on time

and intrafirm deliveries made ahead of time, as much as 15 percent could be added to such enterprise and shop funds.

In developing the economic mechanism, combining the system for the establishment of incentive funds, which depend on the stress of the adopted and, naturally, fulfilled plan, the standard of output, the claims and penalties system, the implementation of contractual and intrafirm obligations based on a system for assessing the work of the collectives was ascribed particular importance. In this case we take mandatorily into consideration the implementation of plan indicators on a cumulative basis, from the beginning of the year, and the growth rates of basic technical and economic indicators are compared with figures for the corresponding period of the preceding year.

Practical experience convincingly proved that properly chosen bonus systems enable us purposefully to influence improvements in the quality of the work and the growth of production efficiency. Thus, awarding bonuses to production brigades for the fulfillment and overfulfillment of assignments and technically substantiated output norms yielded positive results after relating them, on the one hand, to the implementation of the monthly plan (assignment) by the sector or shop for the full variety of items and, on the other, to quality indicators (no technological violations, lowering of technological losses, faulty items and claims, etc.).

Most acceptable under the conditions of a multiple-target bonus is a procedure according to which brigade incentive is made dependent on the implementation of the basic (particularly important) stipulations. In addition to the basic and various secondary stipulations, according to circumstances a coefficient of brigade labor quality is applied, which reflects the effectiveness of end results and working conditions.

The system used in assessing ITR and employee labor in production subdivisions not only ensures the comparability between the results achieved by the collectives and the plan but also determines the intensity of labor (the cumulative result of the volume of output since the beginning of the year, labor productivity and degree of capacity assimilation compared to the preceding year); labor efficiency (extent of improvement of particularly important end labor results compared with the plan: increased output, reduced number of claims, rhythmical production, percentage of goods delivered on demand, etc.); percentage of superior category items in the total volume of output; and level of implementation of the marketing plan taking into consideration nondelivery of goods stipulated in contracts and intrafirm obligations.

Practical experience has convinced us that a properly selected economic management mechanism in intraproduction relations enables us successfully to resolve a number of important problems. This is confirmed by the high growth rates achieved by the association for all basic technical and economic indicators in the course of three five-year plans. For example, this year we shall work 4 days using saved materials.

Despite such successes, the collective and the association's management are always facing difficult problems which cannot always be resolved exclusively through internal reserves.

The association's plants are scattered among several oblasts and are many hundreds of kilometers away from the head enterprise--the Moscow Plant for Electric Vacuum Instruments. It is frequently difficult to resolve efficiently problems of an economic nature while several association plants are being reconstructed.

Stricter quality requirements and the steady increase in the possibilities of production equipment and technology set the specialized scientific subdivisions the task of "updating" serially produced instruments on the basis of the latest scientific and technical achievements. Since they account for a certain share of the work of the scientific collective, they are annually planned and financed out of the plant's fund and are given material incentives in proportion to the contribution made by the scientific and production collectives.

The link between science and production changes at the stage of practical application of new developments. The scientific subdivision submits to the production facilities its new items, the efficiency of which will depend on technical standards, volume of output and time needed for mastering their production. If the enterprise has available capacities for mastering the production of new mass-produced items, a total reciprocal understanding between production and science develops and, as a rule, economic and production indicators improve. If no capacities are available, the production area finds itself in a difficult situation: its volume of output and overall indicators drop during the assimilation period as a result of stopping the production of obsolete items and installing new production capacities. For example, as a result of a severe shortage of color picture tubes, in the mid-1970s the Khromatron Plant converted to a three-shift, 7-day work week based on a sliding schedule without days off. Planned capacity was exceeded by 50 percent. One other plants had mastered the production of color picture tubes, their sectorial output increased sharply. Nevertheless, the Khromatron Plant is steadily planning production increases. This has resulted in the fact that whereas all other sectorial enterprises are operating on the bases of a 5-day work week with 2 days off for repair and preventive operations, no such possibility exists at the Khromatron Plant. Its equipment has been extensively used for more than 10 years, the result of which has been, on the one hand, a gradual worsening of quality and technical and economic indicators and, on the other, the lack of even a minimum of available capacities, which substantially hinders mastering the production of new items.

Naturally, science and production must constantly interact. The scientific subunit needs constant help in the development process and the enterprise collectives also require the steady help of the scientific subdivision in their production process and in improving instrument technology and design. However, no such unity exists in practice. Production means a collective with its material incentive conditions and cost accounting relations. Science is not an industrial group with its own financing conditions, material incentives and specific economic indicators.

The difference of indicators and the different attitude in assessing them, as well as the noncomparability of material incentive conditions, are an invisible but nevertheless very effective barrier to the creation of a single "science-production" complex. The time has come to eliminate this artificial barrier and to create a truly single "science-production" complex. Here again, it is particularly important to find the type of levers which would make it necessary not only to develop and assimilate new equipment faster but also to apply the latest highly productive technological prototypes.

The solution of this problem requires a flexible economic mechanism. Quite recently, a new regulation entitled "procedure for the certification of industrial commodities into two quality categories" was introduced in industry. According to this regulation, second-category goods will no longer be certifiable. It is further stipulated that by agreement with the consumer ministry, the production of noncertified commodities must be stopped within 2 months. If so requested by manufacturing ministries, and in coordination with the State Committee for Science and Technology, the USSR Gosplan is allowed, on an exceptional basis, to expend the production of noncertified commodities for a period not to exceed 2 years, to be sold at a certain wholesale price discount.

However, as our practical experience indicates, this mechanism does not contribute to the fastest possible utilization of the latest instruments and to ending the production of obsolete items, due to the absence of a respective procedure for the development and application of new items to replace those considered obsolete. The consumer is forced to agree to extending deliveries of obsolete equipment, for in the opposite case the procurement of necessary items will come to a complete stop.

Thus, for the past 4 or 5 years we have included in our proposal a request to end the production of some types of radio tubes, indicators and mass spectrometers which have their functional analogues serially produced, without result. Furthermore, some consumers refuse to agree to terminating the production of items not in demand, for periods ranging between 7 and 10 years. To put it mildly, the mechanism aimed at stopping the production of obsolete equipment within the shortest possible time works poorly. In our view, ministries should be given the right to approve on an annual basis a list of instruments not to be produced any longer and not recommended for further use, by agreement with the general contractor. After 1 or 2 years, such items are to be listed as spare parts. In this case, their price to the consumer doubles or triples (without raising the ceiling of material production outlays for the consumers), whereas, as stipulated in the decree, a 50 percent discount is applied to wholesale prices. In such cases, morally obsolete equipment will be equally uneconomical to either side--manufacturer and customer. This will force the faster installation of new and more advanced equipment.

As we know, before planning was converted to the new indicators, fulfilling the plan for the overall volume of output (gross output) and the growth of labor productivity (with the help of the gross output) were the most important criteria in assessing the activities of enterprises and associations. In

addition to these indicators, new ones were being introduced constantly, eventually reaching several dozen. In this case, the extent to which the plan was underfulfilled or overfulfilled, whether by 0.1 percent or by several percentage points, was of no essential significance. Depending on the implementation of obligations to the specific consumers, the work was rated quite arbitrarily and had no clearly defined framework.

It is true that in recent years the volume of goods marketed, taking into consideration contractual obligations, became one of the most important indicators in the work of associations (enterprises). However, since in addition to this indicator several dozen other indicators were retained, the nonfulfillment of which deprived the collective of all material and moral incentives, the indicator of implementation of contractual obligations could not assume a leading role.

The 1979 decree on perfecting the economic mechanism clearly stipulated that the results of economic activities of production associations (enterprises) in industry and their economic incentive will be assessed above all on the basis of the implementation of procurement plans in accordance with concluded contracts. The activities and economic incentives of enterprises and associations for the implementation of procurement plans are rated on the basis of clearly stipulated long-term standards and every collective knows what it gains or loses according to the fulfillment or nonfulfillment of this indicator. It is not a subject of discussion and cannot be amended. The size of the economic incentive, based on the implementation indicator, is determined not on the basis of any departmental decision from above but is computed by the enterprise itself on the basis of a uniform state standard.

The situation with other indicators is somewhat different. In our association "gross output" has not been included in assessing activities starting with 1982. However, we kept the growth rates of volume and rates of growth of labor productivity, computed on the basis of NChP, as well as profits. The work and incentives of the collective are rated on the basis of such indicators as an alternative, i.e., based on the "fulfilled-not fulfilled" principle. It is precisely here that we feel the effect of the basic contradiction between the need to adopt a stressed plan for all indicators and the fear of responsibility both to the collective and superior organizations in the case of nonfulfillment, for the nonfulfillment of such indicators, even by a small fraction, would totally deprive the collective of the enterprise of all types of moral and material incentives. The leadership, therefore, is faced with the following dilemma: on the one hand, according to all estimates, we should adopt a stressed plan; on the other, we are not entirely confident that the entire economic management mechanism will operate efficiently and ensure its implementation. It is at this point that we begin to make the rounds of upper levels with a view to being issued a plan we are confident to fulfill. Under these circumstances, the indicator of implementation of contractual obligations is once again given second priority.

What should be done to encourage the enterprise to adopt stressed plans? Above all, we must ensure the further development of cost accounting on the basis of the assignments of the five-year plan and long-term economic standards, as stipulated in the CPSU and USSR Council of Ministers decree "On

Improving Planning and Intensifying the Effect of the Economic Mechanism on Upgrading Production Efficiency and Work Quality." Such formulation of the matter, which is the essence of cost accounting, would exclude rating the work of the enterprise by the alternative system.

Assessing the work on the basis of the indicators of increased labor productivity, improved production quality and increased profits (reduced production costs) and the accumulation of funds should be the same as on the basis of the indicator of implementation of contractual obligations, i.e., it should be based on long-term standards and exclude the alternative rating system. The standards of withholdings for incentive funds should be based on the intensiveness of the plan and work efficiency which, in turn, should be based on the enterprise's record and the standards governing the lowering of material and labor outlays. At the same time, percentages of withholdings and incentive funds should be drastically reduced in cases of overfulfillment of the plan for fund-forming indicators. The result will be that this loophole as well will be blocked for those who do careless work.

By adopting this approach, the enterprise would find it economically unprofitable to adopt a nonstressed plan, for this would result in a drastic lowering of the amount of withholdings for incentive funds, in which case the management will have to answer not only to the superior organization but also to the collective and the trade union and party organizations.

Under such circumstances, cost accounting would become the only economic management tool. The formulation of the plan in accordance with the enterprise's record would be based exclusively on the progress from physical to volume indicators, rather than the opposite, as is frequently the case today.

It is only thus that we shall be able to formulate 5-year plans on the basis of systems of scientifically substantiated technical and economic norms and standards, according to the type of work, labor outlays, raw materials, materials and fuel and energy resources and standards governing the use of production capacities and specific capital investments. This approach will ensure the formulation of plans based on economic and engineering computations and will prevent setting plan assignments only on the basis of the existing dynamics of respective indicators.

## II

For the past several years the association has been able to keep up with the fund-forming standards which were stipulated at the start of the five-year plan with an annual differentiation. Under these circumstances, there is no need to impose upon the production collectives a higher growth rate for the volume of output or the profit indicator. In drafting their plans for basic economic indicators, the enterprise and shop collectives themselves estimate the cost of adopting an unstressed and, I would add, nonoptimal plan.

But how to formulate an optimal plan from the viewpoint of both the enterprise and the state? To begin with, we must strictly observe the "Regulation on the Socialist State Production Enterprise," according to which the plan must be

formulated by the collective itself, covering all indicators, rather than imposed from above. Secondly, the plan must be formulated on the basis of the enterprise's record. The formulation of long-term standards for withholdings for incentive funds, also based on the enterprise's records, will force the enterprise to adopt stressed plans. Excluding the alternative system in assessing the implementation of basic indicators, such as the growth of labor productivity, volume of output, and profit will automatically change the nature of plan amendment problem. Thirdly, the work of the enterprise will be assessed not on the basis of departmental criteria (percentage of plan fulfillment for one indicator or another) but of the implementation of contractual obligations to consumers. The economic efficiency of its work (growth of labor productivity, profits, production quality) will influence one aspect or another of the formation of incentive funds. Fourth, this will exclude planning from above, based on levels reached in volume indicators and material and technical support. The long-term effect of fixed standards will sharply increase the interest of collectives in engaging in most efficient economic management--conservation of manpower and raw material and energy resources.

Perfecting the economic mechanism is an uninterrupted process. Even the most progressive economic management system requires changes in the course of time. The extensive discussion of this important problem, organized on a democratic basis, is, unquestionably, a positive factor. However, it is hardly necessary to be carried away by endless searching without applying or testing already achieved solutions.

In this connection, let us reemphasize the need for the full application of the economic management system stipulated in the 12 July 1979 decree, on both departmental and territorial levels. I am confident that the application of this decree will enable us to make work in industry substantially more efficient.

Furthermore, we must strictly observe the basic rule of scientific management: to combine power with responsibility on all management levels. To this day, the principle of one-man command remains inviolable. This means that only one superior authority, a single institution, a single agency has the right to issue orders to the enterprise. All other organizations must base their relations on an equal contractual foundation.

But what happens in reality? The special rights of transport organizations are universally known and included even in the new regulation on the production association (combine). Regrettably, not only the railroads but the power system and the gas, heat and water supply enterprises act in terms of the enterprise as cost-accounting partners, on the one hand, who sell their commodities and services on a contractual basis but, on the other, as organizations enjoying state inspection rights. As such, they could impose fines and penalties on their partner who has purchased their commodities if, in their opinion, the enterprise has used them improperly. We are familiar with restrictions in terms of the supply of freight cars and the supply of power and gas during the autumn and winter peaks. The losses which the industrial partner suffers in such cases are subject to no compensation whatsoever.

Procurement and marketing organizations are the most important business partners of associations and enterprises. Their efficient work controls the life of any enterprise. Here as well, however, rights are not balanced with responsibility. The Soyuzglavsnabsbyt [Main Union Supply and Marketing Administration] imposes strict penalties to suppliers for nonfulfillment of orders or for selling centrally funded goods without orders. However, the administration itself bears no material responsibility whatsoever for violating enterprise procurement deadlines.

Dozens of various inspectorates are above us and control our work. Each of them has the right to prescribe, ban, eliminate, regulate something and, finally, penalize the enterprise and its management. Not one of them is interested in the demands and actions of the others.

A situation has developed of late in which, although no one denies the positive significance of the establishment of direct relations in industry, which relieve the enterprises from intermediary actions by numerous marketing and procurement organizations, nevertheless, in terms of the variety of materials and complementing goods issued by the Gosnab through its territorial administrations, results in a virtually total lack of items not subject to centralized distribution. The old methods of distribution have been retained even for items the production of which meets entirely the needs of the national economy and the use of which is virtually unrestricted. The impression develops that here as well it is the interests of individual marketing and procurement organizations rather than those of the state which prevail. Such organizations try to prove the validity of their existence and to enhance their authority by planning, allocating and controlling the production of commodities which are produced in sufficient quantities and could be procured through direct relations.

One of the most difficult problems is that of relations between the enterprise and the superior authority which has jurisdiction over it. The superior authority has great administrative power over the enterprise and does not shy from using it. However, by virtue of its legal and economic nature, it neither bears nor could bear any material responsibility for the consequences of unbalanced planning. In the case of an unbalanced plan but favorable averages, a main administration is never considered a co-responsible, but, as a rule, acts only as...a prosecutor. As a result, in the final account, all blunders in management and planning are blamed only on the association and the enterprises.

The role of prices is drastically enhanced as a result of the set of measures currently related to the implementation of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree "On Improving Planning and Intensifying the Effect of the Economic Mechanism on Upgrading Production Efficiency and Work Quality." Under the new conditions, properly set and properly applied prices create a powerful incentive for using new equipment and technology and applying a scientific organization of labor. Conversely, errors in price setting substantially distort the assessment of enterprise work and prove to be a hindrance to technical progress. Under the conditions of our association, which produces several hundred types of electric vacuum

instruments and light sources, wholesale prices are among the most important economic levers used in upgrading production efficiency.

In the 11th Five-Year Plan, the MELZ undertook the production of 34 types of consumer goods and the production of another 11 will be mastered this year. Therefore, in the course of the 11th Five-Year Plan, the association is planning to master the production of 45 such new items. Stopping the production of some consumer items is determined by commercial considerations. Naturally, there are items which, although produced for a decade or longer, are still in demand whereas the production of other items should be stopped 2-3 years later. In this connection, the price-setting bodies should assume a more definite stance and efficiently set prices in accordance with demand. It is self-evident that such price-setting should remain within the range of profitability. Here as well the following example is typical: our association produces the Topaz chandeliers with crystal pendants. Their price, as set by the USSR State Committee for Prices, is 350 rubles. Is it high? Of course it is. Therefore, demand for this item has declined. We faced the problem of terminating the production of this item. Before that, we turned to that respected organization with the request to lower the price of a chandelier to 200 rubles. Production outlays make this entirely possible, for the association would be able to manufacture such chandeliers for several more years and considerably increase its volume of output. However, the State Committee for Prices did not agree with us and now we must waste efforts to prepare the manufacturing of another item which, considering the difficulties of making the necessary tools and instrumentation, becomes quite difficult and expensive.

All of this proves that in frequent cases our rights do not match our responsibilities. The rights are granted to the upper nonproduction levels, whereas the responsibilities fall on the collectives of associations and enterprises. In our view, the law of consistency between the rights and obligations of association (enterprise) collectives should be observed strictly. Naturally, it is only then that any problem, regardless of its difficulty, can be resolved more efficiently and less costly. For the time being, the real loser is the state. That is why we must decisively limit the practice of intervening in enterprise affairs to the limits set in the "Regulation Under Socialist State Production Enterprise" and the "Regulation on the Production Association (Combine)."

The problem of continuous planning must be resolved as well. The enterprise must have a five-year production plan for the next 5-year period at the latest at the start of the final year of the preceding 5-year period. It should not consist merely of control figures but be a specific plan with an annual breakdown of the basic indicators for forming incentive funds. At the same time, stable fund-forming standards should be approved. The current absence of such plans does not give the enterprise any confidence in the future, for the fear of arbitrary planning is exceptionally strong.

Furthermore, the current system of material and technical orders for ensuring the implementation of the plan stipulates that orders should be placed 1 year ahead. Lacking a specific plan, associations (enterprises) submit "maximal"

orders which introduce chaos in the material and technical supply system. This is another factor which restrains the collectives in adopting a stressed plan.

### III

Stable and rhythmical ties with related enterprises are particularly important for the economy. Breakdowns in deliveries of raw materials and complementing items or supplying such items with concealed defects adversely affect not only the economic indicators of the enterprise-consumer but also harm the economy on a national scale. Thus, merely a delivery of substandard raw material for the production of high-melting metals cost us some half a million rubles in additional outlays. The nondelivery of nonferrous metal wire worth no more than 4,000 rubles stopped the production of instruments of great importance to and needed by the national economy and caused the enterprise needing complementing items made of such wire losses of more than 1 million rubles. The careless partners paid a fine of no more than 100 rubles.

Today responsibility for underprocurements or procurements of substandard goods has been increased significantly. Failures to deliver may entail a measure of responsibility such as the compensation for losses incurred. However, the consumer must prove that this was the only reason for a breakdown in the construction process. Considering that several thousand varieties of materials and complementing items are received on a cooperative basis, to prove this becomes practically impossible.

A number of new documents are being issued currently on increasing the autonomy of associations and enterprises, enhancing material incentive and upgrading their responsibility for end results. It seems to us that in order to ensure the successful exercise of enterprise rights we should go back to the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers 4 October 1965 decree, which stipulates that "...the enterprises must autonomously resolve problems of production-economic activities," and, in particular, "plan labor productivity, number of workers and average wages and establish the most efficient enterprise management structure."

For example, the existence of an entire set of functional subdivisions of central administrations and ministries, engaging in formulating the structures of the formation and utilization of material incentive funds, based on the intensiveness of the work and production quality, has not contributed anything to the solution of the problem, in addition to the fact that the fundamental stipulation of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers 1979 decree "On Specific Trends in the Utilization of Economic Incentive Funds" (and, naturally, FMP--the author) "must be determined by the administration of the production association (enterprise) jointly with the trade union committee" is constantly violated by a variety of additionally issued circulars.

The time has come to abandon the system of setting aside the material incentive funds from overall earnings and abolish a number of related encrustations and establish a correlation between the growth of the overall earnings of an association (enterprise) on increased labor productivity and

above-plan reduction of production outlays on the basis of the following method: first, the association (enterprise) is issued maximal values for the coefficient of the correlation between increased earnings (FZP and FMP together) and the increase (lowering) of labor productivity for the 5-year period. The planned values of said coefficient (0.7 or 0.8) are based on the technical and economic indicators of the enterprise's record. This means that for each percentage of increase (reduction) from year to year labor productivity must be ensured on the basis of the increase (reduction) of the overall association earnings for the year under consideration by 0.7 or 0.8 percent. Secondly, for each above-plan percentage of reduced production cost (increased production outlays) the earnings of the association's FCP and FMP are additionally increased (lowered) by 0.6 percent compared to the year under consideration.

The planned value of the lowering of outlays must also be determined according to the record or computed according to the basic output in accordance with the level reached in the outlays of front-ranking enterprises or foreign companies in the course of one or, on an exceptional basis, two 5-year periods.

It is anticipated that even such a rather simple method will raise a number of questions. For example, how to place all associations (enterprises) under identical conditions, when the base which will be used for determining the growth or lowering of material goods is a level reached at a certain period of time? It is obvious that in the case of associations (enterprises) whose planned capacity has not been entirely reached, the standard governing the growth of earnings (FZP with FMP) should be corrected by the capacity assimilation coefficient. Should the collective fail to reach planned capacity within the stipulated deadlines, it would be expedient to additionally lower the growth of earnings by 10 percent (or a reduction coefficient of 0.1) per each year of lagging. For example, if the 1984 capacity assimilation coefficient of a plant was 0.8 the regulation deadline for their assimilation would have been exceeded by 2 years ( $1 - 0.1 \times 2 = 0.8$ ). In this case, the growth of earnings of this collective according to this system should be determined not according to the 0.7 but the 0.56 standard ( $0.7 \times 0.8$ ). Conversely, in the case of new production, earnings (FZP + FMP) must be computed by individual job.

Furthermore, a control system should be added to the current mechanism of reducing the amount of incentive funds for contractual underprocurements, based on a standard scale by correcting the amount of computed funds, based on firm rates for nonfulfillment of assignments on upgrading the technical standard of output.

Understandably, the application of such a mechanism would be effective if problems of determining the structure of management, and bonuses to workers, ITR and employees according to basic results of economic activities (including

the elimination of restrictions related to the maximal amount of bonuses by worker category) become the full responsibility of the administration of the association (the enterprise), the trade union committee and the respective labor collective.

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## COMPETITION AND PERFECTING DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING TO LABOR

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[Article by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences V. Yakushev; published as a basis for discussion]

[Text] In recent years, specialists in labor sociology and economics have been actively discussing the question of establishing a closer link between the system of distribution according to labor and the successes achieved by individual workers and collectives competing against each other (see SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA, No 3, 1977; No 1, 1978; No 2, 1980; No 3, 1982; No 3, 1983; Nos 1, 2 and 4, 1984; and No 1, 1985). As early as the start of the 1970s, based on the results of experiments aimed at perfecting cadre selection and placement and the study of progressive experience in the organization of the socialist competition, the sociologists submitted a number of suggestions in this area. Currently, the discussion has exceeded the limits of a strictly sociological problem. New approaches have been found to improve the organization of the competition and to stimulate labor and the entire economic mechanism of socialist society.

One of the most difficult problems in the history of socialist thinking has been that of incentives for labor in a society ruled by collective ownership. Thomas More, one of the founders of utopian socialism, had already written that anyone who could say with Plato that everything among friends should be commonly shared, should answer: "How could an abundance of products be obtained if everyone would avoid work, for he would not be forced to engage in it for personal profit and, on the other hand, have the firm hope that someone else's work would allow him to loaf?" (Thomas More, "Utopia," Moscow, 1953, p 98). Socialist thinking reached the answer to this age-old question step by step. Campanella, Mably, Owen and Saint-Simon made their contribution to the solution. However, according to Engels, it was Charles Fourier who established "the great axiom of social philosophy" (see K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 1, p 528).

The meaning of Fourier's discovery was the explanation of how, by motivating human passions, an unparalleled interest in labor could be obtained, "without resorting to the motive forces of necessity, morality, intelligence, duty and coercion" (Ch. Fourier, "Izbr. Soch." [Selected Works], vol III, Moscow, 1954, p 123). Among the various passions, Fourier particularly singled out the

ambitious desire to distinguish oneself, to be ahead of the others, and the desire to compete. It was precisely this that he considered the spring which would bring into action the entire economic mechanism of the commune and will raise "all output to the highest possible level in terms of quality and quantity" (ibid., p 125). This would be achieved thanks to the fact that distribution according to labor would be accompanied by successes achieved by workers and collectives (series) competing with each other and will serve the purpose of promoting rivalry. It was at that point that the effect of the "mechanism of labor aspiration" will be manifested, turning the work into pleasure and guaranteeing the persistence of the people at work. "...Idlers and even dandies will be up at 4 am, winter and summer, in order zealously to engage in useful work..." (ibid., p 26).

The founders of scientific communism highly rated Fourier's thoughts on the role of competition in a socialist society. "Rivalry among individuals," Engels wrote, "or capital against capital, labor against labor, and so on, is reduced under these circumstances to competition based on human nature and, so far, the only decent explanation of it has been given by Fourier: a competition which, with the elimination of conflicting interests, would be limited to its specific and sensible area" (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 1, p 562). In criticizing Prudhon, who attacked the Fourierists for their desire to replace rivalry with competition, Marx proclaimed its support of the latter and formulated the most important methodological concept of the distinction between competition and rivalry: rivalry is competition for the sake of profit... Rivalry is commercial rather than industrial competition. In our time, industrial competition exists for the sake of commercial purposes alone" (op. cit., vol 4, p 161). Marx's statements prove that the difference between rivalry and competition is in the purpose. The purpose of rivalry is profit. The purpose of industrial competition is the labor product. The future society will abandon the orientation of producers toward profit and will adopt competition oriented toward the product.

Therefore, the viewpoint which developed in the history of socialist thinking and which was substantiated was that under the conditions of collective ownership the motivation of people for work is accomplished through competition. It is true that another view as well prevailed, supported by the representatives of petit bourgeois socialism, such as Prudhon, Duhring and others: the united individuals control their overall output on the basis of exchange value and cash. Marx's attitude toward this was categorical: "...Nothing could be more erroneous and stupid..." (op. cit., vol 46, part I, p 102). In his "Anti-Duhring," Engels convincingly proved that this solution inevitably leads to the distortion, breakdown and death of the commune (see op. cit., vol 20, pp 310-325).

The first article which V. I. Lenin wrote after the victory of the October Revolution on problems of economic construction was entitled "How To Organize Competition?" Its appearance was the result of the entire course of development of socialist thinking.

Lenin proceeded from the fact that rivalry inherent in commodity production, despite all of its negative aspects, had positive features as well: it

developed "initiative, energy and the daring of initiative..." ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works, vol 35, p 195).

Consequently, the orientation toward profit had to be removed from it and leave that which Marx had described as "industrial competition," i.e., its stimulating function. But how to do it? It was no longer possible to rely on spontaneity: public property eliminates conflicting interests and does not contain incentives for rivalry. Furthermore, as the experiments of the utopians had confirmed, it creates conditions which enables one to become lazy, for "reliance on other people's work offers the possibility of leisure." Therefore, the competition had to be organized. This required the creation of conditions under which the workers would act toward one another as rivals in labor and would consciously regulate these conditions, so that the competition take place "not in its beastly but in its human forms" (op. cit., vol 36, p 151). Such conditions appear by constantly "comparing practical results in the management of individual communes" and immediately reward outstanding communes (ibid., p 192). Therefore, the effect of the rivalry appears as a result of comparisons and rewards.

There is proof that in 1920 Lenin already had a clear idea of the principles of developed socialism. In a report on the work of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Sovnarkom, delivered in February, he said: "It is also not very difficult to imagine the developed socialist society. This problem as well has been resolved" (op. cit., vol 40, p 104). The documents of the 9th Party Congress, which was held in March-April of that year, under Lenin's chairmanship, gives a specific idea of the nature of this solution and the role of the competition in it.

The congress's resolution includes a section on "Labor Competition," which is of crucial importance in understanding the way Lenin and the party imagined the solution of the problem of stimulating labor in a socialist society:

"Each social system (slavery, serfdom, capitalism) has had its means and methods of labor coercion and labor upbringing in the interest of the exploiting upper crust.

"The Soviet system faces the full problem of developing its own methods of influence with a view to enhancing labor-intensiveness and expediency on the basis of a socialized economy and in the interests of the entire people.

"Along with agitation-ideological influence on the toiling masses and repressive measures toward notorious idlers, parasites and disorganizers, competition is a most powerful force in enhancing labor productivity.

"Competition among plants, rayons, shops, workshops and individual workers must become a subject of thorough organization and close study by trade unions and economic organs.

"The bonus system must become one of the most powerful means of encouraging the competition. The food supply system must take this into consideration..." ("KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh i Resheniyakh S"yezдов, Konferentsiy i Plenumov TsK"

[The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses and Conferences and Central Committee Plenums]. Volume 2, Moscow, 1983, p 244).

The text of the resolution leaves no doubt that Lenin and the party saw in the competition the principal means of stimulating labor activeness under socialist conditions. The stipulation that "the bonus system must become one of the most powerful means of promoting the competition" essentially means that the system of distribution relations should be structured in accordance with the successes achieved by workers and collectives in competition with one another and should contribute to the development of labor rivalry between them.

It is sometimes claimed that subsequently, under the influence of the NEP, Lenin revised his views on some basic foundations of socialist construction under socialism. The nature of this revision was expressed best of all by Lenin himself, who directly raised "the question of in what sense, in assessing our new economic policy, could one speak of the erroneousness of previous economic policy..." (op. cit., vol 44, p 194). In his answer, he drew the parallel of seizing a fortress: if you cannot storm it, lay a siege to it and circumvene it. "...We," he said, "were defeated in our attempt to use the 'storming' method, i.e., to convert to the socialist foundations for production and distribution in the quickest, fastest and most direct way" (ibid., vol 44, p 204). To Lenin the NEP was forced "retreat in order to be better prepared to mount another offensive on capitalism" (ibid., p 342). It did not affect his view on the nature of the socialist foundations of production and distribution.

The 9th Party Congress ended on 5 April 1920; as early as 25 April the Entente mounted a new invasion, which put an end to the spell of peace and postponed for a long time the possibility of implementing the congress's resolutions.

It was only in 1929 that the party once again put on the agenda the question of organizing the competition. The appeal of the 16th Party Conference to all workers and toiling peasants of the Soviet Union stated: "A decree on labor competition, the idea of which Lenin inseparably linked with the cause of building socialism, was adopted at the 9th Party Congress in 1920." It then cited the text of the resolution and concluded as follows: "This resolution of the 9th Party Congress remains totally relevant and vital" ("KPSS v Resolyutsiyakh...", vol 4, Moscow, 1984, pp 495-496).

The successes of the development of socialist competition are well-known. Its history is marked by glorious landmarks, such as the shock worker movement of the 1930s, the Stakhanovite movement and the movement of the Thousands during the Great Patriotic War. Today as well it has been enriched with a number of patriotic initiatives. Unfortunately, examples of a different nature exist as well. As early as the 1930s, party documents noted that "a number of scandalous cases of inadmissibly formalistic attitude toward the socialist competition and shock labor may be found in the practice of plant organizations..." ("KPSS v Resolyutsiyakh...", vol 6, Moscow, 1985, p 52). To this day, we are forced to mention the need to eliminate such formalism.

A great deal has been written and said on the socialist competition. It is ascribed tremendous importance. However, the fact that the "bonus system must become one of the most powerful means for encouraging the competition" was not adopted to its fullest extent in economic theory or economic practice. The same situation prevails to this day: bonuses based on the results of the socialist competition account for no more than about 1 percent of the overall economic incentive funds. Yet it is precisely this which is the key to stimulating labor in the socialist society and developing an efficient economic mechanism. Today the practice of economic management is based primarily on two approaches in the matter of distribution according to labor.

The first is the familiar principle of fulfilling stipulated norms of output, services, management, etc. This approach is quite consistent with common sense, and it is believed by many people that no more efficient means in the implementation of the principle of distribution according to labor may be found than that of well-organized norming. Yet its practical implementation involves considerable difficulties.

Above all, this type of distribution procedure makes the workers interested in a low initial base for norms and standards and a lack of interest in taking organizational and technical steps which may lead to their revision. The reason is well known: since wages directly depend on fulfilling the norms, the lower the latter are the easier it is to earn a bonus. A great deal has been written on this norming shortcoming and great efforts have been made to eliminate it. Steps are being taken to encourage the workers to revise norms. So far, however, scientists and specialists are still wondering how to organize norming; a payment system is surreptitiously developing, which not only distorts the meaning of technically substantiated norms but labor norming in general.

On the surface, matters related to labor norming appear relatively successful (most piece-rate workers work on the basis of technically substantiated norms). However, a special study has shown that in the overwhelming majority of cases such allegedly technically substantiated norms do not reflect the truly necessary time outlays. They have simply been made to fit the current or planned wage level.

The wage fund is the real regulator of the level of norms: if it makes it possible, norms are not changed; if there is a danger of wage fund overexpenditures, the norms are urgently revised, even when this is not supported by corresponding organizational and technical measures. Actually, today the size of earnings is determined not by the level of norm fulfillment but, conversely, it is the existing wage size that determines the level of norm fulfillment. This means that efforts to regulate the problem on the basis of the former approach failed to yield expected results.

The principle of wages based on the fulfillment of production norms developed as a regulator of distribution relations between the capitalist and the hired workers. The workers sell their manpower and the capitalists buy it. A contract is concluded between them in this purchase and sale act, according to which in exchange for a certain amount of labor, as represented by the norm, the worker is paid a certain wage. Under socialist conditions, however,

manpower is no longer a commodity and the problem is no longer simply that of establishing in advance for everyone a labor norm but also of determining the extent of participation of the individual worker and collective in overall labor results. This is an essentially new task which is being currently partially resolved by worker brigades in which joint earnings are divided on the basis of the labor participation coefficient (KTU). Essentially, this is a competitive distribution principle, for individual earnings depend not on norms but on results of the work compared with the labor results achieved by other workers. It is important now to see to it that the earnings of the brigade itself are based not on the principle of collective piece-rate work (which suffers from the same shortcomings as the individual piece-rate system) but according to the competitive principle and the brigade's KTU in the results of the work of the sector, shop and enterprise. In turn, the enterprise bonus funds would depend on the KTU of its participation in the results of the work of the sector and the national economy as a whole.

The second approach is related to the development of cost-accounting labor incentive principles. According to the current cost-accounting model, the individual enterprise is, to a certain extent, an independent commodity producer, who creates both consumer and exchange values. A wholesale price for its output is set on a planned basis, which should be consistent with the socially necessary production labor outlays. In selling its goods at stipulated prices, the enterprise will earn a profit which will be used to set up the collective's incentive funds.

Approached from the positions of the individual enterprise, this procedure is unbeatable in ensuring the observance of the principle of payment based on labor: in order to earn more one must lower production cost and work better. However, taking into consideration that each enterprise is part of the single national economic organism, things become somewhat different.

One of the main principles in the organization of the wage system in the socialist society is, as we know, centrally formulated initial government stipulations on the basis of which wage levels and differentiations are set. They include higher rewards for heavy work and work under conditions distinct from normal and compared with easier work or work under ordinary circumstances; higher wages for labor which, all other conditions being equal, is of greater importance to the entire national economy.

Occasionally the current cost-accounting principles clash with these requirements. In setting up its material incentive funds based on profits, the enterprise becomes less dependent on general stipulations which regulate distribution according to labor and is able to provide higher earnings for its workers compared to similar enterprises in other sectors, where the work is substantially more difficult. Therefore, surreptitiously, undesirable changes take place in the wage ratios among workers in different sectors, which leads to the outflow of cadres from some key national economic sectors.

Furthermore, it turned out that the enterprise can earn higher profits without lowering costs by unjustifiably increasing its production prices. In order to achieve this, it is sufficient to submit to the price-setting organs documentation confirming higher labor and material outlays when the price of a

new commodity is set. Fabricating such figures has become a subject of particular concern at some enterprises, and although the price-setting authorities try to prevent price increases and reject as many as one-third of all statements showing clearly excessive outlays, nevertheless an interest in higher prices is working its way. A higher price is a free-and-easy standard of social labor outlays. The country does not become any richer from profits earned in this manner.

The enterprise can increase its profits also by nomenclatural shifts, which lead to an increased share of the production of the most profitable items in the overall volume of output, to the detriment of contractual obligations. Finally, profits can be increased by reducing costs. But...at the expense of simplifying technology. It is true that this lowers the quality of the items but not their prices. Since these three illegal methods for increasing profits have been extensively practiced for almost 20 years, there is nothing astounding in the fact that major shortcomings have appeared and worsened in the national economic mechanism.

Today the socialist competition is considered an addition to the incentive methods we discussed. A certain portion of the bonuses and rewards (the bulk) is awarded for meeting output norms and showing a profit; another (sometimes symbolic) for victory in the competition. The idea is that these two incentives should complement each-other. In fact, however, they clash. Bonuses for fulfilling norms and plans create an interest in reducing the latter, and profits can be increased through prices and higher outlays. Rewards for victory in the competition lead to higher productivity compared to the rival. However, since the main bonus depends on filling the norms and the amount of profits, economic conditions are created which encourage formalism in the competition, for the workers lose more as a result of the revision of norms or reduction of wholesale prices than they benefit from victory in the competition. The result is that some incentives block others. It would be relevant to think of the profound meaning of Lenin's words that "...it is precisely the elimination of commodity production and capitalism that will open the way to the possibility of organizing the competition..." (op. cit., vol 36, pp 150-151).

Despite the great importance of improving the use of commodity-monetary relations remaining in our economy, we must not forget their specific nature and purpose under socialist conditions, as was mentioned at the All-Union Practical Science Conference on "Perfecting Developed Socialism and Party Ideological Work in the Right of the resolutions of the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum." The main thing is to develop a distribution mechanism and labor incentive methods consistent with the nature of direct social production. It is precisely this task ("to develop our own methods of influence") that was formulated at the 9th Party Congress, chaired by Lenin. The congress indicated both the method to resolve it (competition) and the solution itself ("the bonus system must become one of the most powerful means for promoting competition").

The importance of the socialist competition in the country's economic life has significantly increased in recent years and so has its reputation at enterprises and establishments. Extensive efforts are being made to improve

its organization. This was greatly helped by the special CPSU Central Committee and Soviet government decrees and the instruction issued at the 26th Party Congress of "increasing the ties between material and moral incentives and the results of the socialist competition for upgrading production efficiency and work quality." Nevertheless, the successes achieved so far are insignificant. For example, no proper attention is being paid to socialist competition in the large-scale economic experiment currently under way. Yet, as we know, in September 1983 the CPSU Central Committee passed the decree "On Perfecting the Organization and Practice of Summing up the Results of the Socialist Competition and Rewarding its Winners," which called for the "fuller use of the material incentive and wage funds in awarding bonuses to workers based on competition results." Life demands the strict implementation of this party resolution.

The country's industry has acquired experience in the organization and incentive of labor based on the successes achieved by workers and collectives in competing against each other. The author of this article has had the occasion personally to participate in the organization of three experiments of this type. The first, known as "Pulsar," was carried out as early as 1971-1973 at the Lvov Televisions Plant (today the Elektron Production Association) and was given extensive press coverage. The second took place at Trust No 1 of the Moscow Oblast Construction Administration, Main Moscow Oblast Construction Administration, in Elektrostal in 1973-1975. The third was initiated in January 1983 and is still taking place at the enterprises of the All-Union Fish Industry Association of the Northern Basin (Sevryba VRPO). Similar experiments are being organized at other enterprises as well. Extensive work is being done in this respect by the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Industrial Economics, in Donetsk, under the aegis of which a number of experiments were conducted at the enterprises of the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Coal Industry and at the Soyuzuglemash All-Union Industrial Association.

Unfortunately, all of these studies are aside from the main work of perfecting the economic mechanism, and their results are frequently ignored. Yet they are aimed at finding essentially new labor incentive methods fully consistent with socialism (and as alternatives to commodity production). It is precisely on them that the researchers must focus their main efforts and it is precisely they which "must become the object of thorough organization and close study."

But let us turn to the experiments. Their nature is simple. The participants in the competition are divided into groups on the basis of labor result comparability. Indicators are formulated for determining the competition results. Actually, this work is currently being done, or at least should be done, at each enterprise in the course of ordinary competition organization. The new feature here is that the bonuses for first, second and third place are substantial and set in advance. As many as 80 percent of the workers may be covered by such bonuses but their amounts are strictly differentiated according to the rating in the competition, so that equalization is excluded. The rating of individual workers or collectives is determined on the basis of the competition results (in the brigades this problem is resolved with the help of the KTU [labor participation coefficient]). Therefore, the size of the bonus to be earned by a rated worker or collective is known in advance;

what is not known is what rating will be won and what type of labor productivity will be required to this effect. This is resolved in the course of the labor rivalry. Naturally, the successes of the best are supported morally as well, thanks to which material and moral incentives function together.

As the program for the experiment on strengthening the ties between material and moral incentive, on the one hand, and the results of the socialist competition, on the other, conducted at the Sevryba VRPO, stipulates, its purpose is to redirect the system of distribution according to labor from a factor of norm fulfillment to one of victory in the competition. This means that in assessing the results of labor and worker and collective incentive, the "reference point" is shifted: it is not based on the norm, because of the trend toward lowering it, but on the labor rival, for the interest develops of producing more than he. The norm remains but plays a qualitatively different role: the role of a scale with the help of which those who are the best and the stragglers in the competition are determined. In accordance with this idea, the amount of the bonus based on the results of the socialist competition is increased substantially. This increase is achieved by combining the various bonus systems within a single system (competition fund).

As practical experience indicates, raising bonuses based on competition results, has a tremendous impact on labor activeness. For example, here are some facts from the scientific report on the results of the Pulsar experiment. The experiment was applied to engineers at the department of the enterprise's chief technologist. Before the experiment, in connection with the increased planned volume of work, corresponding wage increases were contemplated as well. The experiments changed the situation. "It soon became clear that there was no work for everyone. The control over the measure of labor indicated that some workers are falling behind in the competition because of insufficient work loads. The question of filling staff positions dropped by itself. It was replaced by the question of reducing the number of positions.... Whereas previously one could note a trend of shifting the work to someone else, which created the illusion of a shortage of personnel, under the conditions of the experiment lack of work meant lack of points and inevitable penalties. At this point no one could calmly remain unoccupied. The mentality of the personnel gradually began to change. Everyone tried to do more and to do it independently. Some odd situations arose as well. In order not to fall behind, some engineers tried to work overtime. Their "cleverness" caused universal indignation. At a trade union meeting the people demanded that either work during days off be forbidden or that no points be awarded for it or else...to allow everyone to work during his days off!" (SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA, No 3, 1977, p 157). The results of the experiment led to the conclusion that "by changing the form and measure of encouragement of frontrankers and influencing stragglers, a high level of competition can be ensured as well as a virtually unlimited upsurge in labor activeness... And that unless the competition is backed by adequate incentives, it is doomed to formalism and extinction" (ibid., p 161). Subsequent experiments and studies of progressive practical experience confirmed this conclusion.

A competition supported by effective incentives can excite and captivate a person. It is as though no one is forced to work but a comparison with others reveals the inner stress of the work and the "game" of lowering norms and plans which is now widespread becomes meaningless: it becomes immediately obvious and dooms the worker or the collective resorting to it to falling behind.

The main objection to assessing work and incentives on the basis of the competition is that, it is alleged, one cannot formulate objective criteria in determining frontrunners and stragglers, for it is difficult to compare working conditions. Obviously, in theory this is a most complex problem. In practice, however, strange though it may seem, it can be resolved quite quickly.

To begin with, a great interest arises, above all from below, at the place where the results of the competition are summed up. Therefore, whereas in an ordinary competition, in which this problem arises as well, it can be resolved somehow and no one would be indignant (the addition to the earnings would be no more than 1 percent), in this case everything must be resolved seriously. An unfair (higher or lower) assessment may give someone an undeserved advantage and would be unacceptable to the collective.

Secondly, the attitude of the workers toward control over the results of their work changes. The work is no longer conceived as something alien, external, in which an occasional deception would not be such a big sin, but becomes needed by the workers as a tool against subjectivism and dishonest actions by the rival. Under these circumstances, control turns into refereeing, in the objectiveness of which all participants in the competition are interested. As a result, imperfect though it may have been at the initial stage, control rapidly develops and becomes accurate and comprehensive.

Based on the conditions of the experiment, ship repair and machine tool brigades are competing at the Murmanskaya Sudoverf' Association (Sevryba ZRPO). Previously, bonuses were paid for a number of indicators, such as completion ahead of schedule, delivery at first presentation, conservation of materials, etc. The cost of this procedure is familiar: the fractional nature of the bonuses depreciates them and the large number of indicators makes it possible to earn bonuses for some and not for others. Now all current bonus payments come from a single source -- the competition fund. Only one bonus can be earned, and its size depends on the ranking in the competition. The bonus is awarded by a collective authority which includes members of the administration, the party committee, the trade union committee and the competing collectives. In summing up the results, not only indicators on the basis of which separate bonuses were paid in the past but many others as well are taken into consideration. Actually, this becomes a serious and thorough analysis of the work of each collective, taking into consideration all aspects and even nuances in its activities, which no impersonal indicators could consider. The guarantee of objectivity here is found not in indicators but in the interest shown by the rivals in the results of the comparisons, the publicity and the moral power of the collective. However precise an indicator may be, it could be ignored, for it cannot stand by itself but needs additional control. The rival will not allow it to be railroaded, so that the

cumbersome system of outside supervision becomes unnecessary. The collective itself can see the way the brigades work and the contribution of the individual worker to common labor results. Here the collective piece-rate system was not followed but the KTU was applied and proved its worth within the brigades and in relations among brigades.

Fears have been expressed that such competition may result in conflicts, refusal of mutual aid and concealment of progressive experience. Have such doubts been confirmed in practical work?

Conflicts indeed arise. The reasons are essentially two: the first is the imperfect nature of indicators and errors in summing up competition results. The conflicts which arise on such grounds show the faults in the control system and encourage its improvement. The second is related to the efforts of some workers to dodge and come out the winners by violating stipulated rules. However, no one wishes to be among the laggards because his rival is playing a dishonest game. Hence intolerance of whitewashing, figure padding, favoritism and conflicts which arise on this basis. Such conflicts are also useful: they cleanse the moral climate in the collective. Actually, these and other conflicts break out only during the first stages of the experiment and subsequently the reasons for them disappear.

As to reciprocal aid, the problem is resolved simply. For example, the competition conditions in the Murmansk trawling fleet includes an item according to which the help which the crew of one ship has given another is taken into consideration when results are summed up. The same applies to the dissemination of progressive experience.

Another question arises: how is the organization of such competition coordinated with centralized planning?

At the present time, we are familiar with contradictions between centralized production planning and the interests of enterprise collectives. The latter are frequently interested in low plan assignments and acquiring greater labor and material resources. The economic bodies, which oppose parasitical feelings, sometimes react to this by planning "on the basis of accomplishments," and with other measures which paralyze enterprise initiative. Organizing labor incentive on the basis of the successes achieved by the collective in competition with other collectives, it seems to us, could be one of the methods for resolving this contradiction. Such incentive not only does not hinder centralized planning but, conversely, comprehensively contributes to the implementation of its objectives and tasks. In this case, the planning authority issues a target to the competitors and stipulates the conditions and indicators which will determine the winners. The public interest represented by the planning authority is given unquestionable priority and the collective becomes highly interested in achieving such objectives. Let us recall that Lenin linked the development of democratic centralism in economic management precisely with the organization of the competition (see op. cit., vol 36, pp 151-152).

The assessment of the enterprise's work is shifted from the factor of plan fulfillment to that of winning the competition. Although the plan intensity

seems to become an internal matter for the collective, nevertheless a reduced plan puts the collective in a lagging position compared with others. Correspondingly, its bonus is reduced, hence the interest of the collective in making maximal use of all available reserves. In this case it is no longer necessary to resort to planning "from the achieved level," for both the assessment of the work and the bonus to the collective are based not only on the implementation of the plan but on the level of its intensity (compared to the corresponding plan levels of competing collectives).

A planned socialist economy is a complex controlled system with a large number of elements and interrelationships among them. The system is built on the hierarchical principle: the primary elements are combined within subsystems each of which, in turn, is an element of the higher stage in the hierarchic ladder. Obviously, the problem is not to give more or less autonomy to the individual units, although this may sometimes be necessary, but to find the principle for interconnection among the elements and levels of the system which would not violate its integrity and would contribute to its self-development. In our view, this principle is included in the rating (and corresponding reward) of each element of the system, depending on the results of its work compared with that of other elements within the same subsystem, based on its contribution to the solution of the problems of the subsystem as a whole. In turn, the rating of the subsystem is determined by its contribution to the results of the work of the higher subsystem, of which it is an element. In this case no contradictions would develop between the hierarchical levels of the entire system, as is the case now, but would form a feedback by virtue of which the economic mechanism will become self-regulating.

In our view, the activities of any collective, be it brigade, sector, shop or enterprise, could be optimally characterized with the help of the following two indicators: extent of utilization of production possibilities at its disposal and labor and material outlays, directly expressed in terms of working time. Such indicators could be integrated within a single one, on the basis of which the work of each competing collective will be rated.

Such an integral indicator would be determined by the ratio between the computed number of man/hours needed for the production of a given amount of output and the actual number of man-hours spent, multiplied by a percentage ratio between the volume of output produced in a given calendar period and the same volume which should be produced by a collective based on the assessed possibilities of the enterprise.

If the collective uses raw and other materials economically, the amount of working time needed for work with the economized raw and other materials would be added (to the estimated time) to the numerator in the integral indicator. In the case of overruns in the amount of working time needed for the production of the excess amount of raw and other materials used, the amount is added to the denominator (to the actually spent working time). A collective which does not fulfill its contractual obligations is penalized by adding to its account working time losses suffered by consumers as a result of procurement failures. Such losses are added in the denominator to the actually spent time.

The quality of the items may be reflected in the integral indicator by adding in the numerator to the estimated time savings in working time obtained by society thanks to the production of high-quality goods. Respectively, working time losses suffered by society as a result of the production of substandard goods will be added to the denominator.

The purpose of this integral indicator is to reflect all savings and all losses of working time to society, related to the activities of the collective. This is important in order for the collective to become really interested in giving priority to steps which promise the greatest economy of working time on a national scale.

In this case, the organization of material incentive may be described as follows:

The earnings of the individual worker consist of two parts: fixed and variable. The fixed depends on skill, position and working conditions. The variable depends on the position earned by the worker and the collective in the competition. Accordingly, it would be expedient for each enterprise to set up two funds: a guaranteed wage fund and a bonus fund for participants in the competition.

The amount of the first fund would be based on the number of people employed by the enterprise. Any reduction or increase in the number of workers would automatically reduce or increase the fund: every worker would, in a way, come and go with his own wage rate. The need to limit the number of workers at the enterprise, in this case, would be eliminated, for an assessment based on the outlay of man/hours would create adequate incentives for saving on manpower.

The size of the competition fund would be established on the basis of the estimated number of man/hours needed by the enterprise to fulfill its program. The more stressed the plan of a collective the higher would be the amount of the fund. It is possible for the latter to reach the amount of the guaranteed wage fund allowed to the enterprise. The competition fund would be distributed by the collectives themselves on the basis of specific rules.

As participants in the intraplant competition, all workers within the given enterprise would also be subjects in the competition among different collectives within the sector. In order to reward the leading enterprises, it would be expedient to set up a sectorial competition fund based on the working time needed for the implementation of the program planned by the sector. In turn, this amount of time would be determined on the basis of labor outlays for the implementation of a similar program in the most developed countries in the world. The bonus for winning the sectorial competition would be distributed among all enterprise workers, regardless of their place in the intraplan competition. In the case of those who do not participate in the intraplan competition (enterprise managers), the bonus would be in proportion to their annual salary; in the case of the rest, in the same proportion but only in terms of their monthly salary.

The reorientation of the system of distribution according to labor to the results of the competition does not involve any kind of essential reorganizations of the economic mechanism. All necessary prerequisites to this effect exist. On the basis of the gradual increase in bonuses based on competition results and organizing the system of control and accountability of public labor, according to the principles dictated by the law of working time economy, conditions would be created for the conversion to the new distribution method and its transformation into the dominant one.

At the very dawn of the Soviet system, Lenin wrote that "...if we consider the organization of the competition our state task, the results would be inevitable and would indicate to us further forms of building" (op. cit., vol 36, p 153).

The development of the competition is one of the main ways for the all-round advancement of the socialist society.

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## FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE MICROCOSM

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[Article by A. Logunov, rector of Moscow State University imeni M. V. Lomonosov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] The study of the structure of matter--the search for new elementary particles--is one of the main trends in the modern natural sciences. Since the material world is "built" of such particles, their properties and laws of motion and the forces interacting among them determine the features of the entire variety of physical phenomena.

The study of the structure of the atom enabled us to discover the unusual properties of microparticles (the main one among which is their corpuscular-undular dualism) and to develop the theory of motion of microparticles--quantum mechanics. It was on the basis of its laws that we were able to determine quite accurately the structure of the electron jacket of the different atoms, to study their spectrum in the greatest possible detail, to explain D. I. Mendeleev's periodical table of elements and to determine the nature of chemical bonds.

The successes achieved in this area laid the foundation for solid state physics. We were able to understand the structure of metals, dielectrics and semiconductors and their thermodynamic, electric and magnetic properties, including phenomena such as ferroelectricity and ferromagnetism and, subsequently, antiferromagnetism. This opened prospects for the purposeful search for new materials possessing the necessary properties and ways for the development of new types of production without which modern technology would be inconceivable.

Each time, the intensification of scientific knowledge of the inside of atoms and the emergence on a new structural level of the structure of matter led to the discovery of essentially new phenomena in the microcosm and, with them, to new opportunities on the macrolevel.

Naturally, the distance between knowledge of the laws of the microcosm and the interpretation of new phenomena in macroscopic bodies may be quite long. Knowledge gained in the structure of the microcosm is the foundation for all

natural sciences. In the final account, major discoveries which broaden our horizons result in radical changes in technology, the appearance of new technological areas and the development of related disciplines.

How far have we gone in the study of the structure of matter? What new forces and concepts have been discovered as a result of research? I shall try to answer these questions in most general terms, for a detailed answer would require the use of the specific and complex apparatus of theoretical physics. But what specifically makes great discoveries amazing is the fact that they could be described virtually without resorting to specialized terminology.

The discovery that the atom consisted of a nucleus and electrons was made during the first decade of our century. The nucleus, it turned out, was approximately  $10^{-13}$  cm and contained the virtually total mass of the atom. The density of matter in the nucleus turned out to be unusually high, roughly  $10^{14}$  g/cm<sup>3</sup>. The nucleus carries a positive charge. The electrons rotate around the nucleus at an approximate distance of  $10^{-8}$  cm. It was only later, in the 1930s, that the discovery that atomic nuclei consist of protons and neutrons was made. It was thus that the basic structure of the atom, from which everything around us is made, was unraveled.

The ancient hypothesis concerning the indivisibility of the atom was discarded. The electron, proton and neutron were accepted as the elementary particles in physics.

Within the atom the electrons are held round the nucleus by electric forces. But what is it that keeps the protons and neutrons within the nucleus if the latter have no charge? Taking their particular nature under consideration, the physicists described the forces binding them as nuclear. It was theoretically predicted that in order to maintain the reciprocal attraction between said particles inside the nucleus at a distance of approximately  $10^{-13}$  centimeters, they must exchange between them some kind of intermediary particle almost 300 times heavier than the electron and act as the carrier of the nuclear force field. For a long time, however, no one was able to observe such a particle. It was only after the war that it was noted in cosmic rays and described as a pi-meson.

It seemed as though everything had been clarified: electrically charged particles interact, photons interchange, and neutrons and protons are linked with nuclear forces which appear through the exchange of pi-mesons. The analogy appeared complete. Yet, as it became clear subsequently, everything related to nuclear forces was significantly more complex, and although there was an analogy, it was taking place on an entirely different, a more profound structural level.

In addition to protons, neutrons, electrons and pi-mesons, two other elementary particles were discovered by then in the cosmic rays: the positron, whose charge equalled that of the electron, as well as mu minus/plus mesons, whose properties were quite similar to those of the electrons and positrons, but whose mass was 200 times that of the electron. And whereas knowledge of the first particles helps to explain the structure of the atoms,

what are the roles of the positron and mu-meson? Do other elementary particles exist as well?

The construction of accelerators was undertaken by various countries after the war, and research in the field of elementary particles was developed extensively. By now, several hundred such particles have been discovered. A strategic trend has developed in nuclear physics: high-energy or elementary particles physics. Particularly outstanding discoveries were made in the last 20 years, which radically changed the previous, now naive- and primitive-seeming, concepts of the microcosm. Reality proved to be richer and more vivid than even the most daring imagination of the theoreticians.

We can see now that this world is exceptionally varied in its characteristics. All elementary particles can be divided into two groups according to the nature of their interaction: leptons and adrons. Leptons are particles which participate only in electromagnetic and weak interchanges. Six such leptons have been identified so far: electrons, mu-mesons, tau-leptons and their neutrino.

The adrons are strongly interacting particles. Several hundreds of them have already been identified. Their large number forced the physicists to identify above all features on the basis of which they could be classified. This led to the appearance of doublet, triplet, octet and decuplet adrons. Their classification made it possible to predict the existence and properties of many new experimentally discovered particles.

However, classification was merely the first step which had to be taken to understand the pattern in the classification of particles into groups. This was logically followed by the question: does the classification of adrons reflect their complex structure?

This idea, which developed by analogy with the periodical table of elements, was essentially heuristic.

In his time, Rutherford suggested to his students an amazingly simple experiment in the study of the atom: to wrap in foil the alpha particles, those heavy shells of the microcosm which release radium. Quite unexpectedly, it turned out that, although infrequently (one per several thousand) alpha particles are repelled by the foil. Rutherford concluded that this was because of the clash between alpha particles with the nucleus of the atom which contains its virtually entire mass. This led to the discovery of the atomic nucleus, 100,000 times smaller than the atom, but with a huge matter density. It takes more than speculations on the possible structural composition of the adrons to answer the question of what is contained inside them. Ideas similar to those expressed by Rutherford abounded even before his time. However, he was able to prove the existence of nuclei--a basic fact in the natural sciences--only as a result of experimental studies of the dynamics of interactions. What could be suggested in this case in order substantially to improve our understanding of the dynamics of strong interactions? All that was clear was that in all reactions involving processes of elastic dispersals and in nonelastic reactions adrons behaved like very brittle systems.

In order to determine the nature of strong interactions we had to move into the high energy field and to study the processes of adron clashes, in the course of which multiple particles are created. This, however, required the use of an essentially new method for the study of such reactions.

When clashes result in the creation of numerous elementary particles, the study of such reactions is so difficult that it is unlikely to help us determine the profound internal laws governing adron behavior. Metaphorically speaking, we had to avoid particulars or unnecessary data which prevented us from seeing the main processes. A new type of processes was found, known as "inclusive." In the clash between two adrons only one specific variety among the numerous new particles is singled out. The rest are considered in their totality.

Knowledge of such processes opened extensive opportunities for the study of the dynamics of strong interactions. The very first experiments with the Serpukhov accelerator led to the discovery of a new law of dynamics, according to which the probability of the birth of the secondary singled out adron in the inclusive process depends exclusively on the attitude of the impulse (within the center of the mass) of the given adron toward the impulse of the clashing particles. This discovery was named the law of similarity in the microcosm, or the law of scale invariance, from which the structural composition of adrons directly follows. In the same manner that in its time Rutherford's experiment was adequate for solving the problem of finding the nucleus of the atom, the inclusive processes of the clashing of adrons and the profound elastic reactions with the participation of leptons, taking place on a deeper level of knowledge, were the most suitable in determining the structure of adrons.

However, if adrons prove to be structurally complex, this means that they are not the final basic brick of which matter is structured.

What do they consist of? In answer to this question, a hypothesis was suggested in 1964, on the existence of special particles: quarks. Initially, many physicists expressed grave doubts on the subject. However, it was supported by numerous experimental data which proved, among other things, that these particles had fractional electric charges.

If we assume the existence of a symmetry between leptons and quarks, we should expect to have six quarks, i.e., as many as there are leptons. The type of quarks or, as the physicists say, their scent, is indicated with letters (u, d, s, c, b, t). In publications s-quarks are referred to as "strange," c-quarks are known as "charmed," and b-quarks as "delightful." The first five quarks have already been identified and a search is on the way for the sixth, which appears to be quite heavy. Theoretically, however, each quark should have a specific "color" charge. There should be no more than three "color" charges. By analogy with ordinary colors, the physicists have colored them yellow, red and blue.

Therefore, we are dealing with 18 different quarks and as many antiquarks, of which all adrons are made. The adrons are divided into two major groups:

barions, with a barion charge, and mesons without a barion charge. The former include protons, neutrons and some other particles; the latter include pi-mesons, kappa-mesons and others. Each barion consists of three quarks with different "color" charges, for which reason, by analogy with ordinary color terms, they are known as white or colorless. A meson consists of a quark and an antiquark. If the quark has a color charge, the antiquark must have an anticolor charge. Therefore, in accordance with accepted terminology, the mesons as well will be colorless. Therefore, the adrons are the simplest colorless quark formations. Here is an example: a proton consists of two u-quarks and one d-quark; a neutron consists of two d-quarks and one u-quark.

Are there free particles with "color" charges? So far, no answer is available to this most important question. However, currently most physicists tend to believe that particles with "color" charges are found only in a bonded condition, forming adrons.

How do quarks interact and what forces bind them into adrons? It turns out that it is precisely on this structural level of matter composition that we note a profound analogy with electrodynamics, which describes the interaction among charged particles. The interaction between two electrons or between one electron and another charged particle is achieved with the help of photons which have their own spin equal to one. According to the physicists, the photons are circumscribed by a vectoral field. The photons carry no electric charge, for which reason, after releasing them, the charged particle does not change its charge. Whatever the process, the electric charge is always preserved. This is one of the most important laws of nature.

By analogy with electrodynamics and its profound symmetry principles, it was proved that the interaction among quarks as well is achieved through vectoral particles. These particles have been given the name of gluons which, like the photons, have zero mass and their own spin equals one. However, since the quarks in the adrons have different "color" charges, the gluons should be bichromatic or, in more precise terms, should have a charge of one color and an anticharge of another. If, for instance, a yellow quark turns into a blue quark, in order that the "color" charge be preserved, it must release a yellow-antiblue gluon. The number of different gluons can be easily determined. All in all, nine bicolor combinations are possible with three quarks and three antiquarks of different colors. One such combination will be fully symmetrical in terms of color and anticolor and will carry no "color" charge and, consequently will be unable to make quarks interact. Therefore, there can be eight different types of gluons. Unlike the case in electrodynamics, where the photon carries no electric charge, in chromodynamics, which deals with quark interaction, the gluons have "color" charges and strongly interact with each other, forming massive particles known as glubols.

Candidates for glubols have already been discovered. The forces which develop between quarks as a result of the gluons are exceptionally interesting. They decline as the distance between quarks is reduced. This means that quarks separated from each other by small distances are almost free and poorly interact. The physicists have described this amazing phenomenon as "asymptotic freedom."

As distance between quarks increases so does their interaction, which becomes stronger and no longer dependent on distance.

All of this is totally unlike the forces so far familiar to us.

The nuclear forces which operate between the protons and neutrons in the nucleus are a secondary manifestation of precisely the quark-gluon forces. Thus, in the course of the study of the microcosm the nature of nuclear forces was discovered, and a deeper understanding of the structure of the nucleus was achieved, which will unquestionably provide a new impetus for its study. The process governing the appearance of elementary particles in the clash between adrons may be qualitatively described as follows: When the distances between quarks are great, the gluons which bind them are concentrated in the shape of distinctive pipe-shaped power fields which keep the colored quarks in the adrons as though tied with strings. If in the course of the clashing among particles a quark would acquire a great impetus and begin to separate itself from the other quarks in the adron, the "gluon string" begins to stretch and then breaks. This occurs when the energy of the gluon field becomes sufficient for the creation at the break point of a "string" of a quark and antiquark pair. The new antiquark becomes tied to the disappearing quark and forms a meson, while the new quark takes the place of the previous one. At high energy, the string may break in several places, leading to the appearance of a stream of adrons which fly in the direction of the quark which has acquired a strong impetus from the clash between the particles.

We may have expected that in an accelerator with opposite electron-positron beams, the adrons born in the clash would fly away in the shape of streams. In accordance with the description we gave, this should happen as follows: In clashing, the electron and the positron annihilate the quark-antiquark pair which, in accordance with the law of the preservation of the impulse, fly off in opposite directions, thus stretching the "gluon string" which binds them. This, however, leads to the formation of two streams which move in the directions of the quark and antiquark. In the flight of the quark and antiquark it is possible for one of them to release a gluon with a high impulse which, separating, in turn forms a group of adrons shaped as a stream flying in the direction of the gluons. In such a case, the clash will create three streams: quark, antiquark and gluon.

These conclusions were fully confirmed experimentally. Double and triple streams were noted in the clashing of particles, one of which indeed consisted of gluons. It was also determined that the quarks were very small--almost a thousand times smaller than the protons. A certain closeness between quarks and leptons was noted, thus opening new possibilities in the study of the unity of forces in nature.

Such are the new quality concepts of the structure of elementary particles and the forces operating within them. The following problems are now on the agenda: the structure of the physical vacuum, the formation of the particles' mass, the existence of basic scalar particles and their role in cosmology, etc.

Establishing the unity among the various forces in nature is another most important strategic direction in the physics of elementary particles. This problem has always drawn the attention of the leading minds of mankind, but it is only in our time that the necessary prerequisites for its solution are being created on a certain structural level of matter. We are familiar with four different types of forces in nature: gravitational, electromagnetic, strong (nuclear) and weak.

Gravitational forces were discovered a long time ago. They control the movements of celestial bodies and serve man well by converting, for example, gravitational energy into electric power in hydroelectric power plants. Although we became familiar with them a long time ago, they remain poorly studied. The main reason for this is that the gravitational interaction among elementary particles is still inaccessible to experimental research.

The electromagnetic forces which enabled us to understand the nature of electrical, magnetic and optical phenomena with no viewpoint differences, have been thoroughly studied. It is precisely these forces which are the base for phenomena studied in chemistry, biology and most branches of physics. They are also the basis for the technological processes used in many industrial sectors.

The nuclear forces which appear as a result of quark-gluon interaction are unusually powerful, but at very short distances-- $10^{-13}$ . It is only in our age that they have been discovered. They are already being put to extensive practical use and we cannot conceive of what humankind would have done without nuclear energy.

Finally, there are the weak forces which have been known for some 50 years. They play an important role in the evolution of the universe and the development of nuclear reactions in the sun and the existence of the neutrino, these amazing totally permeating particles, are related precisely to them.

The question which arises is the following: Is the nature of all of these forces one and the same?

In recent years a major breakthrough was made in this direction of scientific research, and essential and basic results were achieved. The single nature of weak and electromagnetic forces was established. It turned out that the weak forces are bonded by an electric charge and that their smallness in comparison with electromagnetic forces may be explained with the fact that weak interaction processes as well take place through the exchange of vectoral particles the mass of which, however, is very great. These particles were named intermediary bosons and their mass is almost a hundred times heavier than that of protons.

Three types of intermediary bosons are known: two charged ( $W$  plus/minus) and one neutral ( $Z^0$ ). They were discovered by European physicists about 2 years ago at the collision of proton and antiproton beams with an energy level of about 400 gigaelectron-volts, for their creation requires high energy within the mass center.

It became possible to prove the unity between electromagnetic and weak forces thanks to the fact that the interaction between them is achieved through so-called vectoral particles (photons and intermediary bosons). All of this raised the hope that a "great synthesis" was possible, i.e., the possibility of merging together electromagnetic, weak and strong interactions, thanks to which, apparently, a symmetry exists between leptons and quarks and, most importantly, that vectoral particles--a photon, three intermediary bosons and eight gluons--take part in such interaction.

Is it possible that many more such vectoral particles exist? This is still a wide area for theoretical elaborations, due to the acute scarcity of experimental data.

Further experimentation will be necessary in order to resolve the problem of the "great synthesis," involving the use of very high energy in the mass center. This requires even more powerful accelerators of elementary particles, which would enable us to take a further step inside the microcosm. The physicists expect tremendous and difficult yet exciting results of theoretical and experimental work.

One thing is clear: modern physics has entered a most interesting stage in its development. It is studying the entirely new objects which make the microparticles, until recently considered basic, as well as the unusual characteristics of these objects, and establishing the unity among the fundamental forces of nature. Unquestionably, the results will provide an even deeper picture of the structure of matter, which will inevitably lead to restructuring most areas of human knowledge. In turn, this will prepare the grounds for a new scientific and technical revolution. How not to recall, in this connection, Lenin's inspired words: "The human mind was able to discover many marvels in nature and will discover many more, thus increasing its power over it!"

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## HORIZONS OF DEEP SPACE

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[Article by S. Savitskaya, pilot-cosmonaut of the USSR, twice Hero of the Soviet Union]

[Text] An unforgettable event took place 20 years ago, in March 1965: a Soviet citizen was the first to leave his spaceship in deep space.

The first Sputnik, the first flight in near space orbit by Yuriy Gagarin and the first walk in deep space by Aleksey Leonov are three events which, to this day, decades later, are the most important landmarks in the history of cosmonautics.

Many most difficult scientific and technical problems were resolved in the world in subsequent years. On each occasion, these solutions proved the great power of the collective creativity of a large number of specialists, joined in pursuit of a common objective, and superior manifestations of the minds and character of many people, whose combined efforts led to the implementation of ever new daring thoughts which marked the systematic ascent of mankind on the ladder of "space" progress. Such were, in particular, the first dockings of ships in orbit, the launching of the first manned space station, the landings of unmanned stations on the moon, Venus and Mars, the implementation of the comprehensive long-term Interkosmos program, the fulfillment of the Soyuz-Apollo program, lengthy flights aboard orbital stations, and so on. And, finally, the variety of projects carried out in deep space.

All of these achievements required not only the solution of most difficult scientific and technical problems but also a great deal of mastery and courage on the part of the cosmonauts. However, not one of them created such a strong impression on the people as Yuriy Gagarin's first flight and the first "walk" in deep space by Aleksey Leonov. In mentioning the significance of these two events, it would be relevant to emphasize that they were the starting point for the development of human practical activities in space. In the final account, all subsequent manned flights in deep space and even the first steps taken by Neil Armstrong on the moon in a protective suit were, to some extent, the logical extension of the first step taken by Aleksey Leonov outside his ship. This was not only the first test of technical facilities which made

possible this daring experiment but, above all, a test of man finding himself in new extreme circumstances. Success in the implementation of this step instilled confidence in the success of all subsequent actions and made it possible to move on more decisively to new and broader plans and programs. Equally substantial, it seems to me, is the psychological aspect: for the first time man was seen from the earth as a relatively independent object in the universe, able autonomously to resolve problems in space on the basis of qualitatively new knowledge and skills.

Let us point out that cosmonautics is an area of human activities in which virtually every time--in virtually every flight--the crew must do something for the first time: test new equipment systems, engage in totally new experiments, and carry out operations never performed previously. Naturally, carrying out work never done before is important unto itself as well. What is even more important, however, is the results of such work, the conclusions which may be drawn and the opportunities which are created for continuing such work in subsequent flights. The success with which the cosmonaut carries out his assignments and the extent to which the results of the tests can be meaningfully studied and the conclusions which may be drawn for the future in the light of accomplishments frequently determine the fate of an entire trend in cosmonautics.

Such was the case during the flight of Pavel Belyayev and Aleksey Leonov, which was performed with particularly high professionalism, in the course of which an entirely new chapter in the history of manned cosmonautics actually opened: the use of the mind and hands of a person in resolving a set of difficult installation, repair and research problems in deep space. Anyone who left the spaceship after Leonov already knew that this can be physically and psychologically accessible to man. In all likelihood, the American astronaut Edward White, who was to step into deep space several months after the Soviet cosmonaut, felt a certain confidence from the awareness of the fact that this operation had already taken place before him.

It is difficult to imagine today mankind without space flights, not because people have become accustomed to them but simply because a great deal of our matters on earth are now closely related to space practices. For example, thanks to the possibility of flying around the planet in the space of 90 minutes at an altitude of 300 to 350 kilometers, the cartographic survey of the earth's surface is now made much faster than some 20 years ago. A few minutes of work of the camera MKF-6 placed in near space orbit can do the work of a usual aerial photographic survey which takes 2 years to accomplish.

The further development of geology is impossible without information coming from outer space. However perfect the latest automatic equipment may be, the role of visual observation, i.e., the role of man, is not reduced. In looking at the earth from a great height, the cosmonaut can frequently see that which even the highest quality photographic surveys made from satellites reveal. A view from orbit by a specialist familiar with geological structures made it possible to discover a number of previously unknown features in the external structure of the earth's crust--major ring-shaped structures, powerful faults, dried old riverbeds, etc. The summation of the results of such observations, taking available data into consideration, could indicate the existence of

mineral deposits. For example, in the Caspian depression area, the existence of petroleum and natural gas was forecast based on data supplied by the crews of the Salyut-6 and Salyut-7 orbital stations. Geological prospecting parties have already confirmed this.

The cosmonauts can see clearly the accumulations of plankton in the sea: wide greenish spots against the background of the deep blue water. The plankton sometimes gathers in bright green areas along the shore, very much like emerald necklaces around islands. And if there is plankton there is fish, as seamen have long known.

Cosmonautics also has other features useful to the national economy. Thus, weightlessness itself, which causes a number of problems for the human body, makes performing a number of technological operations more efficient than on earth, for the presence or absence of gravity affects the conditions of growth of crystals, the distribution of admixtures in obtained materials and the degree of purifying and separating various substances.

The growing of semiconductor crystals with unique properties, quite valuable in microelectronics, has been mastered aboard Soviet orbital stations. Economic estimates have indicated that the production of semiconductors in space promises to be profitable.

Superpure biologically active substances, developed in a state of weightlessness, also appear very promising. They may be used in the production of valuable medicinal preparations and in the microbiological industry.

In addition to their uniqueness (for few of them have been developed so far), substances developed in weightlessness are valuable for the new scientific information they provide. They are being studied in dozens of institutes and laboratories, for they promise the possibility of developing new technological systems and instruments. Some experience has already been gained in the utilization of the obtained samples. For example, an antiviral preparation was developed with the help of electrophoresis in a state of weightlessness. After a number of tests, it may become the standard for the pure substance.

It is thus that we are gradually approaching the industrial development of "space" materials which are virtually unobtainable on earth. For example, in space albumin can be separated into four or five individual elements.

No more than 6 months ago, working with the Tavriya system, I personally was able to develop cells which generate a valuable agricultural antibiotic. This substance is currently undergoing laboratory tests and will be subjected to industrial testing.

Today we are approaching semi-industrial production in the area of space technology.

Also gradually, as we acquired experience in working in deep space, a transition was made from experimentation for cognitive purposes only to most

complex installations and important technological operations aboard orbital complexes.

After Aleksey Leonov's first walk in space, for a long time the main objective was to acquire the skill of confidently moving in deep space. The cosmonauts learned how to move along the ship and to develop behavioral principles and means of reciprocal protection. The possibility of performing some operations with instruments and tools was determined. Each such walk yielded bits of very valuable information acquired by the crew. Rules for human behavior in outer space were developed and attachments and instruments were perfected.

We must point out that it was work under the new conditions, when it is merely a suit which separates man from deep vacuum, which made the cosmonauts pay particular attention to their "dress." Any accidental damage to the suit caused by a cutting or slicing surface may unseal it, which would create a serious situation requiring a great deal of effort to surmount.

Naturally, all tools used in outer space are made maximally safe in terms of the protective suit; inasmuch as possible, all potentially dangerous areas along the hull of the orbital station are shielded. However, there have already been occasions to cut through the metal lining of instruments in outer space using special sharp cutters; and to weld metal using an electronic manual tool which produced a ray (with a temperature in excess of 1,000 degrees centigrade) burning through the metal. Therefore, the danger of accidentally damaging the suit exists. In order to avoid this, should the use of such a tool become necessary, one must closely watch every single action. That is why the seemingly slow movements in open space are the result of a deliberately developed behavioral mode.

In explaining what it means to work in a protective suit, one of my comrades made the following unusual but quite apt comparison. "Imagine," he said, "that you are inside an inflated rubber bag. In order to make any kind of movement or take anything in your hand, you must surmount the resistance of the lining of this bag." Obviously this requires the necessary strength and skill. That is why the most difficult movements in a suit are those requiring small but accurate movements. For example, in open space I find it far simpler to move a large container with ordinary manual welding tools than to open or shut the small lock of the safety system to which any object moved in a state of weightlessness must be affixed. In the unanimous opinion of my comrades, who have much greater experience in such work, the most difficult thing for them was to carry out small and precise operations with various attachments (or, as we sometimes say, "small fry").

Yet the need for such operations is becoming increasingly greater. Although we have not yet had to assemble a clock in outer space, over the past 2 or 3 years we have begun to carry out projects which we could not even conceive of in the past. The beginning of all of this was laid by the memorable walk in space by Valeriy Ryumin and Vladimir Lyakhov, in the course of which, after remaining in a state of weightlessness for 6 months, the crew was to come out of the hatch, walk (or, rather, crawl) along the entire orbital complex and release the coupling hook and separate the station from a large webbed antenna. No such projects had been contemplated, and if prior to liftoff

someone had told the crew that they would have to take a walk in open space 170 days into the flight, that person would have been looked at with, to put it mildly, puzzlement. For at that time no cosmonaut in the world had spent such a long time in a state of weightlessness, and no one knew what changes would take place in the body and how a person would feel in the thin air of the protective suit in which the pressure was equivalent to being 7-8 kilometers above sea level. As we know, even a healthy and strong body reacts to such an altitude.

Had emergency circumstances not developed, necessitating this walk, there would have probably been extensive discussions as to whether or not such an operation could be allowed at the end of nearly 6 months of space flight, and if so, how far from the hatch would the person be allowed to remain? Ryumin and Lyakhov were immediately able to "answer" a mass of questions.

The next essential step was precisely planned long before it became necessary. As the Salyut-7 orbital station was being designed, the possibility of increasing the system's power supply was contemplated. The point is that in addition to scientific equipment which is taken into orbit, every new freight ship is taking an increasing number of new instruments into space. This is understandable, for the station was launched at the beginning of 1982 and the idea of conducting some scientific experiments came later. Today a great variety of additional equipment and instruments may be seen aboard the Salyut-7 compared to 3 years ago. Yet the new instruments require additional electric power. Realizing this, the designers of the station anticipated the possible installation of a number of additional sections of solar batteries. Special fastenings and power-generating facilities were installed on the main panels for the purpose of coupling the various sections. In order to set them up, the crew not only had to walk into open space but also move along the surface of the station to the work area, carrying the necessary tools and an entire "suitcase" containing the solar battery.

The installation of the battery itself was a "technological matter," as one of the ground specialists said, in observing the activities of the crew on the television screen. This was the result of hours of hard training under water in hydraulic weightlessness, in which the entire cycle of future operations is developed, training in a vacuum chamber under the real conditions of deep space, flights aboard the laboratory aircraft and physically hard and psychologically complex work in open space. Vladimir Lyakhov and Aleksandr Aleksandrov performed their assignment splendidly and when at the request of the flight manager they aimed the television camera at the wing of the solar battery, everyone could see alongside the main large panel a new wavelike brilliant ribbon which had not been there only 2 hours previously. The flight control center burst into applause and everyone realized that at that moment a new stage of working in open space had been completed in full view of every one. Now it became possible to plan confidently new installation operations, installing and removing various large structural elements and, should anyone on earth question the possibility of carrying out such operations, one could always say "Lyakhov and Aleksandrov could and did...." This would somewhat slow down objections.

Naturally, however, no one presumed at that time that in less than a year their accomplishment (in 1983) would be considered an ordinary element of practical work in orbit and that in a single walk in outer space not one but two solar panels could be installed and a number of other operations carried out. However, this is precisely what happened.

Several months later, Leonid Kizim, Vladimir Solov'yev and Oleg At'kov started their work aboard the Salyut-7. The crew was scheduled to perform a 237-day space flight, the longest ever. The cosmonauts were entrusted with the important duty of taking a number of walks in open space to carry out complex installation work on the combined power system. The very fact that they had to deal with a most important system interference in the work of which was not stipulated in designing the station, demanded of those preparing the operation, the harnessing of all efforts and knowledge. It was necessary to open the outside shell of the station at the place where the power system units were located and to install special attachments. This was to be followed by checking the performance of one of the reserve collectors in the system and, depending on the results, to conduct an entire number of additional operations. Subsequently, as though "incidentally," another couple of additional solar batteries had to be installed.

As always, skeptical voices were heard reminding others of the complexity and danger of such projects. They were followed by the sensible answer: "But Lyakhov and Aleksandrov did it..."

Kizim and Solov'yev were also able to take six walks in outer space, the last one after 6 months of weightlessness. No one had ever before worked such a long time in a station and no crew had ever carried out so many installation operations during a single flight. This was difficult and physically very hard work. Virtually every time they walked in outer space, the cosmonauts had to repeat Ryumin's walk along the entire station to its butt end, where the power system was located and, furthermore, carry cumbersome containers with the special equipment and tools. Bearing in mind that in a state of weightlessness, a person in a protective suit may be compared to a skating circus bear, one can realize how difficult it was for Kizim and Solov'yev to reach their workplace at the far end of the station, although, as the cosmonauts themselves said, after several sorties they became so skillful that they covered the distance "almost on the run."

They had to fiddle about a great deal with the system. There were surprises as well. Everyone remembers how hard it was for the crew to loosen up one of the nuts on the surface of the station. On the ground, in a state of hydraulic weightlessness, the operation caused no difficulty and the overall time breakdown schedule did not allow more than a few minutes for it. In outer space, due to the fact that the nut had been fastened on the ground tightly, more than an hour was lost in unscrewing it. When the crew reported to the ground that they had been unable to unscrew the nut, everyone's ears in the control center pricked up. For without this operation the planned project could not be carried out. New variants for the use of the tool were suggested immediately from the ground and Kizim and Solov'yev went on fighting this ill-starred nut. On the transmission channel all of us could hear their heavy breathing and we felt that their task was not among the easiest. The

communication ended when the station left the radio range zone and we waited tensely for the next radio contact. The entire course of further operations depended on what the crew would report. After slightly more than an hour, hearing Kizim report that "we have unscrewed the nut," everyone breathed a sigh of relief. This was only a minor event in the tremendous amount of work which was accomplished.

Kizim and Solov'yev were to complete the final stage in the installation operations after the station was to be visited by an expedition in which I had the occasion to participate. The point was that in order to complete the work with the power system, a special attachment and method had been developed, with which the crew was unfamiliar, and it was Vladimir Dzhanibekov who was to acquaint Kizim with it. In one of the final days of the stay of our crew aboard the Sal'yut, the largest area in the station was turned into a classroom. The "visual aids" we had brought were displayed on the wall and, like a lecturer, Vladimir Aleksandrovich began to explain the procedure of the work to be done. The specialists in such operations, who usually teach such classes, were on the ground, sitting by their television screens closely watching the "lesson" as it was taking place. Judging by their questions and remarks, they themselves had "gone into battle" in the field of education. At the end of the "lesson," the boys saw a videotape on the forthcoming operations, which we had brought with our ship and which, according to our comrades, they found quite useful.

Actually, this videotape caused us some worrisome minutes.

After our ship had docked with the Sal'yut and the first moments of the joyful meeting between the crews, we began to present the "hosts" with the gifts, letters and other "memorabilia" we had brought along. We solemnly presented them with two videocassettes, one of which was of Kizim's small daughter (who had been born 3 months after he had taken off and whom, naturally, he had not seen yet. The second contained the "video lesson." Realizing that he would have to see this tape 1 week later, Volodya carefully fastened the cassette where it could be seen by all ("in order not to lose it"). However, either someone accidentally touched it as he moved in its vicinity and, carried out by the air flow, the cassette had become stuck in a small corner, or else any one among us, straightening up the working section, had subconsciously shelved it according to the principle of "put it farther away and you can retrieve it more easily," and then forgotten the fact. This is something which can no longer be determined. The fact was that the cassette had disappeared. We became concerned. The characteristics of objects in a state of weightlessness left unsupervised have been known for some time. A thorough search frequently fails to locate them and it is only after a considerable amount of time that, suddenly, they swim at you by themselves, as though saying, "here we are...."

However, this choice did not suit us, for we needed the cassette precisely then. All six of us started looking for it in earnest. Oleg At'kov flew toward the air filter which provides the air which circulates within the station and around which lost objects frequently collect. There was no cassette. We looked into all corners of the station, we even looked into the sleeping bags and food containers with the same result. Meanwhile, the specialists from the flight control center asked whether the crew had seen the

video recording and had they understood everything? Naturally, we were unwilling to look like a bunch of scatterbrains, for which reason the evasive answer which was sent to the ground was that Volodya Dzhanibekov had explained everything so clearly that we would see the videotape later, no time for it now. Toward the evening, however, happily the videocassette was finally found. Leonid Kizim and Volod'ya Solov'yev were able to see everything they had to do in deep space. Several days later, after our crew had already returned to earth, Kizim and Solov'yev took their sixth walk in open space.

By that time, Dzhanibekov, Volk and I were in Moscow, at the flight control center, and could see that the training in orbit had not been wasted. The cosmonauts worked confidently and efficiently and it was only the impartial medical parameters received on earth and the heavy breathing during periods of communication that indicated the difficulty of the task and the fact that they were working at peak level. In the course of this work the functioning of the emergency part of the station's power system was fully restored and tested.

During its 237-day flight, the "Mayak" crew carried out not only a large number of scientific and technical medical experiments but also a tremendous amount of work outside the station. Unquestionably, Leonid Kizim and Vladimir Solov'yev became the most experienced workers in open space. It was precisely their experience that was of invaluable help to Vladimir Dzhanibekov and myself in preparing for tests the General Purpose Manual Instrument (URI) developed by the outstanding collective of Kiev's Electric Welding Institute imeni Ye. O. Paton.

Before taking the tool in open space, as usual, we had to prepare our protective suits very carefully. This is a painstaking project demanding precision and scrupulous work. Kizim remarked that this is like folding a parachute before a jump. At the time that Dzhanibekov and I were preparing our "parachutes," Leonid Kizim and Vladimir Solov'yev worked by our side. Their recommendations were quite useful to us and, I am confident, will be found useful by many a crew.

On the other hand, I think that the very necessity of taking six walks in deep space helped the "Mayak" in carrying out the longest space flight. Anyone who has participated in such expeditions is unanimous in saying that the most complex feature in this case is the lack of interesting and important work. This should be not be understood to mean that during a flight there are times when the crew has nothing to do. Even when all the experiments planned for that day have been carried out, like in any house with a good housewife work for all residents of a station can always be found. Furthermore, time must be set aside every day for physical exercises, which are a mandatory prerequisite for remaining in adequate physical shape needed both for a lengthy stay in weightlessness and in preparations for landing. Therefore, even during the officially planned days of rest, the crew is never totally idle. However, when from time to time particularly complex, important and interesting operations are to be performed in the course of regular work over a period of several months, demanding one's full efforts, this helps to endure being away from the earth.

An apt comparison would be a lengthy march in the course of which a number of mountain passes would have to be crossed. The road is long and difficult, but

is divided into individual sectors with a specific target at the end of each one. It may be difficult to reach, but after it has been reached, a "second breath" may be regained. Walks in outer space turned into such "passes" in the course of nearly the entire 237-day flight by Kizim, Solov'yev and Atkov.

Each one of them requires high psychological concentration aimed at the successful implementation of the assignment and, something quite important, to be in proper physical shape. Yet keeping in shape in a state of weightlessness is no simple matter. The lack of gravity is a pleasant but very tricky condition. Unless a person engages in physical exercises, he weakens and a number of vitally important physiological body indicators worsen. The cosmonaut himself does not notice this especially, for virtually no energy is necessary to move in the station in a state of weightlessness. It is only after returning to earth that the person becomes fully aware of the results of the lengthy absence of the force of gravity in the same way that after a long stay in bed due to illness a person would notice his weakness only after standing up and trying to take a few steps around the room. Naturally, in order to avoid any sort of complication, the crew members subject to lengthy space expeditions must regularly pedal "to the seventh sweat" the exercycle, run on the treadmill and do extensive muscle exercises with muscle stretchers.

A walk in outer space requires good physical condition, strength and endurance. The awareness of this objective motivates the cosmonaut to practice on the space "sports stadium" with even greater enthusiasm. Like any sportsman, he must develop his tactic for running the "space marathon" which is what a lengthy flight is. The results of such tactics appear sometimes in most unexpected situations.

We know that people react differently to weightlessness: some lose weight, others lose their appetite, tastes change or, conversely, an excellent appetite remains which, to a certain extent, is proof of the fact that the cosmonaut feels well. Therefore, our Leonid Kizim, fortunately had no lack of appetite in flight, which always pleased the doctors. When Oleg At'kov, concerned that Denisych (as Kizim was affectionately called on board the station) would gain excessive weight, advised him not to open the next can of steaks, the other one usually confidently answered: "I am preparing myself for the walk. One must eat properly to have the necessary strength." After that, he unperturbedly ate his meal and dreamily said that it would not be bad to follow all this with a piece of lard with garlic. As a rule, everyone expressed full agreement with this statement, the more so since this was impossible, for no such meal was listed on our menu.

Incidentally, since we already used the sports term "space marathon" in discussing manned space flights, we should mention another term as well: "Decathlon," which could apply to any flight. Indeed, although of late the need for greater specialization by the members of the crew is becoming apparent, conditions in space flight ask of us to master a great variety of skills. Naturally, the captain, the engineer and the researcher have their mandatory obligations in running the ship's or station's systems. In addition to this, however, they must engage in a great variety of experiments, on the high level of true professionals--physicists, geologists, oceanographers,

astrophysicists, physicians, technologists or metallurgists. Furthermore, they must quite frequently make reports on television and show movies and still shots. Therefore, they must be familiar with the foundations of many skills (naturally, of space flight interest). Finally, everyone must also be able to prepare a meal for himself and his comrades, although the good thing is that in flight such work has been maximally simplified and essentially consists of selecting and warming up products, and adding water to specially packaged dehydrated food. Generally speaking, according to the old saying, one must be a jack-of-all-trades. It is precisely this type of variety which is one of the attractive features of cosmonautics as a profession.

Although almost all of us have their favorite work aboard an orbital station, some experiments are particularly favored. Thus, for example, physician Oleg At'kov performs with a great deal of interest and pleasure activities related to the visual observation of the earth's surface, with good results. Aleksandr Aleksandrov quite successfully performed in orbit the "electrotopograph" experiment and, after his return to earth, actively participated in its continuation, helping specialists by word and action.

Our crew as well has had its "own" experiment. When Leonid Popov, Aleksandr Serebrov and I saw for the first time the Tavriya system in the spring of 1982, with the help of which we were to obtain particularly pure substances, we did not assume at that time that henceforth such work would become a permanent part of a number of technological experiments aboard the Sal'yut. However, the more extensively we studied it, the more we became aware of the great possibilities it had for medicine, pharmacology and biotechnology and the more interested in and attached to it we became. I remember the meticulousness with which Serebrov, an engineer by training, interrogated the developers of the system about all of its structural features and the pleasure with which the latter answered his questions.

During the flight as well, we were always aware of the close attention which the organizers of the experiment paid to our work. Scientists from the Crimean Medical Institute, the MVTU [Moscow Higher Technical School] imeni N. E. Bauman and many other organizations were ready, night or day, to give us their skilled answers and their interest in even the most minute details of the work of the electrophoresis. One can easily imagine our happiness when it became clear that Tavriya had justified our hopes: in a state of weightlessness we were able to separate substances, something which had been impossible to achieve on earth by any known method.

A great deal could be said about what is being done today in space and even more so about what will be done in the future. According to the specialists, global problems such as energy, environmental protection and weather forecasting and control will be successfully resolved thanks to the cosmonautics. It is becoming increasingly clear, with every passing year, how right was the brilliant Tsiolkovskiy in his predictions on the use of space flights in the interests of mankind, for today's orbital complexes of the Sal'yut-Soyuz type are prototypes of the famous "settlements in the air" of which Konstantin Eduardovich dreamed. Today plans for the creation of space shops and plants are no longer a distant dream but a close reality. Their prototypes--experimental technological systems--have successfully operated in

orbit for a number of years. Today cosmonautics has firmly established itself as part of the system of providing radio and television communications on the planet. Through the joint efforts of specialists from four countries--the USSR, the United States, Canada and France--a space system for the location of ships and airplanes in distress (Kospas-Sarsat) has been established. Hundreds of human lives have been saved with its help. Most interesting and most complex international scientific projects are being carried out in the study of the universe such as, for example, the current "Venus-Halley," which help specialists to broaden and deepen our knowledge of the world around us, the development of stars and galaxies, the origin of life on earth and the history and future of the solar system.

The horizons of human activities in space are truly boundless. The more extensive and profound our knowledge of space becomes the more questions and problems it raises, the solutions of which will largely determine the further development of civilization. Tsiolkovskiy was an amazing prophet who, in his scientific thoughts about space dreamed of bringing mankind mountains of bread and an infinity of power. Indeed, the achievements of cosmonautics serve today the economy and culture and help to resolve vital problems of agriculture, medicine, geology, geography, transportation and communications.

However, of late the hopes which the development of cosmonautics in the interests of scientific and technical and social progress instill in the hearts and minds of the people are mixed with concern caused by the intentions of aggressive imperialist U.S. circles to use outer space to intensify and aggravate the political confrontation and turn it into an arena of new spirals of an insane arms race. Those who are already earning colossal profits from the manufacturing of space weapons are most intensively propagandizing the delirious idea of acquiring the monopoly of political power over the planet with the help of outer space. It is only people who have become totally blinded by the thirst for profits and who live according to the principle "after us the deluge," and therefore are unwilling to soberly consider the realities of the contemporary world who can proclaim that it is possible to hold all mankind in a state of fear from outer space. Naturally, the moral concepts and qualities of those who make such declarations are not even worth talking about.

The American administration has invented a "clever" step: using all of its mass information media, it proclaimed the plans for transferring the arms race into space as being plans for "antimissile defense." Indeed, it may seem to the uninformed American, who has perhaps never been interested in problems of outer space and whose only idea of them comes from bourgeois newspaper headlines, that such a program is actually consistent only with the interests of security and that he would be able to sleep peacefully under its umbrella.

However, any even slightly informed specialist can clearly see that the implementation of such plans would require the deployment in near space of powerful military systems equipped with weapons for the destruction of targets on earth and in space and the deployment of laser and other state-of-the-art weapons in outer space. Near space would be crowded with "killer satellites," and flights into space will be made not for the sake of obtaining new basic knowledge for the good of mankind but for threatening the entire planet from

there. Furthermore, the United States is continuing to increase and update offensive nuclear weapons. The quantity of stockpiled weapons is so high and their destructive potential so great that an incautious drop added to this brimming cup by a politically thoughtless hand may lead to an outbreak of a catastrophic nuclear conflagration in the fire of which all life on earth would perish. Would the implementation of U.S. plans for converting space into a military arena not constitute such a criminal "drop"?

The peace-loving forces on the planet welcomed with hope the announcement that, thanks to the efforts of the Soviet government at the new Geneva talks, problems of nuclear and space weapons will be considered as a set. However, world public opinion is greatly alarmed by statements made both by President Reagan and other highly placed officials in the American administration to the effect that the United States will not abandon research in the field of space armaments. For it is obvious that such "research" implies not only scientific computations on paper but the development of experimental prototypes on space weapons, their laboratory development and testing under orbital flight conditions. This means that the latest armament systems will appear in near space orbit in the course of the "research" and will be activated in the course of the tests. However, as history indicates, once a weapon has proved to work, the aggressive military does not stop in seeking opportunities to use it. We should not look too far back for examples: 40 years ago, as a result of U.S. "research" in the area of new armaments, the first atom bomb was developed and exploded and immediately after that used on Hiroshima. Other results of such U.S. "research" have been the current nuclear armaments which are threatening civilization with annihilation. Unless research and the further manufacturing of space weapons are banned as of now, tomorrow mankind will face an even greater threat than the one which was created with the invention of nuclear weapons.

Those who have had the opportunity to look at earth from space orbit are particularly aware of how small our planet is and how much we must value it. When they fly, the cosmonauts consider our entire planet their own big native home and, returning home, every person always wants to find peace and harmony in it. I am confident that the citizens of any country, who have been to outer space, have experienced the same feelings. No other way is possible. We have a number of common professional and human problems and tasks. They can be successfully resolved by joining efforts in the field of cosmonautics. Thanks to the implementation of the Interkosmos program, members of nine socialist countries, India and France have already flown aboard Soviet space ships. Most interesting joint experiments have taken place with international crews and have provided an impetus for new scientific research and, even more important, laid foundations for further cooperation. Everything attained as a result of such joint flights has become available to mankind and the results of the experiments have been used by all participating countries.

In its time, the joint Soviet-American Soyuz-Apollo program made a positive impression. It was noteworthy that Aleksey Leonov, the first person to walk in deep space, was the commander of the Soviet crew which participated in this program. It seemed at that time that the joint flight of the Soyuz and Apollo ships would become the foundation for Soviet-American cooperation in the future, for the sake of peace and social progress. Subsequently, however, the

U.S. administration drastically changed its attitude toward such programs and there was no followup. Today, generally speaking, one-third of the manned flights of the American space shuttles are totally at the disposal of the Pentagon for purposes of preparations for waging "Star Wars."

My comrades and I have had the opportunity to meet with American astronauts who participated in the shuttle flights. We must point out that, as a rule, cosmonauts easily find a common language and well understand one another on problems which excite all of them. This is understandable, for we share the same profession and we know from experience what difficulties and problems have had to be surmounted in flight and how everyone has felt the happiness of returning to earth from orbit.

I had the opportunity to meet with Sally Ride, the first American woman to fly in outer space, and it seems to me that we achieved full reciprocal understanding both professionally and on the purely human level. Naturally, all of us, Soviet cosmonauts, would like good reciprocal understanding, based on the progressive achievements of civilization, to become the foundation for cooperation so that there may never be any hostile confrontation in space and so that we never have to consider our American colleagues as possible foes in a "star war." Man did not go into space to destroy his kin from there.

The sight of the earth from deep space is an amazingly beautiful picture. Flooded by the rays of the sun on the day side, it plays with its colors. The night side is different: against the black, velvety background of clouds which huddle over the earth in some areas, here and there we can see violet flashes of lightning. These powerful stormy charges remind us of how powerful and how largely unknown the forces of nature are. And right around us is the silvery hull of the orbital stations and the huge manmade wings of the solar batteries. Wherever there are no clouds hanging over the earth we can see in the night the clear outlines of the large cities built by man. They tell us that our planet is habitable and the heart is filled with pride in everything created by the minds and hands of people and modern civilization, the vital juices of which nurture the shoots of a better future. Naturally, one believes that if mankind has had the strength, energy and intelligence to create all of this, it should have enough also to prevent nuclear madness and to restrain the political maniacs who are rushing into space with their weapons. I believe that many hundreds of years in the future, as one looks at the earth from outer space, one will see the bright lights of the cities rather than the darkness of postnuclear fire sites, and that the horizons of fruitful human activities in outer space will become inordinately broad, the purposeful offensive toward which was inaugurated by the Soviet state for the sake of mankind and for its good.

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## WE MARCHED TOGETHER TO VICTORY

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6, Apr 85 (signed to press 12 Apr 85) pp 122-123

[Article by Predrag Stojkovic]

[Text] The editors of KOMMUNIST asked V. Sharov, PRAVDA's correspondent in Yugoslavia, to meet with one of the active participants in the people's liberation war against fascism.

Following is the recorded story by Predrag Stojkovic, son of a Serbian peasant, partisan since August 1941 and member of the Yugoslav Communist League since 1942. He was a soldier in the Second Proletarian Brigade and participated in the Belgrade operation. He is the bearer of the orders "Partisan Star," "Services to the People," "For Courage" (two orders), "Fraternity-Unity" and medals. He has been awarded the highest Yugoslav distinction: the memorial medal "Partisan Since 1941." After the victory, he worked in sociopolitical organizations and, subsequently, in the Executive Vece (government) of Serbia. Today he is retired.

In August 1941 Dragolub Petrovic and I--two 16-year-old adolescents--crossed the threshold of the headquarters of the Second Shumadia Partisan Detachment. "You are still too young!" noted the officer on duty, after we expressed our wish to fight the Hitlerite occupation. However, after finding out that we had hidden away nine rifles with ammunition, he began to hesitate. Our first assignment was to distribute in the neighboring villages leaflets containing the appeal of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia Central Committee to fight the fascist aggressors. I remember the piercing words: "The decisive hour has struck. The decisive battle against the worst enemies of the working class has begun, a battle which the fascist criminals started themselves with their treacherous attack on the Soviet Union--the hope of the working people the world over. The precious blood of the heroic Soviet people is being shed not only for the sake of defending the socialist country but also for the definitive social and national liberation of all toiling mankind. Therefore,

this is also our own struggle and we must support it with all our strength, including our lives."

The battle against the enemy demanded of the Yugoslav peoples mass heroism and self-sacrifice. It was particularly difficult during the first stage of the people's liberation struggle. The fascists enjoyed superiority in forces and armaments. The military situation in Europe as a whole was developing unfavorably. However, despite all of this, the partisan movement in our country was gathering strength. The Hitlerite command was forced to keep tens of divisions in Yugoslavia. We paid a high price for victory--1.7 million sons and daughters of our peoples gave their lives for it.

The battles in the autumn of 1941 were particularly hard. We were defending the northern flank of our first free partisan territory--the Republic of Uzice. The enemy was unable to destroy us. The main partisan forces were redeployed in Western Montenegro and Eastern Bosnia.

I recall the day of 1 March 1942, in Cajnice in Bosnia. A hillock on the outskirts of the village. The cold wind flowing down the mountains was making the flag pierced with bullets sway. J. Broz Tito, the commander of the Yugoslav People's Liberation Army (NOAYu) addressed us. This marked the formation of the Second Proletarian Brigade.... After the war, historians have estimated that it covered 24,000 kilometers in battle. No other NOAYu unit has had such a long march.

This march included the valley of the Neretva River. Avoiding an encirclement, a NOAYu strike force, carrying its wounded and sick (some 4,000) crossed the river in battle in March 1943. This crossing, made under exceptionally difficult conditions, was considered an outstanding exploit. What happened to me personally at that time was the following: a special Hitlerite battalion was sent to the Neretva to attack the Supreme Headquarters of the NOAYu. On 3 March I was making my way through the woods, going to the 4th Battalion, carrying a parcel sent by the brigade commander. Not far from the mountain path which linked Prozor with Gorni Vakuf I came across a German major. I had to take this prisoner with me. It turned out that he was the commander of the special battalion. Subsequently, the major was exchanged for communists in a Zagreb jail.

I also participated in the liberation of Belgrade, fighting with Soviet soldiers in the same trench, shoulder to shoulder. On 9 October 1944 our brigade was ordered to move fast to Raca-Kraguevacka village. My feelings were understandable, for that was close to my native Visnica. It was there that more than 3 years previously I had taken up my carbine. My mother, father, little sister and brother had stayed behind. Were they all right?

We entered Visnica in the evening of 11 October. My brief meeting with my family and neighbors was both happy and sad. My coevals Mile Zdravkovic, Vladimir Stoykovic and Dragolub Petrovich had not returned. They had died heroically in battle....

The battalion commander allowed me to spend the night at home. I refused. Several hours before that they had told us that we would meet with the Red Army. I could not miss that encounter.

During the heavy battles and marches, reports on Red Army victories were a great encouragement to us. The battles for Moscow, Kursk and Stalingrad were all events which we experienced as our own. And now this victorious army was approaching us.

The advance element of a Red Army regiment entered Raca-Kraguevacka at 11 pm on 11 October 1944. It would be difficult to describe our joy and enthusiasm. The main forces arrived in the morning. It was an endless column of tanks, "Katyushas" and other combat equipment. On 12 October we began our march on Belgrade with one of the columns, and it was with it that we were among the first, on 14 October, to enter the capital of our homeland.

Our battalion dug in on the slope of Lekino Hill (today the Sumica Microrayon). It was reinforced with a crew of "Katyushas," tanks, machine guns and howitzers. For several days we put up a hard, defensive fight, for a powerful fascist group was making its way out of encirclement, coming from the southeast, from Smederevo. It was feared that it would connect with the Belgrade garrison.

Who was more courageous and daring during those days--the Yugoslav or Soviet soldiers? The only answer is that we fought together. Together we repelled the pressure and attacked. I lost many friends during those days. Their dust rests in the Belgrade memorial cemetery. Here 1,395 Yugoslav and 808 Red Army soldiers and officers sleep their eternal sleep under Yugoslav poplars and Moscow birches. Eternal glory to them, as eternal as the friendship between our peoples, blended by jointly shed blood.

...I welcomed Victory Day in Svetozarevo. At that time I was battalion commander. We were cleaning up Serbia from the remnants of gangs of traitors to the Yugoslav peoples.

The moment Radio Belgrade reported the unconditional surrender of Hitlerite German the entire population of the city rushed to the streets. Spring had already come and roses were blooming. The people laid out on the sidewalks their modest provisions of food and homemade wine. Columns of Soviet trucks carrying fuel and food for the military units were rolling across Svetozarevo going north. At this point, Red Army soldiers and officers were "taken prisoner," of friendship and fraternity. Svetozarevo was exultant. The first day of peace was rising along with the sun over my tortured homeland.

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## REVIVING THE 'ELBE SPIRIT'

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6, Apr 85 (signed to press 12 Apr 85) pp 124-125

[Article by V. Nekrasov]

[Text] The meeting between Soviet and American troops on the Elbe, in the center of the defeated Nazi Reich, was one of the memorable dates of 40 years ago, profoundly meaningful in terms of today. On that now-distant day, 25 April 1945, soldiers and officers of the allied armies, which had walked the heavy paths of war for the sake of the liberation of the European peoples and for crushing the man-hating forces of fascism, strengthened with a soldier's handshake the combat alliance between two great powers--members of the anti-Hitlerite coalition. Photographs have recorded for us the holiday atmosphere of the meeting: the feeling of pride in this accomplishment and the job of approaching victory, experienced by the Soviet and American soldiers. Recollections have brought live impressions of those days. The warmth and sincerity, wrote Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev, "proved that we had mutual and true respect for one another and valued our combat friendship, which had developed and strengthened in the struggle against the common enemy."

Both in Europe and on the other side of the Atlantic, the democratic public and broad popular masses welcomed the handshake on the Elbe as a symbol and guarantee for peaceful cooperation among countries and peoples for decades into the future, for it was precisely this type of cooperation that was mentioned in the resolutions of the Yalta Conference, which had taken place shortly before that. The Soviet Union asserted its firm intention to follow the path coordinated with its allies. Literally on the day which followed the meeting on the Elbe, on 26 April, V. M. Molotov, USSR People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, addressing a UN Conference in San Francisco, said, as instructed by the Soviet government: "If the leading democratic countries prove their ability to act jointly in the postwar period, this will mean that the interests of the peace and security of the nations have finally found their best support and protection." Whatever considerations were governing at that time U.S. President Harry Truman, he too deemed it necessary, in his statement on the encounter between the allied forces, to emphasize that the American and Soviet people "could live together and cooperate in the common cause of organizing peace the world over." Unfortunately, as we know, the

events took a different turn. Very soon after the war, U.S. policy assumed an anti-Soviet coloring, which became increasingly intensive. The unrestrained nuclear armament race, urged on by the U.S. military-industrial complex, was accompanied as the decades passed, by an inflated anti-Soviet psychosis, instilling dislike of the great socialist state and hatred of anything which was the essence of the Soviet way of life. Above all, without which the seeds of evil could not yield abundant shoots, the soil for militaristic propaganda was fertilized with the dissemination of false concepts concerning Soviet society in its ideals and the accomplishments of the man of the new world.

The results, as they say, are obvious. "Americans do not have a very clear idea of what the Soviet Union is all about.... Most Americans do not entirely trust the Soviet government.... To most Americans, Soviet policy is conceived as an aspiration to achieve global communist dictatorship by all possible means." These are excerpts from a letter which R. Langdon, who lives in a small Nebraska town and who is uninvolved in politics, which he sent several months ago to the Soviet Peace Committee. Imbued with sincere concern for the prevention of nuclear war, this letter is one of the many clear confirmations of the confused state of mind of millions of Americans, created by the fault of militaristic propaganda, people who are seriously concerned with the fate of mankind and its civilization in this stormy world, full of alarming events. Here is what the author of said letter goes on to say: "We have become involved in a nuclear arms race which we do not need. In American different views are heard on what to do in this respect. No unanimous opinion prevails on which side is "ahead," and whether or not the Soviet government is trying to attain some kind of nuclear superiority. However, most Americans believe that the further production of nuclear armaments is absurd."

Does all this mean that the long efforts of purposeful anti-Soviet propaganda by the bourgeois mass information media have been able to remove from the collective memory of the nation the main lessons of World War II and make America totally forget that victory in the war was achieved through the joint efforts of the forces of freedom and democracy over those of barbarism and arbitrariness and that this was a triumph of the mind over mindlessness and that both nations--the Soviet and the American--made their contributions to this victory? A check indicates that no, such is not the case. Deep in the public mind of Americans, as in other nations and all mankind, the main conclusion from the events of the war years has been preserved: peace was gained at the cost of the lives of millions of people who left to the living the eternal behest of defending and strengthening peace and preventing the outbreak of new war.

Last autumn, Yankelovich, Skelly and White, the prestigious American public opinion polling company, published in the journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS a report on the results of a study conducted in the United States, which contained quite noteworthy conclusions: "The attitude of the broad public toward the Soviet Union is highly complex.... Americans have a great respect for the Russians as a nation; they believe that America could live in peace with the various communist countries; they assume that the Russians are no less interested than we are in avoiding a suicidal nuclear arms race; they assume that the Soviet Union has legitimate grounds for ensuring its safety; they believe that the Soviet Union is sincerely interested in talks. The overwhelming majority of

Americans believe that America has not done everything it could to settle relations with the Russians and that, to a certain extent, we too are to be blamed for the worsening of American-Soviet relations."

Thoughtful observers of the U.S. political scene have repeatedly noted processes, significant in their view, which are taking place in the American public consciousness. The more thunderous Washington's tirades on the "perfidiousness" of Soviet policy are, the more Americans begin to think of the threat of nuclear war and the more likely it becomes, says D. Watt, the LONDON TIMES observer, "that the Americans will be given an answer which will disturb their emotional balance, undermine the moral unity of purpose in the country and create the impression of doubt or inexpediency of the tremendous appropriations for offensive missiles."

Characteristically, American commentators are pointing out with increasing frequency the propaganda traps contained in the plans for the militarization of space which, allegedly, could make nuclear weapons, which are a matter of concern for millions of U.S. citizens, "helpless and obsolete." As THE WASHINGTON POST wrote, "this idea is in the pure American spirit: Americans tend to believe that all problems can be resolved, as a rule, by mechanical means." However, as the "Star Wars" plans are becoming increasingly specific, a growing number of Americans are beginning to realize their threat to the United States itself and are reaching the conclusion of the need not to console themselves with illusions concerning the possibility of achieving some kind of "absolute security" for America with the help of a "space umbrella," but instead to achieve true security through means which would be consistent with the realities of the contemporary world. "Security is a political category and not a technical invention," that same WASHINGTON POST pointed out.

However, the ruling circles in the American capital think otherwise. They continue to persist in their plans for the development of a notorious "space defense," meanwhile trying to use the Geneva talks to pass through Congress programs for the building and development of new types of first-strike nuclear missiles.

Most Americans increasingly tend to realize the terrible threat which hangs over life itself on earth. They share the conclusion of the world's democratic public to the effect that in the nuclear century the safety of nations and states cannot be based on force or the threat of force. It is possible only as security for all. America is following with close attention the course of the USSR-U.S. Geneva talks, which could open a possibility of preventing the arms race in space, stop and turn it back on earth, thus entirely eliminating all nuclear weapons. Well-informed observers such as, for example, L. Gelb from THE NEW YORK TIMES, are already now pointing out the decisive importance which U.S. public opinion concerning the degree of sincerity of the American positions at the Geneva talks may have in forcing the leading Washington circles to take into consideration the need to engage in businesslike talks with a view to their successful outcome.

The 40th anniversary of the defeat of fascism will provide a new impetus to feelings in favor of American-Soviet cooperation in the persistent search for

ways to strengthen peace. These days, the echo of the meeting on the Elbe seems to gain a second life. American World War II veterans are not alone in the appeal to restore the "spirit of the Elbe," and to preserve the memory of the combat cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States, which makes it incumbent to do everything possible to prevent a new military conflagration. The great anniversary of the victory is a vivid reminder to all that despite different socioeconomic systems, in a time of difficulty, two countries could unite against a common enemy for the sake of lasting peace. The joint actions of their nations are necessary once again today, in order to remove the mortal threat hanging over mankind.

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## MARKING THE ANNIVERSARY OF BANDUNG

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6, Apr 85 (signed to press 12 Apr 85) pp 126-127

[Article by N. Yermoshkin]

[Text] Thirty years ago, within a single hour the Indonesian city of Bandung became world-famous. The heads of 29 countries and governments of Asian and African countries, which had rejected the yoke of colonialism, gathered here for the first time in history, in April 1955, and proclaimed the 10 "Bandung Principles," which rejected the imperialist policy of force. This event took place 10 years after the great victory over the darkest and most aggressive forces of imperialism--fascist Germany and militaristic Japan--in which the heroic Soviet people played a decisive role. It is precisely this victory which symbolized the triumph of the new and progressive features which were emerging in the social life of the peoples, which actively helped to break the obstructions which restrained the tempestuous upsurge of the movement for national independence and became an international factor of success of the national liberation revolution in a number of countries throughout the world.

The peoples of Asia and Africa, who were vegetating in a state of colonial bondage, most loudly proclaimed themselves in Bandung as the new dynamic force in international relations. The conference of heads of young countries firmly spoke out against the economic diktat of the Western countries and demanded the definitive liquidation of the colonial system and the uprooting of apartheid. It clearly proved that the times when the imperialists were able to impose their will on the peoples had forever become part of the past. V. I. Lenin made a brilliant prediction to the effect that "the period of awakening of the Orient in the contemporary revolution will be followed by a period of participation of all the peoples of the Orient in resolving the destinies of the entire world and no longer be a source of enrichment" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 39, p 328).

In an effort to regain its position lost as a result of the collapse of its colonial empires, at that time the West had developed a broad political, economic and ideological offensive on the positions gained by the peoples of the young liberated countries and was doing everything possible to tie them to its own military and political machine. Using the entirely false slogan of struggle against the "communist threat," the United States and its allies had

undertaken to set up aggressive blocs in Asia, the creation of military bases and the deployment of their own forces on foreign soil. They provoked territorial and border conflicts, instigated neighboring peoples against each other and did everything possible to divide them. All of this aggravated the foreign political situation of the liberated countries and gave priority to the task of unifying the anti-imperialist forces against colonialism and racism and in defense of national sovereignty and political and economic independence. In this context, the forum which convened in Bandung assumed a particular meaning as a means of countering and even challenging the development of neocolonialist Western policy.

In addition to external factors worsened by the fault of imperialism, the young Asian and African countries had encountered a number of major difficulties in their development in the mid-1950s, skillfully used by the colonial powers and their local agents. The young countries faced in their entirety problems of developing their national economies to replace the chaos which had followed long years of arbitrary rule by monopoly capital, to reestablish a governmental apparatus and set up a local administration and a national army, to train cadres for industry and agriculture, to uproot Western commercialized influence on culture, education and mass information media, to neutralize the influential stratum of the local population represented by feudal lords, the mercantile bourgeoisie and some of the intelligentsia, which had served the former masters and, finally, to eliminate social calamities such as mass unemployment, almost universal poverty, hunger, illiteracy and the extremely low health care standard.

The composition of the participants in the Bandung Conference was heterogeneous. Furthermore, the colonizers--the former colonizers such as the ruling circles of England, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, and the new colonizers, the United States in particular, were doing everything possible to encourage national and religious discord among the young countries, provoking border and territorial conflicts they had organized, and actively playing on the objective and subjective difficulties of the development of the liberated countries, awarding themselves the role of supreme judges.

Despite all their efforts, the imperialists and their accomplices were unable to torpedo this summit meeting. Furthermore, Bandung proved the objective possibility of uniting the peace-loving and progressive forces of the peoples of Asia and Africa on an anti-imperialist and anticolonial basis, and their ability to surmount individual differences in the interests of peace and universal security. The declaration on contributing to universal peace and cooperation was adopted in Bandung. It firmly condemned nuclear weapons and called for their total banning. It condemned war and military conflicts as a means of resolving disputes. The participants in the meeting spoke out in favor of restraining from acts of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country. They called for avoiding interventions or interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, for respect of the United Nations Charter and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries. They acknowledged the equality of all races and nations, large and small.

Today, looking back at that period and assessing the first Afro-Asian summit meeting, we can see that its main and now historical results are, above all, that it formulated an entire set of fundamental principles which enable the peoples of Asia and Africa to defend their interests. It also proved to the former colonial countries that the world of young liberated countries was firmly resolved to struggle for total independence, based on collective efforts.

Practical experience convincingly confirmed the viability of the "Bandung Principles," which subsequently played an important role in the organization of the nonaligned movement and the formulation of the course of its anti-imperialist policy and means and methods of struggle. It was precisely thanks to the unification of the liberated countries within such organizations as the Nonaligned Movement, developed on a governmental basis, and the Organization of Solidarity of Asian and African Peoples, established on the social level, that the imperialist circles in the United States and their NATO allies lost direct military-political control over the majority of their former colonies. Increasingly the West is coming across the fact that it can no longer suppress the national liberation movements and impose upon the young countries a policy suitable to monopoly capital with the help of "gunboat diplomacy," pressure and diktat. Cooperation with the socialist world plays a major and, frequently, decisive role in strengthening their independent international positions.

Unquestionably, the role of the peoples of the liberated countries in the development of the global revolutionary process will be increasing steadily. The former colonial outlying areas continue to be areas of major socioeconomic and political changes. Facing in contemporary imperialism a powerful and treacherous opponent, these countries can oppose it the more successfully, given the current ratio of class forces in the world, the more decisively they rely on unity within their ranks and close ties with the countries of the world socialist system.

The Soviet Union has always treated respectfully the just demands of the group of young countries. We have developed good relations with most of them. We note with satisfaction the growing role of Asia, African and Latin American countries in international politics and value the peaceable nature and anti-imperialist trend of the nonaligned movement which was clearly demonstrated, in particular, at the 7th Conference of Heads of States and Governments of Nonaligned Countries, which was held 2 years ago. The USSR and the other socialist countries show great understanding of the struggle waged by the liberated countries for a new international economic order and their aspiration to reject the domination of foreign capital and to create their own economic base, i.e., to terminate the new Western colonial exploitation of its "periphery."

With their lulling and syrupy talk of a new economic order, the imperialists and local reactionaries continue their merciless exploitation of the manpower and raw material resources of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, urgently reorganizing the capitalist economy on a neocolonialist basis.

Every year, between \$150 and \$180 billion are extracted from the young countries as profit, loan interest and payment of principal. This is roughly the equivalent of the amount which the leading Western countries annually invest in updating their industries.

In resorting to ever-new acts of aggression and intensifying international tension and promoting conflicts, and by imposing an unrestrained arms race and facing mankind with the threat of a thermonuclear conflict, as in the past imperialism, is demonstrating its aspiration to suppress the yearning of Asian, African and Latin American countries for freedom. The crushing of Grenada by the American military, the neocolonizing of the Malvina (Falkland) Islands, U.S. support of its "strategic allies" such as Israel in the Middle East and the Republic of South Africa, and the aid given to various Pinochets and to the belated followers of anti-people's regimes in Afghanistan and Nicaragua, are all proof that the world is experiencing today one of its most difficult periods in the struggle for national liberation of the peoples, their independence and progress. As in the times of Bandung, the confrontation between the peoples and imperialism, neocolonialism, Zionism and apartheid is one of the realities of our age. In this struggle as well, the heirs of Bandung are on the same side of the barricades as the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, defending their very future.

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